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i 
ABSTRACT 
 
My Khe 4 was the name given by the Americans to a sub-hamlet in the village of Son 
My in South Vietnam. According to the Vietnamese, American soldiers killed over 
ninety civilians there on 16 March 1968, the day that, less than two miles away, another 
unit was massacring the inhabitants of My Lai 4. The Americans did not respond to 
allegations that civilians had been killed at My Khe 4 until December 1969 and 
although the leader of the platoon which had assaulted the sub-hamlet was charged with 
murder and investigators identified a member of his platoon as the killer of a child, 
neither of the men had to face trial.  
 
 American reporters, their attention fixed on the events at My Lai 4, rarely took 
the trouble to familiarise themselves with what was alleged to have happened at My 
Khe 4 and those historians who have mentioned the 'other' massacre in Son My have 
usually presented it as a strand in the story of My Lai. Careless research has led some to 
argue that the massacres were the result of an order to destroy Son My and its people  
and the US Army has also been accused of trying to obscure what its investigators had 
discovered about the killings at My Khe 4 and of ensuring, with the encouragement of 
the Nixon administration, that no one would be tried for them. Whilst the story of My 
Khe 4 reveals many of the Army's weaknesses, however, it does not supply evidence of 
conspiracy. The massacre at My Khe 4 and its consequences are significant because 
they reflect, probably more accurately than what is now referred to as the My Lai 
Massacre, the nature of America's war in Vietnam.        
 
ii 
THE VILLAGE OF SON MY 
 
 
 
Son My is a village in the district of Son Tinh in Quang Ngai, a province which 
in 1968 lay towards the north-east of South Vietnam. Son My consisted of four 
hamlets: Tu Cung; My Lai; Co Luy and My Khe, each of which was made up of 
a number of sub-hamlets. Inhabitants of the village might refer to their home in 
different ways, by the name of a sub-hamlet as it appeared on Vietnamese maps, 
by a name used locally which had no official status or by the name of the hamlet 
in which they lived.  
 
 When the Americans developed their own maps of the country they tried 
to simplify matters. In re-mapping Son My, for example, they ignored the 
boundaries between the four hamlets in Son My and identified groups of sub-
hamlets with a common name and a different number. Hence, on American 
maps, six of the sub-hamlets in Son My were called My Lai although not all of 
them were in the hamlet of My Lai. One of these, a sub-hamlet in Tu Cung 
known to its inhabitants as Thuan Yen, became My Lai 4. To the south-east of 
Tu Cung was the hamlet of Co Luy. It contained the sub-hamlet of My Hoi or 
Xom Go. On American maps this sub-hamlet appeared as My Khe 4.  
 
 To the south of My Khe 4, along the eastern edge of Co Luy were three 
sub-hamlets called Xuan Duong, Xam Tuan and Xam Cua which the Americans 
referred to as Co Lay 1, Co Lay 2 and Co Lay 3. When the Vietnamese referred 
to the hamlet of Co Luy, Americans sometimes assumed that they meant one of 
the sub-hamlets called Co Lay. Some American soldiers who had operated in 
and around Son My simply called the village 'Pinkville', a name apparently 
iii 
coined as a result of the use of the colour pink on US military maps to denote 
areas of Vietnam which were more densely populated and of the perception that 
those who lived there were sympathetic to the enemy. Others were more 
specific: they identified My Lai 1, in the hamlet of My Lai, as 'Pinkville'.  
 
 The potential for confusion was considerable.
1
 
    
 On the following page is a slightly altered version of a map of Son My 
which was printed in Volume I of the Report of the Department of the Army 
Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident, (hereafter 
referred to as the Peers Report).
2
 It was noted in the report that, with the 
exception of the names Thuan Yen and My Lai 4 which were 'used 
interchangeably', the 'US Map designations for the subhamlets' were used 
throughout because those were the names usually cited by witnesses in 
testimony.
3
 The same principle has been adopted in this work with the variation 
that the names My Hoi and My Khe 4 have been used interchangeably.    
                                                 
1
 Early reports in the American media referred to a massacre at Song My (or Songmy): a sign of 
the imprecision with which Vietnamese place names could be translated into English and another 
source of confusion.   
2
 Volume I of the Peers Report was printed in Joseph Goldstein, Burke Marshall and Jack 
Schwartz (eds), The My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-up: Beyond the Reach of Law? (New York: 
The Free Press, 1976). Volumes I-III of the report are available online at http://www. loc.gov/rr/ 
frd/Military_law/Peers_inquiry.html. The printed text has been used as the source for references 
to the first volume of the report throughout this work.    
3
 Goldstein et al., note to p. 59. 

1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On the morning of 16 March 1968 two companies of American soldiers were landed by 
helicopter in Son My in the east of the province of Quang Ngai.
1
 Elements of the 11th 
Infantry Brigade, Bravo and Charlie companies had arrived in South Vietnam in 
December 1967 and, in the new year, they had been assigned to a task force led by 
Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker. In the weeks following the Tet Offensive, Task Force 
Barker had been pursuing a battalion of Viet Cong which was believed to use Son My 
as a sanctuary.
2
 In February, Bravo Company had played a leading role in two actions in 
the area and, according to the US Army's accounts of these actions, 155 enemy soldiers 
had been killed.
3
 If the victims were carrying weapons, their escaping comrades must 
have recovered most of them because the Americans found only six rifles but there had 
been American losses too: six men had been killed and forty-three wounded. The 
operation on 16 March was presented by Barker as an attempt to pin down his 
adversary. He reported afterwards that it had been the mission of the task force: 'To 
destroy enemy forces and fortifications in a VC base camp and to capture enemy 
personnel, weapons and supplies.'
4
  
 
Planning for the operation required the separation of Bravo's 1st Platoon from 
the rest of the company. It was intended that Bravo's 2nd Platoon should sweep through 
                                                 
1
 The United States and Vietnam are on either side of the international date line. It was 15 March in 
America. 
2
 The Tet Offensive was launched to coincide with the celebration of the Vietnamese new year at the end 
of January. Its scale surprised the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies but the American counter 
attack caused serious losses to the forces of the NLF (National Liberation Front). 
3
 The first of these actions had begun on 13 February 1968, the second on 23 February 1968. 
4
 Lt. Col. Frank A. Barker, 'Combat Action Report', 28 March 1968, Peers Report, Vol. III, Book 3, 
Exhibit R-2 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-III. (This and subsequent 
references to the online version of Volumes II and III of the Peers Report relate to access obtained on 1 
January 2010.) There were three infantry companies in Task Force Barker, each from a different 
battalion. Alpha, Bravo and Charlie companies were apparently assigned to the task force because each 
had been identified as the best in its battalion. Ordered to serve as a blocking force to the north of Son 
My, Alpha Company did not enter the village on 16 March 1968. 
2 
My Lai 1, a sub-hamlet which Barker described in his Combat Action Report as 'the 
area of the VC base camp', whilst 1st Platoon acted as a blocking force to the east.
5
 As 
the remainder of the company moved into positions around My Lai 1, therefore, 1st 
Platoon moved towards a bridge which crossed a water course called the Song My 
Khe.
6
 On the other side of the bridge was a small community which the Vietnamese 
called My Hoi or Xom Go. On American maps this collection of huts was named My 
Khe 4.  
 
Lieutenant Thomas K. Willingham, the leader of Bravo's 1st Platoon, had only 
been in Vietnam for three weeks and it was the first time that he had been involved in a 
major operation. His inexperience, rather than any doubts about his men's suitability for 
the task, might have persuaded Barker not to send 1st Platoon into My Lai 1 because 
Willingham had inherited a platoon with a reputation for being aggressive. Military 
press releases in February had celebrated a 'historic assault' by the platoon in which a 
'famous "Dirty Dozen"' of them had penetrated an enemy perimeter in the Son My area 
and scattered its defenders. Two of the men, it was reported, had won Bronze Stars for 
their exploits that day.
7
 Within the company, though, there were rumours that 1st 
Platoon killed civilians and an agent of the Army's Criminal Investigation Division 
(CID) was told by Robert Holmes, a member of Bravo's 3rd Platoon, that 'It was 
common knowledge with all the men of the company that ... the point team for the 1st 
Platoon ... had shot many people indiscriminately.'
8
  
                                                 
5
 Ibid.  
6
 The Song My Khe was sometimes known as the Song Kinh Giang.   
7
 An undated copy of the press release is in Folder 32, Inspector General’s Office: My Lai [4] 
Investigation, Record Group (RG) 472, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). It 
describes the action which began on 13 February 1968.   
8
 The testimony provided to the Peers Inquiry by members of Bravo Company is available at http://www. 
loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-II. See the testimony of David S. Carter to Peers Inquiry, 16 
January 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook21.pdf.; Robert Holmes, 
Witness Statement, 11 February 1970 in CID Report of Investigation on Donald Hooton, 70-CID011-
00049, US Army Crime Records Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The documents in the report have been 
3 
 
Before Willingham's platoon had reached the western bank of the Song My Khe, 
a mine exploded on the edge of My Lai 1 killing the leader of 2nd Platoon, Lieutenant 
Roy Cochran. The news of his death, which soon reached 1st Platoon, particularly 
affected some of its men because they had served under Cochran. Later there was 
another explosion and 2nd Platoon suffered more casualties, enough to persuade Barker 
to abort the attack on My Lai 1. There was no change to 1st Platoon's orders, however, 
and so Willingham and his men crossed the river. Having done so, they found that some 
of the people who lived in My Khe 4 were moving around in the open. Others, 
intimidated by the sounds of gunfire and explosions to the west, sheltered in bunkers. 
Many of them were not to survive what followed: as many as ninety people, most of 
them women, children and old men, were killed. Initially, rifle and machine gun fire cut 
down those who were outside, then explosives were thrown into the bunkers and most 
who tried to escape were shot. One survivor, Nguyen Thi Bay, alleged later that she was 
beaten and raped by two of the soldiers and that, tied with a rope, she was forced to lead 
the way when Bravo Company's 1st Platoon left the ruins of My Khe 4.  
 
An official version of the assault on My Khe 4 can be found in the daily log kept 
by Task Force Barker. The duty officer recorded that Willingham's platoon had killed 
thirty-eight enemy soldiers in My Khe 4: twelve at 09.55, eighteen at 10.25 and eight at 
14.20. Two of these reports indicated that the dead had military equipment and at 12.45 
it was separately reported that steel helmets, uniforms and web equipment had been 
discovered. This was apparently how Willingham described his platoon's action, by 
                                                                                                                                               
redacted and names have been obscured. By cross-referencing with documents in a version of the Report 
of Investigation on Hooton held at the Henry Tufts Archive it is possible to identify the witnesses. The 
copy of the report held at the Tufts Archive does not include the witness statements. CID Report of 
Investigation on Donald Hooton, 70-CID011-00049, Henry Tufts Archive (HTA), Labadie Collection 
(LC), University of Michigan Special Collections Library (UMSCL), Ann Arbor (AA). 
 
4 
radio, to Captain Earl Michles, the commander of Bravo Company. Willingham's claims 
were relayed by Michles to the headquarters of the task force and then notified to 11th 
Brigade. Perhaps Willingham's figures troubled someone because, according to an entry 
in the task force log, Michles was asked later that afternoon about the nature of the 
victims. His response, that 'none of VC body count reported by his unit were women 
and children', was logged as having been passed on to brigade headquarters but, unlike 
Willingham's reports of the killing of enemy soldiers, it was not included in the daily 
log kept at 11th Brigade.
9
   
 
The routing of an enemy force reported by Willingham became a feature of the 
accounts of Task Force Barker's operation in Son My provided by the brigade's 
information officers and, because 11th Brigade was attached to the Americal Division, 
by information officers at divisional headquarters in Chu Lai. These accounts, which 
included a description of Charlie Company's engagement with the enemy in My Lai 4, 
formed the basis of the stories about the assault on Son My that appeared in American 
newspapers, including The New York Times. The newspapers were not alone in their 
acceptance of this version of the operation. General William Westmoreland, commander 
of American forces in Vietnam, sent his congratulations to the 'officers and men' of 
Bravo and Charlie companies for 'outstanding action' which had dealt the enemy a 
'heavy blow' and, in passing on Westmoreland's message, Major General Koster, 
commander of the Americal, added his own congratulations.
10
 
 
                                                 
9
 'Duty Officer's Log, TF Barker, 16 March 1968', Peers Report, Vol. III, Exhibit M-14; 'Duty Officer's 
Log, 11th Light Infantry Brigade, 16 March 1968', Peers Report, Vol. III, Exhibit M-46; both at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-III. The brigade log did not include the entry in 
the task force log which recorded the finding of steel helmets, uniforms and web equipment in My Khe 4 
at 12.45. There were some additional details in the brigade log, however, one of which indicated that the 
enemy soldiers killed at 14.20 had been 'engaged in tunnels'.  
10
 'Extract Message from Major General Koster', dated 19 March 1968 in Box 8, Folder 52, Papers of 
Four Hours in My Lai, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA), King's College, London 
(KCL). 
5 
 Although Willingham had reported the killing of thirty-eight enemy soldiers, his 
platoon had recovered none of their weapons and, elsewhere in Son My, the task force 
claimed to have killed a further ninety enemy soldiers and to have recovered only three 
weapons. In his memoir A Soldier Reports, published in 1976, Westmoreland argued 
that there was nothing unusual about these figures. His commendation, he explained, 
was 'based on the brigade's official report' and 'such a disparity between killed and 
weapons' would not have aroused his suspicion because:   
high body counts and low numbers of weapons collected in the war against the 
guerrilla in hamlet and village were not uncommon [the dead were presumed to 
be armed combatants not civilians]. To assure accurate reporting, I had had 
several reports like that investigated; the investigations revealed that guerrillas 
were adept at disposing of weapons in paddy or canal, and many guerrillas often 
were armed only with grenades and explosives. ... We had to rely on the 
presumed and generally established veracity of the reports and the chain of 
command.
11
 
 
Just about any report claiming that enemy soldiers had been killed was rendered 
credible by this combination of presumption and conviction and it is significant that 
Lieutenant General William R. Peers, who conducted the inquiry into the cover-up of 
the massacre at My Lai 4, commented later that the figures ought to have aroused 
suspicion:  
a ratio of forty-three enemy dead to one weapon captured was completely out of 
line. The operations section should have noted the disparity and called it to 
General Westmoreland's attention, and an inquiry should have been initiated. 
Instead, a message of congratulations was sent to the unit.
12
  
 
At a briefing of senior officers in the Americal on the evening of 16 March, the figures 
reported for the Son My operation apparently elicited some scepticism but it was the 
actions of Charlie Company at My Lai 4 which provoked Koster to make some 
                                                 
11
 General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 
1976), p. 379. Here and elsewhere, square brackets indicate a parenthesis in the original. 
12
 Lt. Gen. W. R. Peers, The My Lai Inquiry (New York: W.W. Norton, 1979), p. 208.  
6 
superficial inquiries.
13
 As George C. Herring observed in America's Longest War, 
'"attriting the enemy" was the major goal' of the US Army in Vietnam and, because 
'the"body count" became the index of progress', there was 'heavy pressure to produce 
favorable figures'.
14
 In the weeks following the Tet Offensive, when this pressure was 
perhaps at its most intense, it is unsurprising that Willingham's superiors accepted his 
report of what had happened at My Khe 4.
15
  
 
As Bravo Company had landed in Son My on 16 March, the soldiers of Charlie 
Company had been making their way through that part of the village which appeared as 
My Lai 4 on American maps. They left behind them the bodies of hundreds of civilians 
and, when their actions were brought to the Army's attention by Ronald Ridenhour 
eighteen months later, their place in history was assured.
16
 The massacre in and around 
My Lai 4 was to be reported and dissected in the press, on television and, over a period 
of forty years, in more than twenty books. By March 1971, according to NBC's Frank 
McGee, the words My Lai had been 'seared into the American consciousness', a 
metaphor which gathered some empirical support at the end of that month. When 
William Calley was found guilty of the murder of at least twenty-two civilians in My 
Lai 4, a survey indicated that 96% of Americans were aware of the verdict, a degree of 
                                                 
13
 Peers noted that Lieutenant Colonel Francis Lewis, the chaplain of the Americal Division, recalled 
'considerable murmuring and buzzing among the staff members' when the figures were announced and 
that one officer had muttered 'They were all women and children'. Ibid., p. 129. 
14
 George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 3rd edn. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1996), pp. 170-171. 
15
 Seymour Hersh expressed the opinion that senior officers faced a choice 'between a higher body count 
or a war crime investigation.'  Seymour Hersh, Cover-Up: The Army's Secret Investigation of the 
Massacre at My Lai 4 (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 35.   
16
 Ridenhour was a Vietnam veteran who had heard about the massacre at 'Pinkville' from some of the 
men in Charlie Company.On 29 March 1969 he wrote to a selection of America's political and military 
leaders to request an investigation. Amongst the recipients of his letter were President Nixon, Secretary of 
Defense Melvin Laird and General Earle Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The letter is 
printed in Goldstein et al., pp. 34-37. 
7 
awareness which prompted President Nixon's Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to note that 
this was 'the highest we've gotten on any subject in any of our polls.'
17
  
 
 No such impact can be claimed for the massacre at My Khe 4. The American 
media showed some interest when, the Army having recognised in December 1969 that 
there had been a second massacre in Son My, charges of murder were brought against 
Willingham in February 1970. Four months later, the story faded away when the 
charges were dropped. In The Court-martial of Lt. Calley, published in 1971, Richard 
Hammer suggested that 'the light that had flickered for only a moment over the … 
killings at … My Khe [4], was extinguished' by the Army's decision and that 'what 
happened at that sub-hamlet in Son My would remain, it seemed, forever arcane and 
obscure.'
18
 Attempting to revive the nation's interest in 1972, Seymour Hersh was guilty 
of exaggeration when he wrote of 'the American public's total ignorance' of the 
massacre at My Khe 4 but the Army's presentation of the charges against Willingham 
and the majority of the media coverage had encouraged the idea that any killings at My 
Khe 4 had been a part of what had become known as 'The My Lai Massacre' and it was 
Charlie Company and particularly William Calley who were at the centre of that story 
from the moment that it was broken in November 1969.
19
 As Kendrick Oliver asserted 
in the February 2006 issue of History Today: 'the killings in My Khe [4] were largely 
ignored'.
20
 
                                                 
17
 McGee made his comment on NBC Nightly News on 19 March 1971. This, the references to the results 
of the survey and Haldeman's response to it are cited in Kendrick Oliver, The My Lai massacre in 
American history and memory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), p. 231. 
18
 Richard Hammer, The Court-martial of Lt. Calley (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, Inc., 
1971), pp. 39-40.  
19
 Hersh, Cover-Up, p. 25. 
20
 Kendrick Oliver, 'Coming to Terms with the Past: My Lai', History Today, Vol. 56, February 2006. By 
1996 even Henry Kamm, the first American reporter to suggest that there had been a second massacre in 
Son My, seemed to think the events at My Khe 4 not worth mentioning. In Dragon Ascending: Vietnam 
and the Vietnamese. Kamm wrote of: 'the unarmed, helpless women, children and old men massacred by 
First Lieutenant William Laws Calley Jr. and his platoon, as well as others from C Company of the 
8 
 
Those writing histories of America's war in Vietnam have done little to fill this 
gap.
21
 Most have been content to offer brief and sometimes imprecise accounts of what 
occurred at My Lai 4.
22
 Those who have written books about My Lai 4 have been more 
likely to include a few, often inaccurate lines about the events at My Khe 4 but, like 
most of the reports in the media, these works have tended to subsume those events into 
the narrative of the My Lai Massacre.
23
 Attempting to explain the actions of Bravo 
                                                                                                                                               
Eleventh Brigade of the Americal Division on the morning of March 16, 1968.' Henry Kamm, Dragon 
Ascending: Vietnam and the Vietnamese (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1996), p. 4. 
21
 There are brief references to the massacre at My Khe 4 in Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 362-363 and in Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul 
Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Vintage Books, 1989). Sheehan does not identify My Khe 4 as 
the site of the killing of 'about another ninety unarmed Vietnamese … by soldiers from a separate 
company' and he does not distinguish between the two massacres in his description of what occurred. 
Sheehan, p. 689. A little more detail is provided in William M. Hammond, Vietnam, Public Affairs: The 
Military and the Media, 1968-1973 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1996), a 
survey of the relationship between the media and US forces in Vietnam, although Hammond dates the 
massacre as having occurred two days before the massacre at My Lai. Hammond, pp. 243-244. There is 
no mention of My Khe 4 in: Larry H. Addington, America's War in Vietnam: A Short Narrative History 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000); Frances FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese 
and the Americans in Vietnam (New York: Vintage Books, 1972); George C. Herring, America's Longest 
War; Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (London: Guild Publishing, 1983); Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of 
a War: Vietnam, The United States, and the Modern Historical Experience (New York: The New Press, 
1985); Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997); Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1991). Although the massacre at My Lai 4 is described in some detail, there is no reference to My 
Khe 4 in Stanley I. Kutler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1996), pp. 342-343. One of the hundreds of memoirs by American veterans of the Vietnam War was 
written by Leroy TeCube, a member of Bravo Company's 3rd Platoon. Te Cube, who took part in the 
operation in Son My on 16 March 1968, recalled 'rumors of villagers and livestock being killed by GIs, 
mostly by Charlie Company' but he made no reference to the events at My Khe 4. Leroy TeCube, Year in 
Nam: A Native American Soldier's Story (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), p. 97.  
22
 Examples of this imprecision are detailed in Oliver, The My Lai massacre in American history and 
memory, p. 264 and Mark Taylor, The Vietnam War in History, Literature and Film (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2003), p. 113. See also the brief account in Sallah and Weiss's Tiger Force 
which claimed that: 'In a small cluster of hamlets known as My Lai … more than five hundred 
Vietnamese had been slaughtered … by an angry Army brigade led by Lieutenant William Calley.' 
Michael Sallah and Mitch Weiss, Tiger Force (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2006), p. 216. As others 
have done, Sallah and Weiss assumed that Calley's unit was responsible for all the killings in Son My. 
They seem to be the first to give Lieutenant Calley command of a brigade. Colonel William G. Eckhardt 
is another who has given the impression that Charlie Company killed about 500 non-combatants in Son 
My. See Eckhardt's 'Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea for a Workable Standard', Military Law 
Review No. 97 (1982) and 'My Lai: An American Tragedy' at http://religion.rutgers.edu/courses/347/ 
readings/my_lai.html. Accessed on 9 April 2007. 
23
 The books about My Lai 4 which were rushed into print in 1971 were particularly unhelpful. Arthur 
Everett, Kathryn Johnson and Harry F. Rosenthal stated in Calley (New York: Dell, 1971) that 
Willingham was the commander of Bravo Company and that he had been charged with offences 
committed at My Lai. Everett et al., pp. 105-106. Martin Gershen wrote in Destroy or Die: The True 
Story of My Lai (New Rochelle, NY.: Arlington House, 1971) that Bravo Company landed at My Khe 4. 
Gershen, p. 284. Wayne Greenshaw referred to the estimate that 500 civilians were killed in and around 
My Lai 4 in The Making of a Hero: The Story of Lieut. William Calley Jr. (Louisville, Ky.: Touchstone, 
9 
Company's 1st Platoon by locking them into that narrative is an error, however, because 
the massacre at My Khe 4 was significantly different in its nature, its causes, its 
consequences and its reception. Even when it has been appreciated that there were 
separate massacres, it has been the links between the men who, landing in Son My that 
morning, went their separate ways to murder which have attracted attention. Analysis 
which focuses instead on the distinctive features of the massacre at My Khe 4 and its 
outcomes is more revealing. My Khe 4, it turns out, requires its own narrative, one 
which illuminates important aspects of America's war in Vietnam.     
 
 Richard Hammer was one of the first writers to assert 'there had been not one but 
two separate and distinct massacres' in Son My on 16 March and to try to throw some 
light on what had happened at My Khe 4. Like other books which appeared in the wake 
of the revelations about the My Lai Massacre, One Morning in the War focused upon 
the actions of Charlie Company in and around My Lai 4 but in his introduction Hammer 
promised to provide the 'details' of the action at My Khe 4 which 'the army has not  
revealed'.
24
 Unfortunately, most of the 'details' Hammer provided were wrong.
25
 He 
located the massacre on the western bank of the Song My Khe (and therefore in the 
                                                                                                                                               
1971) but gave no indication that this estimate included the dead at My Khe 4. Greenshaw, p. 158. Tom 
Tiede included a picture of Vo Thi Lien in Calley: Soldier or Killer? (New York: Pinnacle Books, 1971). 
Lien, who was a survivor of the massacre at My Khe 4, was described as a survivor of the My Lai 
massacre. Tiede, p. 33. Seymour Hersh's earlier My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and its Aftermath 
(New York: Random House, 1970), was rather more accurate in its brief references to the Willingham 
case. Lengthy excerpts of this work were published first in Harper's Magazine and it is considered in 
Chapter III. Mary McCarthy's Medina (London: Wildwood House, 1973), which was published in 
America in 1972, identified My Khe 4 as the site of a massacre in which 90 to 100 civilians were killed 
by the men of Bravo Company. McCarthy, p. 78. Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim's Four Hours in My Lai 
(New York: Viking, 1992) included brief references to the massacre at Co Luy and its investigation by 
Peers. These are noted later in this chapter and in Chapter III. Forty years later, some writers remain 
uncertain about the details of the massacre at My Khe 4. In William Thomas Allison's Military Justice in 
Vietnam: The Role of Law in an American War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), for 
example, it is asserted that the whole of Company B moved 'into nearby My Khe, just across the river 
from My Lai'. Allison, p. 94.  
   Oliver has noted that, whilst the American media has returned to the My Lai story on anniversaries or 
'as part of a project to commemorate the Vietnam war', the massacre at My Khe 4 has 'hardly ever (been) 
mentioned' since the early 1970s. Oliver, The My Lai massacre in American history and memory, p. 268. 
24
 Richard Hammer, One Morning in the War: The Tragedy at Son My (New York: Coward-McCann, 
Inc., 1970), p. xii. 
10 
hamlet of My Khe), claiming that helicopters strafed and shelled My Khe 4 before 
soldiers were landed on its western edge.
26
 In his description of how 'The houses were 
all burning and blown up and there were ... ninety-seven, a hundred people killed' by the 
time the Americans left, Hammer was closer to the truth but his account did little to 
dispel the confusion that had come to surround the massacre at My Khe 4.
27
 He was, 
however, correct in his belief that the Army already had a description of the events in 
the sub-hamlet.   
 
 When Peers delivered the results of his inquiry into the cover-up of the massacre 
at My Lai 4 to his superiors in the US Army on 14 March 1970, his findings were 
summarised in the first of the four volumes which constituted his report. A chapter 
entitled 'Company B, 4 Battalion, 3D Infantry: Actions on 16-19 March 1968', which 
was one of several not released to the public until November 1974, presented 'such facts 
and evidence as have been developed bearing upon (Bravo Company's) participation in 
the Son My Village operation'.
28
 This chapter, which has served as the basis of most of 
the subsequent descriptions of the massacre, was written by Jerome K. Walsh, one of 
two civilian lawyers who assisted Peers during the inquiry.
29
 Walsh, who had been 
asked by Peers to look into Bravo Company's actions in Son My, drew upon American 
                                                                                                                                               
25
 Hammer's account was based on what he was told by Hguyen Van Danh, apparently the deputy chief of 
My Hoi. Danh did not testify to the Peers Inquiry and the available records do not indicate that he made a 
statement to a CID agent. 
26
 According to Hammer, My Hoi was 'divided into two sections', separated by the Song My Khe, and 
'About half the sub-hamlet lies on either side of the river.' Hammer, One Morning in the War, p. 145. 
Danh told Hammer that 'The shooting, the burning and the detonations from grenades and explosives 
lasted for more than an hour' as the soldiers massacred the inhabitants of the western half of My Hoi and 
that, when the Americans left, he and others crossed the river 'to see what had happened'. Ibid., pp. 145-
146. Perhaps Hammer misunderstood Danh or his translator. If Danh was sheltering on the western side 
of the river and crossed to its eastern bank to discover the massacre, that part of his story would make 
some sense. My Hoi was not shelled and strafed by helicopters on 16 March, however, although gunships 
did fire into what remained of My Hoi on the following day. 
27
 Hammer cites Danh's estimate in ibid., pp. 146-147.  
28
 Goldstein et al., p. 188. 
29
 Walsh revealed that he had been the author of this chapter during conversation with the writer on 5 
August 2009. A recording of the conversation is in the writer's possession. It was at the suggestion of 
Robert MacCrate, the other civilian lawyer appointed to assist Peers, that Walsh was asked to join the 
inquiry. 
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and Vietnamese testimony, much of which he had helped to elicit, to describe the 
assault on My Khe 4. Because of a two year statute of limitations on military offences 
such as dereliction of duty and false reporting, however, Peers was required to present 
the findings of his inquiry by 14 March 1970 and so Walsh's account, written to meet 
that deadline, did not include material developed by CID during a separate investigation 
into the massacre at My Khe 4 which began in February 1970 and continued for several 
months.
30
  
 
According to the Peers Report, it was after 'the completion of the ongoing 
criminal investigations and any resulting prosecutions' that 'the full story' of the 
massacre at My Khe 4 would become available but the records of the CID investigation 
provide a less complete account of the events at My Khe 4 than the Peers Report.
31
 In 
December 1969 an agent had stumbled across evidence that there had been a second 
massacre in the process of CID's investigation into the crimes committed at My Lai 4, 
an investigation which Westmoreland, who had become the Army's Chief of Staff, had 
initiated in August 1969. It was the Peers Inquiry, however, which followed up this lead 
and it was not until Willingham was charged in February 1970 that CID began a serious 
examination of the events at My Khe 4. Then it looked into allegations against three 
members of Bravo Company's 1st Platoon and completed two reports of investigation, 
one upon Willingham and one upon Donald Hooton. Responsible for the assessment of 
the weight of evidence against individuals, the records of the CID investigation do not 
provide the 'full story' of what had happened at My Khe 4 although the report of 
investigation on Hooton, which concluded that he had murdered a child at My Khe 4, 
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 CID, which worked under the supervision of the Army's Provost Marshal General, investigated 
allegations of criminal behaviour by soldiers in the US Army. 
31
 Goldstein et al., p. 188. 
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contains crucial testimony not heard by the Peers Inquiry.
32
 The CID investigation of 
the massacre at My Khe 4 did not lead to any prosecutions either and Peers' frustration 
at this outcome is evident. In The My Lai Inquiry, a memoir published in 1979, Peers 
described Lieutenant General Albert O. Connor’s decision to dismiss the charges 
against Willingham ‘without benefit of an Article 32 investigation’, as 'difficult to 
understand’ and when he was asked at the end of his military career if there was 
‘anything of substance’ he wished he had done differently in conducting his inquiry, he 
replied: 'the only thing ... is to look in … a little greater depth into the activities of 
BRAVO Company.'
33
  
     
Two other investigations were prompted by the events at My Lai 4: one by the 
Army's Office of the Inspector General and one by the Armed Services Committee of 
the House of Representatives. In the course of the former, Willingham made a lengthy 
statement about the activities of his platoon on 16 March to Colonel William V. Wilson 
who had been instructed by the Army, late in April 1969, to find out if there was any 
substance to the allegations contained in Ridenhour's letter. Wilson, who began by 
interviewing Ridenhour and Ridenhour's informants, questioned Willingham in May, 
telling him that he was not a suspect and asking him to describe 'the concept' of the 
operation in Son My.
34
 There is no sign that Wilson was aware of the official record of 
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 CID concluded that 'There is insufficient evidence to refute or substantiate the allegations that 
Willingham ordered the killing of an undetermined number of Vietnamese noncombatants'. CID Report 
of Investigation on Thomas Willingham, 70-CID011-00039, HTA, LC, UMSCL, AA. This conclusion 
apparently prompted Colonel William G. Eckhardt, the chief prosecutor in the Son My cases, to write a 
lengthy justification of the decision to drop the charges against Willingham.   
33
 Peers, p. 222. Article 32 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice required independent investigation of 
the evidence before a court martial could take place. It was the responsibility of the Article 32 
investigating officers to decide if a court martial was justified; De-Briefing Interview with Lt. Gen. 
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William R. Peers Papers, US Army Military History Institute (USAMHI), Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 
34
 Testimony of Thomas K. Willingham, Inspector General's Investigation, 8 May 1969 in Box 2, MACV 
Inspector General, Investigative Division: My Lai Investigation, RG 472, NARA. Wilson's decision to 
question Willingham does not imply that he had fallen under suspicion at this stage. In order to collate 
information about the operation in Son My, Wilson had to find out about the movements of Alpha and 
Bravo companies. Neither Barker nor Michles had survived the war and Cochran had been killed on the 
13 
the action in the log kept by the task force, according to which Willingham had reported 
the killing of thirty-eight of the enemy at My Khe 4 on 16 March 1968. Willingham told 
Wilson that he reported the killing of twenty-eight civilians, of whom he thought 
twenty-three were 'VC'. Wilson did not ask about the five civilians who, Willingham 
thought, were not hostiles.
35
 Wilson's acceptance of Willingham's testimony that 'heavy 
resistance' had been encountered at My Khe 4 and that there had been no 'unnecessary 
killing' is demonstrated in an essay that he published twenty years later in which he 
credited the Peers Inquiry with the discovery of 'an equally vicious massacre … 
conducted by a second company … of Task Force Barker'.36  
 
Congressional investigation generated even less information about the second 
massacre. On 19 December 1969 the House Armed Services Committee directed an 
investigating sub-committee to produce a report about Charlie Company's actions in My 
Lai 4 and to ascertain if there had been a cover-up.
37
 F. Edward Hébert, the chairman of 
the sub-committee, wrote on 3 March 1970 that he was ready to begin formal hearings 
and that the sub-committee would address in its report the question of 'the Task Force 
Barker operation in ... Son My'.
38
 By July, however, when the report was completed, it 
looked as if the sub-committee's intention had been to subvert the prosecution of 
members of Charlie Company by taking testimony from members of the company in 
                                                                                                                                               
first day of the operation. Willingham, who was still in the Army and stationed in the USA, was a 
convenient and potentially useful witness.      
35
 'Duty Officer's Log, TF Barker, 16 March 1968', Peers Report, Vol. III, Exhibit M-14; Testimony of 
Thomas K. Willingham, Inspector General's Investigation. 
36
 Testimony of Thomas K. Willingham, Inspector General's Investigation; William Wilson, 'I Had 
Prayed to God That This Thing Was Fiction', American Heritage, February 1990. 
37
 The Senate's Armed Services Committee, which began to plan an investigation, decided to leave the 
matter to the House.    
38
 Letter from F. Edward Hébert to L. Mendel Rivers, Chairman of the House Armed Services 
Committee, 3 March 1970 reprinted in U.S. Congress, House, Investigating Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on the Armed Services, Investigation of the My Lai Incident: Report  ... Under Authority of H. 
Res. 105, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 3. 
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executive session and refusing to release it.
39
 The sub-committee evinced little interest 
in the massacre at My Khe 4.
40
  
 
The only other chapters to have been written about the massacre at My Khe 4 
appear in Hersh's Cover-Up: The Army's Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai 
4 and Peers' The My Lai Inquiry. Both rely upon Walsh's work in their descriptions of 
what happened in the sub-hamlet.
41
 Peers added little to the chapter which had appeared 
in his report but Hersh departed from Walsh in an important respect. Possessing a 
leaked copy of the Peers Report which included the unreleased chapters of the first 
volume and transcripts of the testimony which the Peers Inquiry had heard from, 
amongst others, members of Bravo Company, Hersh selected material to demonstrate 
that the massacres at My Lai 4 and My Khe 4 had proceeded from the same set of 
orders. In doing so, Hersh ignored or failed to notice the overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary but this misinterpretation, which had a wider audience because most of Hersh's 
Cover-Up also appeared in The New Yorker, has seduced others and the idea that the 
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 Under the Jencks Act, a defendant was entitled to see the previous testimony of a prospective witness. 
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'Unfounded'. 'Son My Army Staff Monitor Summary', 6 April 1970 in Box 8, Folder 16, Papers of Four 
Hours in My Lai, LHCMA, KCL. 
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 Hersh, Cover-Up; Peers, pp. 184-198. 
15 
men of Task Force Barker were ordered to massacre the inhabitants of Son My 
continues to appear in discussions of the massacre at My Khe 4.
42
  
 
Although it remains the most useful source for an examination of the massacres 
in Son My, the Peers Report was originally intended to have a much narrower focus. 
Peers had been ordered by Westmoreland to conduct an inquiry into 'the nature and the 
scope of the original U. S. Army investigation[s] of the alleged My Lai [4] incident' but 
he persuaded Westmoreland and the Secretary of the Army that, in order to conduct 
such an inquiry, he had first to establish what had happened at My Lai 4.
43
 When he 
began his investigations on 26 November 1969 there is no indication that he or his 
superiors suspected that a second massacre might have occurred. How Peers reached the 
conclusion, five weeks into his inquiry, that the men of Bravo Company needed to be 
questioned about a massacre at My Khe 4 makes a complicated story, not least because 
the accounts which he and others have given of that process are inconsistent. In the 
records of the Peers Inquiry, a file of papers related to the Willingham case contains a 
typewritten note headed 'Willingham' which reads: 'Have report on killing of 30-38. Is 
he a suspect? Check with Wilson' and this perhaps marks the point at which Peers, or 
someone working with him, began to be suspicious about the activities of Willingham 
and his platoon.
44
 Unsigned and undated, however, the note does no more than 
demonstrate that someone had noticed one of several clues that a second massacre had 
occurred. 
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 Seymour Hersh, 'Coverup-I', The New Yorker, 22 January 1972; 'Coverup-II', The New Yorker, 29 
January 1972. Hersh's description of the massacre, his explanation of its causes and his opinion of the 
Army's response to the events at My Khe 4 are explored in Chapter III. Amongst those who have recently 
found common ground with Hersh in their analysis of the massacre at My Khe 4 and its investigation is 
Robert Hodierne whose radio documentary The My Lai Tapes, first broadcast in 2008, is considered later 
in this chapter.  
43
 'Directive for Investigation', 26 November 1969, is printed in ibid., p. 33. 
44
 'Willingham', undated in CIP (Closed Inventory) 180 XI-1-5: Captain Thomas K. Willingham, Records 
of the Peers Inquiry (RPI), NARA. Presumably, the writer of the note was aware that Colonel Wilson had 
interviewed Willingham in May 1969. 
16 
 
Peers observed later that information about the massacre at My Khe 4 had been 
'tightly held within the 1st Platoon, and perhaps by certain other members of Bravo 
Company' but allegations of a second massacre had passed along South Vietnamese 
military channels in March and April 1968.
45
 Within two days of the massacres in Son 
My a Census Grievance Report had been completed which accused the Americans of 
killing 320 people at Thuan Yen and '80 people young and old' in Co Luy.
46
 During the 
same period, the NLF and the North Vietnamese had disseminated stories in which the 
massacre at My Khe 4 received as much attention as the massacre at My Lai 4. That 
those involved in the cover-up of the massacre at My Lai 4 did not realise that there was 
a second massacre to be concealed is because they were focused upon the actions of 
Charlie Company, pre-disposed to reject allegations of American criminality as enemy 
propaganda and mystified by the geography of Son My. By November and December 
1969, little had changed: Americans failed to respond to clues that there had been a 
massacre at My Khe 4 because they appeared in the context of details about the 
massacre at My Lai, the geography of Son My remained a puzzle and what the 
Vietnamese had to say was treated with scepticism.  
 
Peers has explained that when he and his assistants arrived in South Vietnam on 
28 December 1969 to pursue the investigation into the massacre at My Lai 4 and its 
cover-up, his grounds for suspecting Bravo Company of criminality were 'tenuous at 
best', consisting of little more than a reference to the killing of civilians in a hamlet 
called Co Luy which had been found in a statement attached to a US Army 'Report of 
Investigation' prepared by Colonel Oran K. Henderson, Barker's immediate superior, in 
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 Peers, p. 198. 
46
 The report is printed in ibid., pp. 276-277. The Census Grievance Program had been set up by the South 
Vietnamese government with the assistance of the CIA. It purported to provide a confidential opportunity 
for South Vietnamese villagers to complain about ill-treatment. 
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April 1968.
47
 Ironically, the Henderson report had been intended to put an end to 
suggestions that there had been a massacre at My Lai 4 and Peers did not believe that 
Henderson 'had any knowledge' of the massacre at My Khe 4.
48
  
 
Complaints that civilians had been unnecessarily killed at My Lai 4 had been 
received from the crews of American helicopters which had been flying in support of 
Task Force Barker. One of the pilots, Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, had even 
landed twice to help the villagers. A diluted version of these complaints and reports 
from Barker and Charlie Company's commander, Captain Ernest Medina, that up to 
twenty-eight civilians had been killed at My Lai 4 reached General Koster. His response 
was to instruct Henderson to investigate.
49
 The only documentary evidence of 
Henderson's conclusions, which were first delivered orally to Koster, is in the form of a 
'Report of Investigation' dated 24 April 1968.
50
 It claimed that the enemy had lost 128 
soldiers during the operation and described the death of twenty non-combatants as 
'inadvertent': they had been hit during 'Artillery and gunship preparatory fires' or caught 
in the crossfire between American and enemy forces.
51
  
 
 Significantly, Henderson chose to make no reference to the allegations which the 
Americans in the helicopters had made. Instead, he described the suggestion that there 
had been a massacre in Son My as 'a Viet Cong propaganda move to discredit the 
United States' and he attached to his report two documents intended to reinforce this 
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 Peers, p. 184. Henderson had assumed command of the 11th Infantry Brigade on the day before TF 
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48
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49
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idea. One was a translated transcript of a NLF radio broadcast entitled 'American Evil 
Appears' which claimed that: 
In the operation of 15 March 1968 in Son Tinh District the American enemies 
went crazy. They used machine guns and every other kind of weapons to kill 
500 people who had empty hands, in Tinh Khe [Son My] ... There were many 
pregnant women some of which were only a few days from childbirth. The 
Americans would shoot everybody they saw.
52
 
 
Unwittingly, therefore, Henderson conveyed what has become a generally accepted 
estimate of the number of people killed in the two massacres which had occurred in Son 
My but the other attachment to his report, a statement dismissing allegations that there 
had been two massacres in Son My, gave away something more. The statement, which 
bore no signature, gave the impression of being a translation of a South Vietnamese 
document. Having discovered that the statement had originally been signed by the 
Assistant Son Tinh District Advisor, Captain Rodriguez, 
 
Peers suggested in his report 
that the signature had been deliberately removed from the copy attached to the 
Henderson report in a 'conscious effort to deceive': to imply that the South Vietnamese 
concurred in Henderson's rejection of the allegations as NLF propaganda.
53
 The 
statement recorded that a complaint by the village chief of Son My about the killing of 
civilians in Son My 'was not given much importance by the District Chief'' although it 
had been passed to the chief of Quang Ngai province and to Colonel Toan, the 
commander of the 2nd ARVN Division. It also included, however, the details that the 
village chief had complained that American soldiers had killed '400 civilians in Tu-
Cong hamlet' and '90 more civilians' in Co-Luy hamlet.
54
 Accidental and unnecessary in 
the context of Henderson's attempt to cover up the massacre at My Lai 4, the reference 
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 Ibid., p. 288.  
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to the killing of 90 civilians at Co Luy, the hamlet of which My Khe 4 was a part, was a 
clear sign of what else had occurred in Son My.
55
 
 
 A much more detailed account of the massacre at My Khe 4 was probably in 
circulation by the end of March 1968. 'Concerning the Crimes Committed by US 
Imperialists and Their Lackeys Who Killed More Than 500 Civilians of Tinh Khe 
Village (Son My), Son Tinh District' was produced by the NLF in Quang Ngai and it 
devoted approximately the same amount of space to the killings at Xom Go (My Khe 4) 
as it did to the killings at Xom Lang (My Lai 4). It described how Xom Lang and Xom 
Go 'were pounded by artillery for hours' before providing details of the events at Xom 
Lang. Then the notice continued: 
At Xom Go Sub-Hamlet of Co Luy Hamlets, American pirates blew up 
and burned every hut and tossed grenades into civilian shelters. The sand was 
soaked with blood; beheaded bodies lay sprawled on the ground. People died 
without enough time to utter a word! Mothers holding sons' bodies! 
Grandmothers holding grandsons' bodies! They died unjustly. Fifteen people 
were killed inside Mr. Le's shelter. They even killed pregnant women. Vo Thi 
Hai, who had given birth to a child the night before, was raped and killed, 
leaving behind a newly-born baby with no milk, with no one to suckle it. 
Nguyen Thi Ngon, 32 years old, near the end of her pregnancy, was mutilated 
inside her bunker, exposing the stirring, unborn baby. While 30 year old Vo Thi 
Phu was feeding her baby, they snatched her baby away and raped her. Later, 
both were burned to death. 
 Mrs. Kheo, 65 years old, was shot to death by the bunker entrance and 
her body was tossed onto the burning fire. Mr Duong, 85 years old, was marched 
out of the bunker when they came. They marched him to every bunker, showing 
him the sights of the barbaric killings. They offered him poisoned candy, but he 
caught the bad smell and didn't eat the candy. They searched him and found 
nothing and released him. 
 At this place, American pirates killed 92, wounded 10, burned 304 huts, 
destroyed 78 bunkers and destroyed and burned civilian property worth 900,000 
piastres. 
 Civilian laborers who had come to work or to visit relatives at Tu Cung  
Hamlet and Co Luy Hamlet were also massacred. 
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Whilst this account contains features like the 'poisoned candy' which can be dismissed 
as invention for the purposes of propaganda, other features confirm the later testimony 
of American soldiers about the events at My Khe 4: the killing of women and children, 
the use of explosives and the burning of huts.
56
 
 
 Because the Americans apparently did not encounter a copy of this notice until 
December 1969, Peers suggested that it might have been produced in late 1969 with the 
earlier date of 28 March 1968 upon it 'in order to capitalize on the widespread publicity 
at that time concerning the Son My incident.'
57
 This begs the question of why, if the 
NLF produced the notice to take advantage of the publicity surrounding the My Lai 
Massacre, so much of it was devoted to the events at Xom Go, events which received 
little attention until February 1970. Furthermore, significant elements of the description 
and detail in the notice had appeared in a report entitled 'Son My Mothers Call for 
Vengeance' which was published in the Viet Nam Courier in Hanoi on 27 May 1968. 
This report recorded the fates of Vo Thi Phu and her child: 'Vo Thi Phu, mother of a 12-
month-old baby, was shot dead ... The baby tried to suck at its mother's breast ... The 
Yankees ... heaped straw on mother and baby and set fire to it.' It referred to the death of 
                                                 
56
 A translation of the notice is printed in Peers, pp. 283-286. 
57
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Vo Thi Mai(sic), 'who had just had her baby', to the speed with which the Americans 
'fell' upon their victims, to the use of explosives and to the killing of villagers inside 
their shelters. Similarly, the notice's account of the killings at Xom Lang can be 
matched to some of the details in the report in the Viet Nam Courier.
58
  
 
 Whilst the Americans tended to assume that the enemy's propaganda had to be 
false and their South Vietnamese allies were eager to reject allegations against 
American soldiers in case they turned out to be true, Peers noted that the specific nature 
of the claims being made against the Americans in 'American Evil Appears' and the 
confirmation of what American and South Vietnamese commanders had already heard 
from other sources ought to have alerted more determined attempts to find out what had 
happened in Son My.
59
 A closer study of the enemy's 'propaganda', in this case, could 
have revealed that the NLF had detailed descriptions of not one but two massacres on 
16 March. 
 
 According to Peers, 'the first leads on Bravo Company being involved in various 
activities' arose during his conversations with three ARVN officers in South Vietnam. 
Each of the officers had been referred to in the statement appended to Henderson's 
report: Colonel Toan, the commander of the 2nd Division of the Army of the Republic 
of Vietnam (ARVN), Colonel Khien, the military chief of Quang Ngai, and Lieutenant 
Tan, the District Chief who had forwarded the complaint about the killings in Tu Cung 
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Makes It News', Scanlan's, 1 (1970). 
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and Co Luy with the comment, unmentioned in the Rodriguez statement, that the 
Americans could be accused of 'an act of insane violence.'
60
 Any 'leads' they might have 
given Peers do not appear in the transcripts of their testimony and there is no indication 
that Peers was successful in his attempts to discover the whereabouts of Co Luy in his 
questioning of Toan and Khien. He did, however, receive a clarification of 'the 
geographic terminology' of Son My which provided the inquiry's 'start in understanding 
Bravo Company's operation' as a result of his meeting with Khien on 30 December.
61
 
Peers was shown a report, prepared by Khien at the end of November 1969, which 
summarised the results of a South Vietnamese investigation into 'the case of the 
American operation in the Son My Area'. Although there was no reference to the 
possibility of a massacre in Co Luy, the summary began by naming the four hamlets 
which formed Son My and it revealed to Peers that Co Luy was a hamlet in the south-
eastern corner of Son My rather than an alternative spelling of a series of sub-hamlets 
further south which the Americans referred to as Co Lay 1, 2 and 3.
62
 
 
There was, however, rather more to the discovery of the massacre at My Khe 4 
than the 'tenuous' reference in the statement attached to Henderson's report and Peers' 
discovery that Co Luy was a hamlet in Son My. Peers' accounts of that process make no 
mention of a story by Henry Kamm in The New York Times on 7 December 1969 which 
reported the allegation that a massacre had taken place in Co Luy although Army 
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 De-Briefing Interview with Peers, Section 4, pp. 40-41. Toan, whose name is spelt Tuan in the 
transcript of the interview, had become a general by December 1970. A translation of Tan's letter of 
complaint, dated 11 April 1968, is printed in Peers, pp. 279-280.  
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 Peers, p. 185. The testimonies of Nguyen Van Toan and Ton That Khien to Peers Inquiry on 30 
December 1969 and the testimony of Tran Ngoc Tan to Peers Inquiry on 3 January 1970 are at 
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 Peers included a translation of the summary, dated 1 January 1970, in the Peers Report as Exhibit R-33. 
'Results of the Investigation of the Case of the American Operation in the Son My Area', 30 November 
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/Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook32.pdf. 
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records show that, because Co Luy was assumed to be a mis-spelling of Co Lay, the 
allegation was immediately connected with Bravo Company which had passed through 
Co Lay 1, 2 and 3 on 17 March. On 10 December, Peers and the Provost Marshal 
General were ordered to investigate and Peers responded by requesting General 
Abrams, commander of American forces in Vietnam, to make immediate inquiries.
63
 
There were other indications that there had been a second massacre. On several 
occasions during November and December 1969, newspapers and news magazines cited 
South Vietnamese allegations that there had been killings outside of My Lai 4 on 16 
March. Sometimes the source of the allegation was a member of the military, sometimes 
it was a civilian.
64
 Indeed, almost two weeks before Peers arrived in South Vietnam to 
pursue his inquiries into the massacre at My Lai 4, an agent had taken testimony from a 
civilian in Chu Lai which persuaded the CID that it ought to operate on the assumption 
that there were two massacres to investigate.  
 
In The My Lai Inquiry, Peers recalled that Andre C. Feher, a CID investigator 
who was assigned to assist him in South Vietnam, 'strongly suspected that more had 
taken place in the Bravo Company area than had thus far been brought to light' and that 
'this opinion, as well as our own growing concern, prompted us to delve into Bravo 
Company's activities.'
65
 This hardly did justice to what Feher had learned on 15 
December at the 91st Evacuation Hospital in Chu Lai. There he had spoken to three 
Vietnamese women who alleged that, on the day of the massacre at My Lai 4, American 
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soldiers had killed up to 100 people in Co Luy. Two of the women, of whom one was 
Nguyen Thi Bay, specified My Hoi as the site of the killings.
66
 Bay also told Feher that 
two of the soldiers had raped her during a two day period in which she was held captive. 
American investigators were uncertain about the location of My Hoi and, initially, the 
response of the CID Task Force in South Vietnam which was investigating the killings 
at My Lai 4 was to consider the women's statements as further evidence of a massacre 
there.
67
 After Feher had re-interviewed Bay and one of the other women on 17 
December, the task force altered its view. The statement incorporating a more detailed 
version of Bay's testimony which was forwarded to CID headquarters in Washington 
made it clear that a second massacre was being alleged.
68
  
 
 Unable to locate My Hoi on American maps, the CID Task Force concluded that 
the allegations centred on events in and around the sub-hamlet in the south-east of Son 
My which the Americans called Co Lay 2.
69
 Although it was approximately two 
kilometres to the south of My Hoi, Co Lay 2 had been in 'the B Company AO (Area of 
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 Nguyen Thi Hien, the third woman, located the killings in Xuan Duong, a sub-hamlet which adjoined 
the southern edge of My Hoi. 
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 A Combined Interrogation Report dated 16 December 1969 which contains a summary of the 
information provided by the three women on 15 December is in Box 10 Folder 53, Inspector General’s 
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assistance of an interpreter, he and Bay found it difficult to understand each other, especially with regard 
to the geography of Son My. 
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 Perhaps CID agents were aware that Peers was investigating the possibility that a massacre had taken 
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Operations) during Operation Pinkville' and this was noted on 19 December in the CID's 
Daily Journal. On the same day the journal noted that the women's allegations of a 
second massacre provided some confirmation of the notice produced by the NLF in 
Quang Ngai, a copy of which had surfaced on 12 December.
70
 By 20 December the CID 
had realised that two investigations might be necessary: agents were directed to take 
'separate statements whenever individuals have information about events at My Lai [4] 
and Co Lay [2].'
71
  
 
  Peers does not seem to have been informed of Bay's testimony until nearly two 
weeks later, when he visited South Vietnam.
72
 Within a day or two of his arrival there 
he had learned enough about Bay's allegations to convince him that further investigation 
was necessary. He arranged for the South Vietnamese authorities to track down 
Vietnamese civilians who might have additional information about the events in My Hoi 
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Walsh in a letter to Bilton, 15 August 1990 in Box 8, Folder 61, Papers of Four Hours in My Lai, 
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and he sent Jerry Walsh to Quang Ngai to interview them.
73
 By 1 January, the records of 
the Peers Inquiry demonstrate, Walsh had begun his inquiries: whilst interviewing Ngo 
Tan Hai, the Hamlet Chief of Co Luy, and Hai's assistant Ngo Son in Quang Ngai, 
Walsh asked them about the killing of civilians at My Hoi. The location of My Hoi was 
revealed when Hai explained the geography of Co Luy and, although Hai insisted that 
most of the dead at My Hoi had been Viet Cong or supporters of the Viet Cong, he 
indicated that over ninety people had been killed there.
74
 A 'Memorandum for Record' 
explaining the geography of Son My, which Walsh produced a few days later, confirms 
that the Peers Inquiry had established the geographical context of Bay's allegations.
75
 
On 2 January, when Peers interviewed Do Thanh Hien, an interpreter who had been 
with Task Force Barker in Son My, he also began to ask questions which were 
prompted by Bay's allegations.
76
 A new dimension having been added to the inquiry, a 
reorganisation was necessary: 'Because of our increasing interest in Bravo Company's 
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operation', Peers recalled in The My Lai Inquiry, we 'split the official party into two 
interrogation teams'.
77
 During his final three days in South Vietnam Walsh concentrated 
on the massacre at My Hoi and when he returned to America on 6 January he and 
Colonel Wilson became the leaders of the inquiry's C Team, which was solely 
concerned with the Bravo Company operation.
78
 By 6 March 1970 sixty men who had 
served with Bravo Company, eighteen of them members of 1st Platoon, had appeared 
before the C Team and when Peers presented his report on 14 March 1970 he was able 
to describe a second massacre in which 'the number of noncombatants killed ... may 
have been as high as 90.'
79
 
 
  In The My Lai Inquiry Peers observed that Walsh and Wilson had done a 'truly 
remarkable job' in 'assembling information' about Bravo Company's role in the assault 
on Son My.
80
 The report and transcripts of the testimony taken by Walsh and Wilson's 
C Team suggest that Peers' admiration was justified because very little about the 
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investigation was straightforward. Whilst in South Vietnam, Walsh had found it 
difficult to trace other survivors of the massacre.
81
 He explained in the Peers Report that 
this was mainly because of the destruction of the area in which My Khe 4 had been 
located: 
the entire coastal area in which My Khe [4] is located has been virtually leveled 
in the period since the incident took place. The dwellings, trails, and much of the 
foliage existing in the area in 1968 have been obliterated, and the surviving 
populace has moved out of the area.
82
 
 
The leveling of the area caused a further complication: the investigators could not tell 
what My Khe 4 and its surroundings had looked like. Although they had some 
photographs, most of them were aerial shots taken after the destruction of My Khe 4 
and, for a description of the sub-hamlet's physical features, Walsh and Wilson were 
forced to rely upon the frequently misty and contradictory memories of the Americans 
who had taken part in the Son My operation.
83
 The absence of another sort of 
photograph was more critical. Susan D. Moeller has written that 'it is photography that 
brings war home' and the images of the dead at My Lai 4 taken by Ronald Haeberle, an 
Army photographer, had convinced most of the Americans who saw them that civilians 
had been killed there.
84
 In the court room, too, Haeberle's images served an important 
role: they demonstrated that there was a case to answer. Unless American investigators 
were prepared to go back to My Khe 4 to try to find the bodies which had been buried, 
according to the testimony of the surviving inhabitants of Son My, in and around the 
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sub-hamlet, Walsh and Wilson had to find evidence that people had been killed there.
85
 
The most compelling witnesses, if they could be persuaded to talk, would be 
Americans: the men in Willingham's platoon.
86
 
 
 When Wilson had interviewed members of Charlie Company during the 
Inspector General's preliminary investigation into Ridenhour's allegations some of the 
men he encountered were willing, even eager to tell him what they had seen and done. 
He was to recall that Paul Meadlo came to meet him 'determined to relieve his 
conscience and describe the horrors of My Lai.'
87
 The men in Bravo Company's 1st 
Platoon were a different proposition. Twenty-four of the twenty-seven men who had 
crossed the bridge towards My Khe 4 on 16 March had survived the war but, it was 
noted in the Peers Report, eight of them refused to answer the inquiry's 'questions about 
the incident and several others who testified claimed to have little or no recollection of 
their actions and observations'.
88
 Perhaps the trappings of a military inquiry were less 
likely to impress those who had left the Army but, of the four men who were still in 
uniform, only SP4 Rodney Linkous, who had led the platoon's 2nd Squad, offered any 
co-operation. Willingham refused to answer questions and Staff Sergeant Earl Rushin, 
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who had been the 1st Platoon's sergeant, and Staff Sergeant Roy Lias, who had been the 
leader of the platoon's 1st Squad, insisted that they found it difficult to recall the details 
of the operation.  
 
 One of those who had left the Army had been more forthcoming. Late in 
November 1969, Terry Reid had volunteered an account of a massacre to a newspaper 
in Wisconsin, identified the unit to which he had belonged and indicated that the 
massacre had taken place before August 1968.
89
 Although the newspaper report located 
the massacre to the north-west of Chu Lai, miles away from Son My, it contained other 
details which suggested that Reid might have described the assault on My Khe 4 and 
when the report was brought to Walsh's attention, probably while he was still in 
Vietnam, Reid's potential as a witness must have been clear.
90
 Frustratingly, however, 
whatever had driven Reid to talk to a journalist about the events at My Khe 4 did not 
persuade him to assist the army in its inquiries. CID, which had been ordered in 
December to investigate Reid's allegations, sent an agent to interview him on 21 
January but Reid would not elaborate upon the information which he had given to the 
newspaper, explaining that:  
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   On 2 January 1970 it was recorded that 'The Peers Inquiry is … looking into this allegation as part of its 
investigation of TF Barker operations.' 'Reid Allegation (Co Lay/Co Luy)', 2 January 1970 in ibid. 
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The reason I'm not revealing the entire incident to you or the press is this: I will 
not place myself in a position to possibly persecute and condemn my comrades 
even though what they did was wrong. The guilt, I believe, is not with them 
alone but with the people who helped train their minds with regard to the 
invincibility of one's race, color and creed.
91
 
 
Those who were prepared, unlike Reid, to talk to Walsh and Wilson about what had 
happened nearly two years before proved to have similar misgivings: they did not want 
to provide testimony which might be used against their comrades. 
 
 It was not even easy to establish who had been in Willingham's platoon.
92
 A 
roster of Bravo Company's personnel for the operation in Son My which Walsh and 
Wilson had obtained was no more than a starting point: it listed only twenty of the 
twenty-seven men in the platoon and it led Walsh and Wilson to believe that others, 
who had missed the operation or switched platoons, might have been involved in the 
massacre.
93
 Much of Walsh and Wilson's questioning, even in the later interviews, was 
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He had told The Paper: 'If I had been a man and objected to what I saw being done, I probably would 
have gone to jail for five years'. Allan Ekvall, 'Fond du Lac GI says Viet slaughter "common"', The 
Paper, 28 November 1969. 
92
 In Vietnam, the US Army chose to replace the individuals in a unit rather than to rotate the units. This 
made more difficult the task of identifying a unit's personnel at a particular time.   
93
 'Personnel Roster, Company B, 4th Bn, 3rd Inf, as of 31 October 1968. Corrected as of 16 March 1968.' 
Peers Report, Vol. III, Book 3, Exhibit M-24 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-
III. The roster was corrected by Sergeant Wilhelm Dahner, Bravo's company sergeant, when he appeared 
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driven by the need to establish who had been in Willingham's platoon. The transcripts 
indicate what a frustrating task this must have been: some of those who testified were 
unwilling to help, most found it difficult to remember exactly who they had served with 
on an operation nearly two years before and even when a name was remembered, it was 
not necessarily a surname.
94
 Reaching agreement about who had been attached to the 
platoon's first and second squads and the role that each soldier had played in the assault 
on My Khe 4 was more trying still. At the same time, there were the men who had 
served in Bravo Company's other platoons to identify and question and, in addition to 
the massacre at My Khe 4, there were allegations that members of the company had 
been involved in the mistreatment of prisoners to investigate.  
 
 Walsh and Wilson's C Team elicited enough information to corroborate, in 
important ways, the descriptions of the massacre which had been obtained from 
Vietnamese sources. Some of the testimony by men in Bravo Company's other platoons 
also suggested that Willingham's platoon had killed civilians on 16 March. Although it 
had 'not been possible to reconstruct the events with certainty', the Peers Report was 
able to describe the nature of the assault on My Khe 4. The initial burst of fire, which 
had lasted 'for approximately 5 minutes', had killed 'some inhabitants … mostly women 
and children' and when members of the platoon entered the sub-hamlet 'firing into the 
houses and throwing demolitions into shelters … Many noncombatants apparently were 
killed in the process'.
95
 Although there was no suggestion that villagers had been 
                                                                                                                                               
before the Peers Inquiry on 14 January 1970. Despite the alterations Dahner made to the roster to reflect 
the company's strength on 16 March, gaps remained.   
94
 A complete list of the men in Willingham's platoon on 16 March 1968 was not provided in the Peers 
Report. The statement that 'only 22 men' in the platoon 'appear to have witnessed or participated' in the 
massacre is the closest that the report came to specifying the platoon's strength. Goldstein et al., p. 168. 
Peers was wrong to assert in The My Lai Inquiry that Willingham's platoon 'consisted of only twenty-two 
men'. Peers, p. 185. Comparison of the testimony heard by the Peers Inquiry, the first volume of the Peers 
Report and available CID records indicates that there were twenty-seven men in 1st Platoon. Their names 
are listed in Chapter I. 
95
 Goldstein et al., p. 46. 
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gathered into groups to be executed, as they had been at My Lai 4, 'testimony and 
circumstantial evidence strongly suggest(ed) that a large number of non-combatants' 
had been killed by Willingham's platoon. It was much harder, however, to find evidence 
against individual soldiers.
96
  
 
 Eventually, Walsh and Wilson's inquiries led to the conclusion in the Peers 
Report that 'ten men directly participated in the search and destruction of My Khe [4]'. 
Although they were not named in the report, it is clear that the ten included the four men 
in the point team, Donald Hooton, Beverly Larche, Larry Taylor and Ray Tittle, and two 
soldiers who had not survived the war, Edward Milus and Gregory Mossford.
97
 There 
was strong evidence that the machine gunner Milus had fired at and killed civilians. 
Some testified to witnessing his actions in My Khe 4 and others to hearing him boast of 
his exploits but there was not much to be gained by developing a case against Milus. By 
the middle of February Walsh and Wilson had also gathered enough evidence against 
Hooton and Taylor to warn them, when each appeared before the inquiry, that they were 
suspected of murder.
98
 By then, Willingham had been charged but Peers was reluctantly 
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 Ibid., p. 175. 
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 Walsh wrote in the Peers Report that two of the ten were dead and described how 'the point team and 
the 1st Squad moved down the trail searching and then burning the houses'. As they did so these 'elements 
of the platoon … killed an undetermined number of noncombatants'. Ibid., p. 174. It seems likely that the 
report was also referring to Lias, the leader of 1st Squad and Leo J. Strachan, Milus' assistant on the 
machine gun. There was contradictory testimony about the number of men in Lias' squad and who they 
were. Making up the ten might have been Marvin Jones or James Placek, who appeared before the 
inquiry, David Millsaps, who did not, or Cresencio Garcia who had been killed in April 1968. Larry 
Holmes was a member of the platoon's 2nd Squad but there was an allegation, which CID began to 
investigate, that he had committed murder at My Khe 4. In a brief reference to Peers' investigation of the 
massacre at My Khe 4, Bilton and Sim jumped to the erroneous conclusion that, with Milus and 
Mossford, the eight men who refused to appear before the Peers Inquiry 'were thought primarily 
responsible for most of the ninety deaths in the village.' Neither Terry Reid nor Amos Williams appeared 
before the Peers Inquiry but there is no indication in the report that either of them were suspected of 
killing anyone at My Khe 4. Bilton and Sim, p. 297. 
98
 Unlike the others in the point team, Hooton and Taylor agreed to make appearances before the inquiry 
but Wilson's journey to St Louis to interview Taylor on 15 February 1970 achieved little: Taylor refused 
to answer questions. Hooton's appearance was two days later. He answered some of the inquiry's 
questions but, on the advice of counsel, refused to answer others. (Wilson interviewed Placek in Chicago 
and Taylor in St Louis on successive days. Taylor had lost a foot while trying to disarm a mine on the day 
after the massacre at My Khe 4 and this may explain why Wilson travelled to St Louis to meet him. 
Placek might simply have refused to travel to Washington.) 
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coming to the conclusion that none of the men who had left the Army would be 
prosecuted for the murder of civilians in Son My.
99
  
 
This was because the Supreme Court had ruled in 1955 that it was 
'unconstitutional to subject ex-servicemen to trial by courts-martial, and Congress had 
never given any civilian federal court the authority to try them for crimes committed 
abroad' as Michal R. Belknap has explained in The Vietnam War on Trial.
100
 It had 
become clear to the Army by the middle of November 1969 that this was going to cause 
a problem. The Provost Marshal General reported to Westmoreland that, whilst 
'consideration is being given to possible charges' against nine members of Charlie 
Company who were still on active duty, there were another fifteen 'who are no longer 
on active duty' who were suspected of intentionally killing civilians at My Lai 4.
101
 
Various solutions were considered. Colonel William G. Eckhardt, who supervised the 
prosecutions of those charged with offences at Son My, wrote later that 'there were three 
jurisdictional bases that could have been chosen': one was to try ex-servicemen by 
courts-martial for violation of the law of war, another was to try them by military 
commission and a third possibility was to persuade Congress to give federal district 
courts the necessary authority.
102
 Particular effort was expended in exploring the 
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 CID documents indicate that Tittle had left the Army. A 'Fact Sheet', dated 2 April 1970, listed him as a 
civilian and he is referred to as Mr. Ray Tittle, Jr. in an investigator's statement, dated 21 April 1970, 
which identified Lias and Rushin according to their ranks. However, a memorandum sent to the Deputy 
Secretary of the General Staff by the Office of the Provost Marshal General on 11 April 1970 noted that, 
of the four members of the point team, 'only SGT Tittle is still in the service'. In view of Tittle's refusal to 
appear before the Peers Inquiry or make a statement to the CID and because there is no suggestion that 
charges against him were considered, it seems likely that he had left the Army by the end of 1969. 'Fact 
Sheet: Son My Investigation', 11 April 1970 in Folder 2AA, Box 2, HTA, LC, UMSCL, AA; 
Investigator's Statement by Raymond E. Miller, 21 April 1970 in CID Report of Investigation on Donald 
Hooton, 70-CID011-00049, HTA, LC, UMSCL, AA; Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of the General 
Staff, Subject: Son My Investigation - Company B, 4th Battalion, 3d Infantry, 11 April 1970 in Folder 
2CC, Box 2, HTA, LC, UMSCL, AA. 
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 Belknap, p. 221. The Supreme Court had made the ruling in the case of Toth v Quarles. 
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 'Fact Sheet: To inform the Army Chief of Staff of the current status of the My Lai Investigation', 18 
November 1969 in Folder 2AA, Box 2, HTA, LC, UMSCL, AA. 
102
 William G. Eckhardt, 'My Lai: An American Tragedy', 2000. In 1996, as Eckhardt noted, the US 
Congress finally gave federal district courts the authority to try civilians for violations of the law of war. 
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possibility that ex-servicemen could be tried for violations of the law of war. On 24 
November, Secretary of the Army Resor was provided with a fact sheet by the Provost 
Marshal General's office which included a 'Discussion of Jurisdiction Over Former 
Army Members Who May Have Committed Offenses at My Lai' drafted by Major 
General Kenneth Hodgson, the Judge Advocate General. Hodgson expressed the 
opinion 'that the Army is empowered to try by general court-martial or military 
commission former members of the military who may have committed offenses at My 
Lai in violation of the law of war.'
103
 Eight days later, with Resor's support, Army 
General Counsel Robert E. Jordan III sent an eight page memorandum to the US 
Attorney General's office which argued that 'There is statutory authority which would 
allow discharged servicemen to be tried for violations of the law of war'. The 
memorandum concluded with the suggestion that 'we attempt to obtain Executive 
Branch agreement on the propriety of trial by military tribunal' in such cases. According 
to Jordan, however, the possibility was not pursued because 'We would have needed the 
president's support to proceed … We didn't have much support'.104  
                                                                                                                                               
Bernd Greiner has pointed out that this legislation does not apply to Vietnam veterans and 'others who left 
military service before 1996'. Greiner, War Without Fronts: The USA in Vietnam (London: The Bodley 
Head, [original in German 2007] 2009), p. 298. Steven D. Green became the first ex-serviceman to be 
tried under this authority in May 2009. He was found guilty of the rape and murder of an Iraqi girl and of 
the murder of members of her family. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. James Dao, 'Ex-Soldier 
Gets Life Sentence for Iraq Murders', The New York Times, 21 May 2009. 
103
 Inclosure 5 to 'Fact Sheet: Alleged Murder of Noncombatant Civilians in the Hamlet of My Lai [4], 
Republic of Vietnam', undated. A  memorandum to the Secretary of the General Staff indicates that Resor 
had instructed the Provost Marshal General to provide the fact sheet by 24 November 1969. A draft of the 
material in the inclosure is headed 'TJAG Response'. These documents are in Folder 2CC, Box 2, HTA, 
LC, UMSCL, AA. 
104
 Jordan's memorandum and his comments about its fate are cited in Deborah Nelson, The War Behind 
Me:Vietnam Veterans Confront The Truth About US War Crimes (New York: Perseus Books, 2008), p. 
138 and pp. 149-153. Eckhardt, who referred to the memorandum in 'My Lai: An American Tragedy', 
asserted that President Nixon and his attorney general 'could not or would not' support the idea of trying 
ex-servicemen in a federal court. He was speaking at a conference held at Tulane University in December 
1994. The purpose of the conference was 'to reflect upon the massacre (at My Lai 4) and related issues of 
war and atrocity.' Some of the sessions were recorded and transcripts made of the recordings. The 
transcripts appeared in David L. Anderson (ed.), Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), p. 43. Eckhardt also expressed the opinion in a 
conversation with the writer on 3 August 2009 that Nixon and his advisors 'would just as soon the whole 
thing went away'. A recording of the conversation is in the writer's possession.  
   The wording of President Nixon's first public statement about the massacre at My Lai 4 suggests that 
Jordan and Eckhardt were correct in their assessments of the president's attitude. The statement was 
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  Word of the work that military lawyers were engaged in reached the 
newspapers. On 26 November, for example, The New York Times reported that 
'Pentagon lawyers are searching lawbooks to find if there is any way to prosecute men 
who took part in … the massacre at Songmy but who have since been released from 
active duty' adding that, if they were successful, an announcement would be made 
within a few days.
105
 Seymour Hersh detected conspiracy, alleging that 'Pentagon 
correspondents were fed information pointing out that the Army was doing everything 
possible to get jurisdiction over former Charlie Company members in order to prosecute 
them' because the Army wanted to frighten into silence those members of Charlie 
Company who, believing that they could not be charged, were confessing to the media 
that they had killed people at My Lai 4.
106
 Whilst the Army might have been guilty of 
manipulating reporters to this end, it was not inventing the stories.
107
 Military lawyers 
were trying to find ways to prosecute ex-servicemen and when The Washington Star 
reported on 3 December that, as Hersh put it, 'the Army was planning to send the Justice 
                                                                                                                                               
reported in The New York Times on 9 December 1969 under the headline 'President Pledges Penalty For 
Any Guilty at Songmy' but Nixon had been careful to say something rather different: 'That's why I'm 
going to do everything I possibly can to see that all the facts in this incident are brought to light and that 
those who are charged, if they are found guilty, are punished.' About the problems associated with the 
charging of ex-servicemen, the president had no comment. David Rosenbaum, 'President Pledges Penalty 
For Any Guilty at Songmy', The New York Times, 9 December 1969.  
   Privately, Nixon was more explicit. He told Kissinger during a telephone conversation on 17 March 
1970 that the massacre at My Lai 4 'was covered up because it was in the interest of the country … We 
know why it was done. These boys being killed by women carrying that stuff in their satchels … Let's get 
it out of the way.' Cited by Greiner, p. 288. Greiner and others have noted Nixon's fear that his plans in 
Vietnam might be disrupted by the reaction to the massacre. Ibid., p. 319. A more sophisticated analysis 
is to be found in Oliver, The My Lai massacre in American history and memory, pp. 73-79.  
   In Belknap's opinion, the attorney general rejected the idea of trying ex-servicemen by military tribunal 
because of a concern that 'this procedure would trigger protracted litigation over its legality'. He also 
noted the concern that public opinion might have swung against the military trial of civilians. Belknap, p. 
222. 
105
Fred Graham, 'Army Lawyers Seek Way To Bring Ex-G.I.'s to Trial', The New York Times, 26 
November 1969; the possibility of a 'special military tribunal' was raised in Edward F. Sherman, 'Songmy 
2: Some Knotty Legal Questions', The New York Times, 7 December 1969. 
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 Hersh, My Lai 4, p. 162. On 24 November, for example, Paul Meadlo had confessed to murdering 
women and children on television. Details of the confessions made to the media by Meadlo and others in 
Charlie Company are provided in Chapter III.   
107
 In conversation with the writer Eckhardt expressed the view that Hersh's theory 'assumes a 
sophistication that is far beyond what I think the (Army's) capabilities were at the time.' 
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Department a document outlining possible ways of trying ex-servicemen', it was 
referring to Jordan's memorandum.
108
   
 
 That, by February 1970, Peers thought it unlikely that charges would be laid 
against civilians is suggested in The My Lai Inquiry. Willingham was charged on the 
day that he was due to leave the Army, Peers explained, because 'the attitude of the 
American people and the climate within the government at the time were such that had 
he been released to civilian status, it was highly unlikely that he would have been 
prosecuted at all.'
109
 Nevertheless, the documentary record shows that, when 
Willingham was charged, senior military lawyers were still hopeful of finding a way to 
try those who had left the Army. Indeed, the idea was mooted that the case against 
Willingham could test the proposition that ex-servicemen could be tried by a military 
tribunal for violations of the law of war. 
 
 Willingham's lawyers were expected to contend that their client had become a 
civilian before he was charged. This was because Willingham had received orders on 7 
February releasing him from active duty on 10 February and it had been necessary to 
revoke these orders so that he could remain under the Army's jurisdiction.
110
 The first 
charge against Willingham, that he had violated Article 118 of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ) by the 'unpremeditated murder of 20 Vietnamese individuals', 
was similar to the charges which had been preferred against members of Charlie 
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 Hersh, My Lai 4, p. 162. 
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 Peers, p. 197. 
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 'Talking Paper', 13 February 1970 in CIP 180 XI-1-5: Captain Thomas K. Willingham, RPI, NARA. 
On 2 March the Chicago Tribune reported that Willingham's lawyer was planning to demand his client's 
release from the Army on the grounds that he had been released from the Army when he was charged. 
'Viet Massacre Suspect Seeks Army Release', Chicago Tribune, 2 March 1970. By 3 March the Judge 
Advocate General had been 'informed that attorneys for Captain Willingham are preparing to seek his 
release from the Army in either the United States Court of Military Appeals or a United States District 
Court.' 'Son My Summary Report Number 11', 3 March 1970 in Box 1, My Lai: Army Staff Monitor 
Summaries, Feb.-May 1970, RAS, RG 319, NARA. 
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Company but the second anticipated the defence that he had already become a civilian. 
He was charged with violating 'the laws of war by murdering 20 Vietnamese 
individuals'.
111
 The wording reflected the involvement of the Army's senior lawyers: as 
Peers recalled, the Army General Counsel, the Judge Advocate General, and the Provost 
Marshal were consulted before the decision was taken to prefer charges against 
Willingham.
112
 The thinking behind the second charge is revealed in an Army 'Talking 
Paper', dated 13 February 1970, which suggested that if Willingham's lawyers were 
successful in arguing that he had been 'irrevocably separated from active duty prior to 
the time he was charged', his case 'may provide a test vehicle for the proposition that 
former servicemen may be tried by a military tribunal for war crimes in violation of the 
law of war.'
113
 In the same document it was recorded that 'The Judge Advocate General 
and the Office of the General Counsel, Department of the Army, have concluded
 
that 
(former servicemen) may be tried by military tribunal [either military commission or 
court-martial] for war crimes in violation of the law of war' and that: 
The legal issues, policy implications and the mechanics of such trials – as well 
as the possibility of conferring jurisdiction upon civilian courts to try these 
persons - are being considered further by The Judge Advocate General, the 
General Counsel of the Army, the Department of Defense, and the Department 
of State.
114
  
 
 
According to Westmoreland, the question of jurisdiction was still under 
discussion several months later. When he appeared before Hébert's sub-committee on 
10 June 1970, the day on which it was announced that the charges against Willingham 
had been dropped, Westmoreland stated that he had been told by the Secretary of the 
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 Son My Army Staff Monitor Summary, 11 February 1970 in Box 1, My Lai: Army Staff Monitor 
Summaries, Feb. - May 1970, RAS, RG319, NARA. 
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 Peers, p. 197. 
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 Talking Paper', 13 February 1970. There was some speculation in the newspapers about the nature of 
the charges against Willingham, the precise wording of which was not released. The New York Times was 
told by a 'ranking Pentagon officer' that the second charge might be easier to prove than the first. 
Possibly, this was deliberately misleading. The Army would not have been eager to reveal the charge's 
rationale.  'Accused Captain Linked to 20 Killings', The New York Times, 14 February 1970. 
114
 Talking Paper', 13 February 1970.    
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Army and the Army's Judge Advocate General that 'there probably is a way' that ex-
servicemen could be charged with crimes committed whilst they were in uniform and 
that he had been informed that 'the Secretary and his General Counsel are working 
diligently on this matter with the Department of Justice.
115
 At what point Army lawyers 
resigned themselves to defeat is unclear. Peers' pessimism might have been unjustified 
in February 1970 but, by the time that the charges against Willingham were dropped, it 
seems likely that Army lawyers had realised that the executive branch did not want to 
get involved and that Westmoreland's statement to the sub-committee was driven by 
pragmatism: telling the sub-committee that those who had left the service could not be 
tried would have put the Chief of Staff in an uncomfortable position.
116
 It was not until 
8 April 1971 that the Department of Defense and the Justice Department announced that 
they had been unable to agree on a method of prosecuting ex-servicemen and that 'as a 
practical matter the problem is not being studied any further' but the delay in making the 
announcement was probably to allow the dust to settle.
117
  
 
Charges having been made against Willingham, it became the CID's 
responsibility to investigate the events at My Khe 4. Prompted by Bay's testimony to 
Feher, the agency had recognised by 20 December that a second investigation might be 
necessary and the leads which it had been ordered to pursue in Kamm's report in The 
New York Times and the newspaper story about Terry Reid had implicated the men of 
Bravo Company. There had been little progress, however. Kamm's report was dismissed 
as 'a questionable, unsupported lead' and the agency did no more than forward 'a request 
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 Investigation of the My Lai Incident: Hearings ... Under Authority of H. Res. 105, pp. 851-852. In 
December 1969 Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. of North Carolina 'introduced legislation to give federal district 
courts jurisdiction over discharged soldiers accused of offenses committed while in the service.' The bill 
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 In conversation with the writer, Eckhardt commented: 'I don't know when the decision was made and I 
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 'Failure to Prosecution(sic) former soldiers', Box 8, Folder 42, Papers of Four Hours in My Lai, 
LHCMA, KCL. 
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for appropriate inquiry' to the headquarters of the US Army in Saigon eighteen days 
after Peers had sent the same inquiry to General Abrams.
118
 The decision to interview 
Reid was taken on 31 December but three weeks were to pass before he made his 
statement. Colonel Henry Tufts, CID's commanding officer, had indicated on 6 January 
1970 that consideration was to be given to the formation of 'another team for 
requirements at Co Lay [2]' and, in Vietnam, agents continued to question people who 
had lived in Co Luy but it was not until 11 February, the day after Willingham was 
charged, that the CID investigation was formally expanded to include the actions of 
Bravo Company.
119
 Had it not been for Walsh and Wilson's efforts, therefore, the 
actions of Willingham and his platoon might not have been investigated. 
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 Undated, untitled CID record in War Crimes Allegations - 9; Reid Allegation (Co Lay/Co Luy). The 
response, from Captain Dale E. Patrick on behalf of General Abrams, clarified the geography of Son My 
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 Daily Journal of the CID Task Force in Vietnam, 6 January 1970 in Box 8, Folder 36, Papers of Four 
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we desire to interview.' Daily Journal of the CID Task Force in Vietnam, 13 January 1970 in Box 8, 
Folder 36, Papers of Four Hours in My Lai, LHCMA, KCL; on 19 January 1970 an agent made a 
statement that he had interviewed six Vietnamese who had once resided in Co Luy. None of them had 
been in Co Luy on 16 March but all of them had heard rumours that people living in Co Luy had been 
killed. Witness Statement by Juel M. Moses, 19 January 1970 in Box 02, Folder 04, My Lai Collection, 
TVA, TTU.  
   Tufts issued a memorandum affirming the the decision he had taken on 11 February 1970 to reorient 
CID's My Lai investigation. He noted that 'In connection with CPT Willingham's involvement, it becomes 
apparent that we must expand our My Lai investigation to explore allegations of crimes committed by … 
B4/3 (Bravo Company)'. 'Reorientation of My Lai [4] Investigation', 12 February 1970 in CIP 180 XI-1-
5: Captain Thomas K. Willingham, RPI, NARA. CID recorded the progress of its Son My investigation in 
weekly fact sheets. The first to indicate that CID agents were investigating the Bravo Company operation 
is dated 17 February 1970. See Folder 2, Box 2, HTA, LC, UMSCL, AA. Thus, Belknap's assertion that 
'The CID's investigation yielded evidence sufficient to justify prosecuting … Willingham' is an error. 
Belknap, p. 217. 
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Responsible for the collection of evidence against those suspected of crimes at 
My Lai 4 and, in the form of reports of investigation, for assessing the value of that 
evidence, CID's resources seem to have been stretched to the limit.
120
 By 4 December 
1970, when the agency completed its work, seventy-six complaints had been 
investigated, thirty-eight of which had formed the basis for twenty-five reports of 
investigation 'identifying 46 subjects and pertaining to offenses of murder, assault with 
attempt to commit murder, rape, aggravated assault, maimimg (and) indecent assault.' 
Agents had conducted over 800 interviews during an investigation which, by December 
1969, was proceeding 'at an accelerated pace' because of 'Worldwide attention to the 
incident (at My Lai 4)'.
121
 The memorandum in which Tufts affirmed the agency's 
intention to widen its investigation suggests it was because of a lack of personnel that he 
had not, as Peers had, established a separate team to look into the massacre at My Khe 
4.
122
 Tufts complained in the memorandum that 'we cannot do all of the things that we 
have to do simultaneously without obtaining additional investigators from groups in the 
field' and he was unwilling to do this because 'the impact of further depletion of their 
resources would be disastrous to the investigation of crimes in the field'.
123
 His solution 
                                                 
120
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If a CID report indicated that a case was 'founded' and if the suspect remained under military jurisdiction, 
an Article 32 investigation would follow.  
   In 'Lessons Learned From the Son My Incident', completed in June 1972, CID evaluated its 
performance during the investigation of the massacres in Son My. The report, which was sent to the 
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would be supplied with all the people, funds and anything else needed for the investigation.' Peers, p. 12. 
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 'Reorientation of My Lai [4] Investigation', 12 February 1970. 
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was to establish a series of 'priorities ... to produce the products in the order that they are 
required by the Army', the first of which was investigation of the Willingham case.
124
  
 
CID's involvement did not persuade Peers to abandon his investigation into what 
had happened at My Khe 4 although, on the day that Tufts formally expanded the CID 
effort, Colonel Wilson had sent a memorandum to Peers recommending that 'C Team 
terminate interrogations after Friday, 13 February'. Wilson's memo explained that he 
had 'co-ordinated with a CID Team located in the Pentagon which has been assigned to 
pursue the criminal aspects of the unit's operation' and he did not feel that further 
interrogations by C Team would 'provide significant information concerning the unit 
operation'.
125
 Interview Team C, however, questioned another ten members of Bravo 
Company before the end of February and re-interviewed two more early in March.
126
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 Ibid. Tufts' memorandum makes it clear that the reorientation of the CID investigation was a response 
to the requirements of the Army but one historian has interpreted the memorandum differently. In War 
Without Fronts, Greiner argues that Tufts was so impressed by the strength of the case against 
Willingham that he 'demanded that the scope of the (CID) investigation be broadened' to include the 
massacre at My Khe 4 and he adduces Tufts' memorandum, which he does not quote from, as evidence of 
this. Greiner, p. 321. Although the memorandum established as a priority the 'Substantiation of a case or 
the lack of one against CPT Willingham', however, it made no comment about the evidence developed by 
the Peers Inquiry against Willingham. 'Reorientation of My Lai [4] Investigation', 12 February 1970.   
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 'Memorandum for General Peers', 11 February 1970 in CID Report of Investigation on Donald 
Hooton, 70-CID011-00049, p. 667c, US Army Crime Records Center. The identities of the writer of the 
memorandum and the intended recipient of a copy have been obscured in the redacted form in which the 
memorandum appears in the report of investigation. Nevertheless, the 'Colonel' who signed it could 
hardly have been other than Wilson and it is unlikely that he would have intended to send a copy to a 
civilian other than Walsh. In conversation with the writer, Walsh said that he could not remember seeing 
the memorandum before and it is possible that the copy did not reach him. 
126
 There seems to been a compromise - according to Wilson's memo, fifty-five members of Bravo 
Company were still to be interviewed by the inquiry – although Walsh feels that Peers would have been 
determined to  pursue all the leads which were available. Walsh told the writer that 'Peers wouldn’t have 
said (to Wilson), "OK, forget it"' and, only two days before Wilson sent his memo, Peers had told one of 
the men in Willingham's platoon::  
 
I don't appreciate my job as Investigating Officer, but I feel the same way that you do, in that we 
are soldiers and we are American soldiers. We have certain obligations which we have to 
uphold. So, we're not leaving any single stone unturned in order to get at the facts ...We have to 
uphold our honor. And, that's what we're going to do. 
 
Testimony of Jimmie L. Jenkins to Peers Inquiry, 9 February 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/ 
Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook19.pdf.  How much was learned from those who appeared after 13 
February is explored in Chapter I. 
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Peers' unwillingness to accept Wilson's recommendation is susceptible to 
different interpretations. The most provocative of these is that Peers did not trust Tufts' 
agents to investigate properly. That Peers felt that he could have improved upon CID's 
efforts is implied in his comment, seven years later, that he would have liked 'to look in 
… a little greater depth into the activities of BRAVO Company'. Alternatively, he might 
have suspected that he would not be kept informed of any progress made by the CID 
investigation. There is only one statement from a member of Bravo Company in the 
final volume of the Peers Report which, according to its preface, contained 'CID 
statements received prior to the submission of this report (that were) considered to be 
relevant to this inquiry'.
127
 It is possible, therefore, that Tufts did not provide Peers with 
the CID statements taken from members of Willingham's platoon. Amongst those who 
had not testified to the inquiry when Peers received Wilson's memorandum were a 
number of men in 1st Platoon, including Hooton, Taylor and Willingham and, whilst 
Peers might have been doubtful that anybody's testimony would lead to fresh charges, 
he might have wanted to ensure that he had direct access to any information which they 
might provide in order that Walsh could write a more conclusive report about the events 
at My Khe 4.
128
 Whatever the grounds for Peers' decision to reject Wilson's 
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This volume of the Peers Report is available on micro-film as The Peers Inquiry of the Massacre at My 
Lai, Vol. IV: CID Statements, (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1996), p. i. The only 
statement by a member of Bravo Company included in Volume IV was made by Sergeant Paul Love. 
After Cochran was killed, Love had taken command of Bravo's 2nd Platoon for the rest of the day but 
Walsh and Wilson had mistakenly believed that Love had been in Willingham's platoon during the 
operation in Son My. Love's statement was taken on 19 February 1970 by a CID agent on behalf of the 
Peers Inquiry because Love was stationed in South Vietnam. (It was requested by Colonel Whalen who 
was responsible for the collection of documents during the inquiry.) Love stated that he 'did not know 
where the other platoons operated or what they did' on 16 March 1968. Testimony of Rodney V. Linkous 
to Peers Inquiry; Testimony of Paul Bartholomew Love, CID Witness Statement, 19 February 1970 in 
The Peers Inquiry of the Massacre at My Lai, Vol. IV: CID Statements, pp. 116A-116C. 
128
 Peers made no complaint about a lack of co-operation from CID in The My Lai Inquiry. Indeed, he 
noted that Major E.F. Zychowski, who liaised between CID and the Peers Inquiry, 'was most useful 
throughout our investigation in obtaining copies of the CID's testimony'. Peers, p. 13. In conversation 
with the writer, however, Walsh recalled that 'we didn't regularly see everything that (CID) were doing' 
and it might have been that, in the rush to complete the report, the CID statements from members of 
Bravo Company were simply forgotten.  
   Another possibility is that the statements were excluded because, by the time Peers was completing his 
report, there were doubts that a case could be made against Willingham. Those on the Army staff 
monitoring the progress of the Son My investigations were told on 6 April 1970 that 'Some 25 former 
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recommendation, it is clear that he was determined to find out what he could about My 
Khe 4.  
  
The outcome of CID's efforts to investigate the events at My Khe 4 cannot be 
described as satisfactory. The charges against Willingham were dropped in June 1970 
because there was 'insufficient evidence to substantiate or refute allegations' that he had 
'ordered the killings'.
129
 There was evidence that Donald Hooton had murdered a child: 
on 23 April 1970 a CID Report of Investigation was completed with the conclusion that 
'Hooton did, at My Khe [4] … with premeditation, murder an unidentified Vietnamese 
boy by shooting him in the head with, presumably, a .45 caliber pistol' but Hooton was a 
civilian and he was not charged.
130
 The other subject of CID investigation was Larry 
Holmes. He, too, was suspected of murder but he was also a civilian. His case did not 
                                                                                                                                               
members of 1st plt have been interviewed' and that the case against Willingham had 'an estimated 
conclusion of "unfounded"'. The two other members of Willingham's platoon against whom allegations 
had been made were no longer in the Army and, by March 1970, Peers apparently doubted that charges 
would be laid against those who had left the service. If pessimism about the outcomes of CID's 
investigations into the massacre at My Khe 4 explains the decision to omit these statements from the 
report, however, it is hard to understand why Peers chose to include the testimony given to his inquiry by 
members of Bravo Company in the second volume of his report,. 'Son My Army Staff Monitor Summary', 
6 April 1970. 
   Greiner makes the unsourced assertion that, at some unidentified point after Peers' return from South 
Vietnam, CID 'no longer had the power to analyse the evidence and interviews it had collected' and that 
'118 interviews about My Lai [4] and My Khe [4] were placed at the disposal of Peers and his colleagues.' 
Greiner, p. 313. It is possible that this is true of some of the statements about the events at My Lai 4 and, 
perhaps, Walsh was provided with some or all of the statements relating to the killings in My Hoi which 
Vietnamese witnesses had given to CID agents between 2 January and 10 March. The statements about 
the massacre at My Hoi taken by CID agents from Vietnamese witnesses on 14 March could not have 
reached the inquiry in time to have any impact on the report. (The content of the CID statements taken 
from Vietnamese witnesses between January-March 1970 is considered in Chapter II.) If CID statements 
taken from members of Bravo Company were presented to the Peers Inquiry as Greiner has suggested, it 
seems strange that they were then omitted from Volume IV of the Peers Report. Neither does Greiner's 
suggestion accord with Walsh's description of the relationship between CID and the Peers Inquiry. That 
CID was required to analyse the evidence against Willingham and Hooton and produce a report of 
investigation about each case sheds further doubt on Greiner's claim. 
129
 Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel: 'The CID Investigation Concerning the 
Conduct of B/4/3rd Infantry and A/3/1st Infantry at Son My', 6 July 1971. In 1971, when Chief of Staff 
Westmoreland ordered an administrative review of the actions of some of the men who had been charged 
with offences arising out of the massacre in Son My 'to determine if the individual's conduct was short of 
the desired professional standards', it was concluded that 'The performance of duty by CPT Willingham 
did meet the standards of an officer of his position, grade, and experience, thereby rendering 
administrative action unnecessary.' 'Administrative Review of Son My Cases: JAG 1969/8751', 26 April 
1971 in Folder: Administrative Review - My Lai Cases, 1 of 4, RG319, RAS, NARA. The administrative 
review of Willingham's actions is considered in Chapter II. 
130
 CID Report of Investigation on Donald Hooton, 70-CID011-00049, HTA, LC, UMSCL, AA. 
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even merit a report: it was 'administratively closed' on 21 April 1970 because of 
'insufficient evidence' although he had admitted to a CID agent that he had shot a 
woman at My Khe 4.
131
 There had been a massacre at My Khe 4 but none of the men 
who were responsible were going to be prosecuted.    
 
 The American media, which had been encouraged by the Army's presentation of 
the charges against Willingham to portray the events at My Khe 4 in the context of the 
massacre at My Lai 4, rarely exhibited any enthusiasm for what seemed to be a 
secondary story.
132
 Without photographs of the victims or the drama of a trial, it is 
unsurprising that the story of My Khe 4 made no lasting impression upon the American 
people. Despite this, those who have written about the My Lai Massacre have frequently 
asserted that there were over five hundred victims, a figure which includes those killed 
at My Khe 4.
133
 Those who have not ignored the distinction between the two massacres 
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 See, for example, 'CID Fact Sheet: Son My Village', 2 October 1970 in Box 8, Folder 33, Papers of 
Four Hours in My Lai, LHCMA, KCL. Holmes made this admission to CID agent Thomas Porter on 5 
March 1970. Although Holmes' name has been redacted, other details in the agent's statement make it 
clear that he had been speaking with Holmes. Witness Statement of Larry Holmes, 6 March 1970 in CID 
Report of Investigation on Donald Hooton, 70-CID011-00049, US Army Crime Records Center.  
132
 The Army's presentation of the actions of Bravo and Charlie Companies as if they constituted a single 
incident is exemplified in the official titles of the Peers Inquiry and the Peers Report. The title of the 
inquiry was The Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai 
Incident and the title of the subsequent report was The Report of the Department of the Army Review of 
the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident. The presentation of the massacre at My Khe 4 in 
the media is the subject of Chapter III.   
133
 The Vietnamese have produced a list, which purports to be definitive, of 504 men, women and 
children who were killed in Son My. Many of the names on the list are the same as, or very similar to, the 
names of those identified as victims at My Hoi by Vietnamese who testified to CID (the translation of 
Vietnamese names into English being subject to some variation).  
   In Son My, the victims of the massacre at My Hoi are also memorialised in song, as Heonik Kwon has 
revealed in After the Massacre: Commemoration and Consolation in Ha My and My Lai, an analysis of 
the ways in which Vietnamese communities have responded to the suffering inflicted upon them during 
the 'American War'. The title of the song, which Kwon recorded in Son My, translates as 'Come, and Visit 
My Hoi' and its words assert that one of the sadnesses of the massacre at My Hoi is that the precise 
number of victims cannot be known: 
 
 
Let's listen to a story of a crime. 
When the night's fog is still glittering the bush, 
Birds are singing, hens are calling chicks. 
Diligent children have already begun their play. 
Farmers chase their buffalo toward the horizon. 
Old women and men, and children, 
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have usually followed Seymour Hersh in arguing that, whilst the massacres were carried 
out in different places by men from different units, they proceeded from the same set of 
orders.
134
 The weaknesses of this argument have been recently exemplified in The My 
Lai Tapes, a radio documentary presented by Robert Hodierne.
135
 Made to 
commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the massacres in Son My, The My Lai Tapes 
was dramatised by the inclusion of recordings of testimony given to the Peers Inquiry. 
Like Hersh, Hodierne drew selectively upon the testimony heard by the Peers Inquiry in 
an attempt to fit the story of the massacre at My Khe 4 into the context of the 'My Lai 
Massacre' but, in doing so, he was guilty of numerous factual errors. Hodierne stated, 
for example, that:  
Up until the Peers Inquiry it had been part of the cover-up that only Charlie 
Company had been involved in the massacre and only in the village of My Lai 
but during the inquiry it emerged that a second company, Bravo, was also 
involved and had attacked another village: My Khe. Both companies, it became 
                                                                                                                                               
Who earn a living from the soil- 
Who wants to kill them? 
Does the nation know about it? 
An American crime has just been heard. 
Some lost parents. 
Some left no trace, entire families, leaving nobody to wear the white ribbon of mourning. 
This is grievous death. 
You ask me how many, I don't know how many. 
You keep asking me the number, How many? 
I do not know how many were killed. 
I do not count how many incense sticks I ought to burn. 
Let's go see My Hoi, Tu Cung. 
People! Remember My Hoi's blood. 
 Stop the hands of killing.  
The concept of 'grievous death', Kwon explained, involves a sense of the injustice of the killing of non-
combatants and, as the song suggests, of the particular injustices of the destruction of whole families 
which leaves 'nobody to wear the white ribbon of mourning' and the impossibility of precisely 
establishing the number and the identity of the victims. Kwon, who was apparently unaware that there 
had been two massacres in Son My, thought that My Hoi was 'the old name of a subhamlet ... in My Lai'. 
Consequently, he missed the significance of the question 'Does the nation know about it?' and the irony 
that people cannot visit My Hoi because, as Peers reported, it no longer exists which adds another element 
to the concept of 'grievous death': the death of the sub-hamlet itself. Heonik Kwon, After the Massacre: 
Commemoration and Consolation in Ha My and My Lai (London: University of Califiornia Press, 2006), 
pp. 126-127. 
134
 Hersh's argument, which appeared in 'Coverup-I' and Cover-Up, is considered in Chapter III. Ronald 
Ridenhour demonstrated his support for Hersh's position at the conference at Tulane University in 
December 1994 when he declared that 'this was part of a plan. Those men were ordered to go out there 
and destroy this village.' Anderson, pp. 56-57. 
135
 The Archive Hour: The My Lai Tapes, BBC Radio 4, 15 March 2008. Presented by Robert Hodierne. 
The script was written by Hodierne, the Senior Managing Editor of the Military Times, and Rosie 
Goldsmith, the programme's producer. It was also broadcast by BBC's World Service. 
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clear, had received the same briefing before the operation by task force 
commanders Colonel Oran Henderson and Lieutenant Colonel Barker. General 
Peers and his team concluded that the command to kill was a well thought out, 
concerted plan, not a chaotic free-for-all on the part of rogue soldiers. Most 
members of Bravo Company refused to testify at the inquiry.
136
 
 
It is far from certain that there was a conscious attempt to conceal what had happened at 
My Khe 4 by Colonel Henderson and his superiors; Hodierne's identification of the 
location of the second massacre is imprecise and his implication that the whole of Bravo 
Company attacked the 'village' of 'My Khe' is misleading. Worse is the assumption that 
the men of Bravo and Charlie companies received the same briefing from Henderson 
and Barker and the misrepresentation of Peers' conclusions about the significance of the 
briefings received by the men of Bravo Company.  
 
To support the claims that 'Both companies ... had received the same briefing 
before the operation by task force commanders Colonel Oran Henderson and Lieutenant 
Colonel Barker' and that 'the command to kill was a well thought out, concerted plan, 
not a chaotic free-for-all', Hodierne used the testimony of Robert Holmes, who was 
described as 'a rifleman with Bravo'. According to Hodierne, Holmes' testimony was 
particularly 'important' and those listening to The My Lai Tapes heard the following 
exchange between Colonel Wilson and Holmes who, it was explained, was being asked 
about Bravo's pre-operation briefing: 
Wilson: Was there anything discussed about the destruction of villages, and the 
burning of hootches?  
Holmes: Yes. We were … it was supposed to be a search and destroy mission, 
and one of the orders that I thought I heard, or somebody did say, was to shoot 
anything that moves.  
Wilson: Anything? 
Holmes:  Yes, that's the way I received the order. I didn't understand it at the 
time really.  
Wilson: Did you receive orders like this before?  
Holmes: No, not in that tone. Just that we understood that Colonel Barker was 
upset about the men we had been losing. We were led to believe that this area 
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that we were going into was either all VC or they were VCS, VC supporters. I 
thought the area was supposed to be cleared, you know, like the people were 
supposed to have evacuated the area. We found out there were many, many 
civilians.
137
 
  
Had Holmes been a member of Willingham's platoon, had he attended a briefing with 
the rest of the men in Bravo and Charlie companies and received an order to 'shoot 
anything that moves' from Colonel Barker and had, as Hodierne asserted, 'Most 
members of Bravo Company refused to testify at the inquiry', this might have been 
crucial testimony. However, Holmes had been a member of Bravo Company's 3rd 
Platoon, a unit which had killed no-one on 16 March according to the Peers Inquiry, 
and, as fifty-nine of the men in Bravo Company had offered at least some testimony, it 
had become obvious to Peers that 'In the case of B Company, no firm conclusions can 
be drawn as to either the nature or effect of any preoperational psychological buildup 
that may have been given to the men' because they were briefed in different ways and 
not gathered together as a company.
138
 Indeed, elsewhere in his testimony, Holmes 
admitted that he could not recall the source of the idea that anything that moved should 
be shot. Asked 'Were you briefed by Sergeant McCloud or the squad leader?' he replied, 
'I can't really remember whether we were. We talked about it, that's all I can remember, 
that it was, you know, the whole platoon was together and we talked about it, I can't 
really remember, that well …'139 Holmes also painted a picture of an operation that 
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 Walsh concluded that Holmes' platoon 'had searched … My Lai [6]' on the morning of 16 March and 
that the inhabitants had not been harmed. Goldstein et al., p. 172; on 11 February Robert Holmes testified 
to a CID agent that he had seen the body of a Vietnamese in My Lai 6 but there was no indication that his 
platoon had been responding to an order to 'shoot anything that moves'. Robert Holmes, Witness 
Statement, 11 February 1970; Goldstein et al., p. 205. Peers concluded that there were 139 officers and 
enlisted men assigned to Bravo Company in mid-March 1968. The 'field operating strength was ... 
approximately 115 men' of whom at least six did not survive the war. Ibid., p. 83. Of the fifty-nine who 
testified to the Peers Inquiry, fifty-four had taken part in the operation on 16 March. Amos Williams was 
in prison and it is likely that at least some of the others were either untraceable or not required to attend. It 
is at least misleading to suggest that 'Most members of Bravo Company refused to testify at the inquiry'.     
139
 Testimony of Robert D. Holmes to Peers Inquiry, 16 January 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd 
/Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook22.pdf. It is possible that Hodierne confused Robert Holmes with 
Larry Holmes. Hersh referred to Larry Holmes' testimony to the Peers Inquiry when he argued in Cover-
Up that the men of Bravo and Charlie companies had been gathered together and ordered to destroy Son 
My and its inhabitants. Hersh, Cover-Up, p. 9; p. 11.    
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seemed more like 'a chaotic free-for-all' than 'a well thought out, concerted plan' when 
he told Wilson that:  
We never really knew what exactly was going to happen once we got out there. 
It was almost complete disorganization once we hit the ground, all we knew is 
we moved out and we set up security right away, but we didn't know - Sergeant 
McCloud, he, he really didn't know anything either.
140
  
 
 
In November 2009, having already won a BBC Audio and Music award for best 
journalism, The My Lai Tapes earned an award from the London Foreign Press 
Association as the radio story of the year.
141
 Its portrayal of the events at My Khe 4, 
however, is flawed by a carelessness that has become characteristic of attempts to reveal 
the truth about the massacre at My Khe 4. The task of disentangling the story of My 
Khe 4 from the record of the My Lai Massacre requires a willingness to recognise that it 
is a different story and that to explain the behaviour of Willingham's platoon one has to 
do more than dip into the Peers Report.  
 
Whilst the first volume of the Peers Report identified 'Significant Factors Which 
Contributed to the Son My Tragedy', the focus of this section of the report is on the 
events at My Lai 4. In the following chapter, the transcripts of the testimony taken from 
members of Bravo Company by Walsh and Wilson are analysed in order to provide a 
more complete account of the causes of the massacre at My Khe 4. A separate chapter 
considers the available records of the CID investigation and provides an explanation of 
the difficulties faced by prosecutors trying to build a case against Willingham and 
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members of his platoon.
142
 This is an explanation rendered particularly important by the 
recent publication in English of Greiner's War Without Fronts, which resurrects an 
argument first mounted by Hersh that the dropping of the charges against Willingham 
was the result of external pressures. 
  
 To understand why the massacre at My Khe 4 was 'largely ignored' requires a 
consideration of the Army's management of the story and of how the American media 
responded to this. Survey of the ways in which newspapers and news programmes on 
national television reported the clues that there had been another massacre and the 
progress of the case against Willingham reflects the sort of journalistic practice 
identified by Daniel Hallin in The 'Uncensored War', a practice characterised by 'the 
low priority … place(d) on analysis and interpretation' and a 'strong tendency to focus 
on immediate events.'
143
 Collectively, the amount of information about the massacre at 
My Khe 4 was enough to tell the story in some detail. Frequently, however, the 
American media failed to distinguish between the massacres at My Lai 4 and My Khe 4 
and only occasionally was an attempt made to put the details of the story into an 
appropriate context. 
  
 In the first of two chapters about the media's response to the events at My Khe 4, 
the focus is on four newspapers. In the absence of a national newspaper, the only 
printed media which could claim a national audience were the major weekly news 
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 It has proved difficult to obtain a full record of the CID investigation of the massacre at My Khe 4. 
Materials available from the US Army Crime Records Center at Fort Belvoir are heavily redacted and the 
collections of CID documents relating to My Khe 4 to be found at the Henry Tufts Archive, the Liddell 
Hart Centre for Military Archives, the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech University and the National 
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page that people distill down and talk to.'     
143
 Daniel C. Hallin, The 'Uncensored War': The Media and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), p. 74. 
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magazines, Life, Time and Newsweek but, although each of these provided detailed 
coverage of the massacre at My Lai 4, they displayed little interest in the story of My 
Khe 4.
144
 Consequently, the analysis is primarily based upon The NewYork Times, 
described by Leonard R. Sussman in a foreword to Peter Braestrup's Big Story: How the 
American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in 
Vietnam and Washington as 'the nation's most prestigious newspaper and a major 
influence on other media' and The Washington Post, 'important' as Sussman noted 
'because of its bellwether role in the nation's capital'.
145
 Because each of these 
newspapers provided a news service to regional and local newspapers, the stories they 
contained often reached beyond their own readers. The presentation of the story of My 
Khe 4 in the Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times is also considered in order to 
provide some variety of regional and political perspective. All four of these newspapers 
picked up the stories carried by the major wire services, Associated Press (AP) and 
United Press International (UPI). 
 
 Survey of the coverage of stories about My Khe 4 on television news 
programmes is limited to those broadcast by ABC, CBS and NBC. As Hallin noted, 
'virtually nothing of local broadcast journalism has been preserved' from the Vietnam 
War era.
146
 Tapes of the national networks' evening news programmes are available, 
however, and, as James L. Baughman has pointed out in The Republic of Mass Culture: 
In the late 1960s, broadcast regulation of cable and the federal government's 
half-hearted support for non-commercial TV had the effect of reinforcing the 
three networks' dominance. They had little real competition: on a given evening 
more than 90 percent of all sets were tuned to a network program.
147
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 Hallin, p. 11. It is for the same reason that an analysis of the presentation of the My Khe 4 story on 
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America since 1941 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, [1992] 1997), p. 108. 
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 Study of the ways that it was usually presented in print and on the screen helps 
to explain why the massacre at My Khe 4 failed to command the attention of the 
American people. As the next chapter demonstrates, however, it was a story which 
needed to be told.   
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CHAPTER I: THE PEERS INQUIRY AND  
THE MASSACRE AT MY KHE 4 
 
The first volume of the Peers Report attempted to record what had happened in Son My 
and to show the extent to which the events there had been covered up by senior officers 
in the US Army. Although the seventh chapter of the report focused upon the behaviour 
of Willingham's platoon in My Khe 4, Peers was primarily concerned with what had 
happened in and around My Lai 4 and there were only passing references to the 
massacre at My Khe 4 in his consideration of the factors which had led to the killings in 
Son My. Outlines of the actions of Charlie Company in the hamlet of Tu Cung and of 
Bravo Company in the hamlet of Co Luy featured in the second and fifth chapters and 
the fourth chapter included a brief explanation of Bravo Company's history, its strength 
and some comments about its officers but, as Walsh has commented, 'Bravo Company 
… was a sideshow' and this is reflected in the report.1 
 
The inquiry’s description of the massacre at My Khe 4 drew upon the testimony 
taken from the men of Bravo Company by Walsh and Wilson’s Interview Team C and 
the testimony which Feher had elicited from Nguyen Thi Bay. Walsh’s attempts to find 
support for Bay’s story by speaking to other Vietnamese do not seem to have 
contributed much to what he wrote. Although he had questioned 'about twenty-five 
persons’ from Co  Luy whilst he was in Vietnam and others had been talked with 
‘informally … to obtain background information’, what he heard ‘was so jumbled and, 
at times, contradictory that it was difficult to piece together any kind of a picture’, as 
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 Peers devoted a section of the tenth chapter of the report to 'Indicators of Unusual Events' which should 
have attracted the attention of commanders at task force, brigade and divisional levels. He did not 
consider the indications that something 'unusual' was happening at My Khe 4: burning buildings; the 
reports that thirty-eight of the enemy had been killed; the failure to recover any weapons and the absence 
of US casualties. Goldstein et al., pp. 246-259; Walsh in conversation with the writer. 
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Peers observed in The My Lai Inquiry.
2
 The testimony of only six of these witnesses 
appeared in Volume II of the Peers Report, presumably because the others questioned 
by Walsh gave such unhelpful testimony that there was no point in including it. Of the 
six, Ngo Tan Hai was the most useful because he was able to explain the location of My 
Hoi but he also maintained that of ninety-seven people killed in My Hoi only fourteen 
had been innocent civilians.
3
 Otherwise, Walsh seems to have picked up little more than 
rumours: Do Vien spoke of hearing that 'under a hundred' people, including 'some 
women and children', had been killed in My Hoi and other witnesses talked of the 
killing of Viet Cong in the sub-hamlet.
4
  
 
Walsh might also have seen copies of the statements taken by a CID agent in 
early January from Tran Dau and Nguyen The in which mention was made of talk that 
people had been killed in Co Luy.
5
 There is no sign, however, that he was aware of the 
statements supporting many of Bay's allegations which were taken by CID agents from 
over thirty Vietnamese on 10 March and 14 March. Neither is there any indication that 
Walsh had seen any of the statements which CID agents had begun to collect from 
members of Bravo Company after 11 February.
6
  
 
There was an account of the massacre by another survivor which, by January 
1970, had been widely disseminated by the North Vietnamese. Vo Thi Lien's 
description of a 'killing and burning rampage' in My Hoi in which about ninety people, 
mainly old men, women and children had lost their lives was consistent with what Bay 
                                                 
2
  Peers, p. 141. 
3
 See the testimony of Ngo Tan Hai to Peers Inquiry, 1 January 1970. 
4
 See the testimony of Do Vien to Peers Inquiry, 4 January 1970; see the testimonies of Nguyen Am and 
Tinh Troung to Peers Inquiry, 4 January 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/n/frd/Military_Law/pdf/DAR-Vol-
IIBook32.pdf.  
5
 Witness Statement of Tran Dau, 3 January 1970 and Witness Statement of Nguyen The, 4 January 1970. 
Box 02, Folder 01, My Lai Collection, TVA, TTU.  
6
 CID agents had made progress before the completion of the Peers Report. On 5 March, for example, 
Larry Holmes had made the admission that he had shot a woman at My Khe 4.         
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had told Feher and the claims which had appeared in the NLF notice in March 1968. 
Most of the victims, Lien explained, had been killed in their shelters by grenades and 
others were shot as they tried to escape. She identified over fifty of the dead either as  
members of a particular family or as individuals, several of whom had been mentioned 
by Bay or in the NLF notice. Because it was presented as the story of a survivor from 
My Lai and because its source was a twelve year old girl who had been taken to North 
Vietnam after the massacre, the significance of this account does not appear to have 
been recognised by the inquiry.
7
  
 
According to Peers, Walsh ‘felt certain that some atrocities had been committed 
by Bravo Company’when he returned to America on 6 January.8 The detailed nature of 
Bay’s allegations and the accuracy with which she had described the movements of 
Willingham's platoon seem to have led Walsh to this conclusion but he might also have 
recognised that Bay's testimony was corroborated in some respects by the statement 
which Willingham had made to Colonel Wilson on 8 May 1969 during the Inspector 
General's investigation of the Ridenhour allegation and, as CID agents had realised, by 
the text of the NLF notice which had been discovered in Vietnam in December.  
 
Wilson had asked Willingham, only the seventh of the thirty-six men he 
interviewed during his investigation, to explain the 'concept of operations as far as your 
unit was concerned and any units working with you' and he had probed Willingham for 
information about Medina and Calley. There was nothing in Willingham's testimony to 
assist Wilson in his investigation of Charlie Company but he did provide an account of 
Bravo Company's movements during the three-day operation and details of his platoon's 
                                                 
7
 'Son My Survivor's First-hand Account of Massacre', Viet Nam Courier, 1 December 1969. See Item 
2293904001 in Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 - War Atrocities, TVA, TTU. The dissemination of 
Lien's story and reaction to it are considered in Chapters III and IV. 
8
 Peers, p. 141.  
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approach to My Khe 4.
9
 The alacrity with which Willingham provided this description 
is in sharp contrast to the amnesia which apparently afflicted some of the other members 
of 1st Platoon when they were questioned by Wilson in the early months of 1970. 
Willingham, however, was in a different position. He had been in command of the 
platoon in an engagement in which, his reports had indicated, a large number of enemy 
soldiers had been killed. It was also his first experience of command in a major 
operation and, he told Wilson, 'the one and only' occasion on which Bravo Company 
was involved in a 'Search and Destroy' operation. Having been told that he was not a 
suspect, any reticence on Willingham's part might have provoked suspicion and so he 
proceeded to explain at some length the difficulties he and his platoon had faced during 
the operation. Significantly, his description of what had happened after his platoon 
entered My Hoi was, at first, restricted to the single sentence: 'The activities of the rest 
of the day was to search the village of My Khe (4) and burn it.'
10
 
 
According to Willingham, the company's landing zone in Son My was 'hot', 
Cochran was killed before 1st Platoon moved off and there was 'heavy resistance', 
consisting of sniper fire and two grenades which failed to detonate, as he and his men  
approached the bridge leading to My Khe 4, an approach which took 'approximately 
two and a half hours'.
11
 He recalled that he had requested the support of gunships as he 
prepared to cross the bridge because 'we received a heavy sniper fire' but that there were 
none available. Driven back as he tried to lead his platoon across the bridge, he asked 
for mortars to fire across the river but none of the shells exploded. A second attempt to 
cross the bridge having failed, Willingham told Wilson, he reported to Michles that fire 
                                                 
9
 Willingham thought that the operation had begun on 18 or 19 March but his account of the movements 
of Bravo Company during the operation was mainly accurate. Testimony of Thomas K. Willingham, 
Inspector General's Investigation.   
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid. American soldiers were firing their guns in My Lai 4 as the helicopters carrying the men of Bravo 
Company landed and Willingham might have mistaken this, as other members of his company did, for the 
sound of enemy gunfire. 
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was being received from My Khe 4 and then ordered his machine guns to fire 'into the 
area that we received the sniper fire(sic)', an area of 'heavy foliage' which obscured the 
sub-hamlet.
12
 It was noted in the Peers Report that there was 'no record of any report 
being made of this alleged enemy contact' but the Army's rules of engagement in 
Vietnam would have permitted 'preparatory fire' across the bridge 'whether the platoon 
received fire or not'.
13
 A more important question was whether anyone in the platoon 
was fired upon once the bridge had been crossed. What is clear is that there were no 
casualties and, although some of the men maintained that they had received fire in My 
Khe 4, testimony on this point was often vague.
14
 
  
Wilson does not appear to have known about the reports in which Willingham 
had indicated that his platoon had killed thirty-eight of the enemy in My Khe 4 and, 
when Willingham was asked 'How many civilians were killed and wounded in your 
area?', he told Wilson that there had been twenty-eight, of whom five had been non-
combatants. At first it seemed that Wilson was troubled by this testimony and he asked 
Willingham how he had identified twenty-three of the dead as Viet Cong. Willingham, 
who admitted that his platoon had 'found no weapons' in My Khe 4, replied: 
we found one who planted the mine which made one of my men an amputee. In 
a tunnel we found booby traps when these people were in the tunnel, and in the 
area four evaded and wouldn't stop, and the other ones that we found, when we 
received this fire, were young men about the age of 18 to 25. You know how 
they look.
15
 
                                                 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Goldstein et al., pp. 171-172. On 9 February 1970 Leon Mercer appeared before Interview Team C. 
Mercer had served as a Radio Telephone Operator (RTO) for Michles during the operation in Son My and 
he testified that Michles had refused Willingham's request for gunship support because the target was a 
single sniper. Mercer was not sure if this had happened on 16 or 17 March but he added that Willingham 
'on several occasions wanted unnecessary stuff at that time.' Testimony of Leon R. Mercer to Peers 
Inquiry, 9 February 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook21.pdf.    
14
 Jimmie Jenkins, one of the platoon's RTOs, was amongst those who recalled no opposition.  
15
 Testimony of Thomas K. Willingham, Inspector General's Investigation. Taylor, who was the amputee, 
was wounded on 17 March. If the 'one who planted the mine' was killed, it is unlikely that he met his end 
on 16 March. It was the inquiry's view that the mine had been planted after the assault on My Khe 4. 
Wilson made this clear when he questioned Jimmie Jenkins: 'Now, would you tell me ... why you left that 
bridge and went up north and let the VC mine it that night? Why didn't (Willingham) stay down there at 
the bridge ... The company had to cross it the next day.' Testimony of Jimmie L. Jenkins to Peers Inquiry. 
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 Perhaps Wilson did not want to be distracted from the task of finding out if there had 
been a massacre at My Lai 4 because he failed to challenge Willingham's assumption 
that it was acceptable to identify his enemies by the way that they looked and he did not 
ask Willingham to explain the fate of the non-combatants. Asked to account for the 
deaths in My Khe 4, Willingham repeated, with some additional details, his description 
of the difficulties that his platoon had faced in the approach to the sub-hamlet before 
claiming that:      
we met four evading ... They tried to go down the beach line. They were killed. 
We got into the village and assembled all the people in the village ... The tunnel 
rats encountered people in the tunnels and received one grenade which didn't 
hurt anybody ... We found in the hootch and one tunnel we went down ... two 
boobytraps ... One was ... two bullets put together with a firing mechanism ... 
The other one was a mine ... We ... destroyed the tunnel ... We destroyed ... 
bunkers ... and then the body count at that time was about 20 to 23. The final 
report total, when we got there, was 28.
16
   
 
Wilson did not press Willingham for information about the procedure that had been 
followed in the destruction of the tunnel and the bunkers or ask him if this was how the 
non-combatants had died. Reviewed by Walsh in the light of what Bay had told Feher, 
however, some of the details which Willingham had been prepared to divulge would 
have demonstrated that Bay's recollection of events was at least partly accurate.  
 
Like Willingham, Bay stated that some of the victims at My Hoi had been killed 
in a bunker although Bay's description was more precise: she had seen the bodies of 
thirteen women and children in a bunker which had belonged to an inhabitant called Mr 
Le. What confirmed that she had, at least, been in My Hoi when it was searched by 
Willingham's platoon was her testimony that, after she had been raped by two black 
soldiers, 'she was taken ... to another hooch (in which) there were five white soldiers 
and one of them showed her two spent cartridges which were tied together with a rubber 
                                                                                                                                               
Wilson's view was challenged, not very convincingly, by Marvin Jones. Testimony of Marvin B. Jones to 
Peers Inquiry, 7 February 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/ Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook19.pdf.  
16
 Testimony of Thomas K. Willingham, Inspector General's Investigation. 
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band and she was then called a VC' and threatened with a knife.
17
 If Walsh appreciated 
that her testimony in this regard was confirmed by Willingham's reference to the same 
objects, he would have had a compelling reason to take her allegations seriously.
18
     
 
There were also resemblances between Bay's statement and the description of 
the massacre which had been disseminated by the NLF and this had attracted CID's 
attention. The tone of the NLF notice was more sensational but it referred, as Bay had, 
to the killing of a group of people in a bunker belonging to Mr Le and Walsh might 
have noticed that the NLF's allegation that the Americans had 'burned every hut and 
tossed grenades into civilian shelters' was supported to some degree by Willingham's 
testimony.
19
 Bay, who had stressed that 'there were no VC or Vietnamese troops in the 
hamlet' on 16 March and that 'the U.S. troops were not fired upon', explained to Feher 
that 'when American troops entered the hamlet, the population always went into 
bunkers.' On this occasion, however, 'when they came out of the bunkers the soldiers 
opened fire and shot them' and this was reflected in the NLF notice which identified 
'Mrs. Kheo' as having been 'shot to death by (a) bunker entrance.'
20
 Although Bay had 
listed the names of those who had survived and the NLF had named some of the women 
who had been killed, there was, significantly, some agreement about the extent of the 
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 Witness Statement of Nguyen Thi Bay, 17 December 1969. 
18
 Perhaps Willingham made another reference to Bay. When Wilson asked him if he had encountered 
'many South Vietnamese women who were VC.' Willingham replied: 
 
What we can surmise is just if you go into a village and there are a lot of young pregnant women 
and no males around, and there are only old males, that someone has to be doing it ... the 
assumption can be made ... that if you see a young, very healthy woman, then she's probably the 
wife or the girlfriend of a VC ... but we couldn't do anything to them. 
 
Bay was to tell Feher that she was two months pregnant when she was raped and it is possible that 
Willingham was remembering a meeting with Bay in My Hoi and the suspicions that her pregnancy had 
aroused. If so, he might also have been describing My Hoi when he spoke of a village containing 'a lot of 
young pregnant women and no males'. The NLF notice dated 28 March 1968 which described the 
massacre at Xom Go numbered two pregnant women amongst the dead and another who had only 
recently given birth. Testimony of Thomas K. Willingham, Inspector General's Investigation; Witness 
Statement of Nguyen Thi Bay, 17 December 1969; Peers, pp. 283-286. 
19
 Peers, pp. 283-286; Witness Statement of Nguyen Thi Bay, 17 December 1969. Bay told Feher that she 
had seen thirteen bodies in Mr Le's bunker and the NLF notice claimed that fifteen bodies were found 
there.  
20
 Witness Statement of Nguyen Thi Bay, 17 December 1969; Peers, pp. 283-286. 
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massacre. Bay told Feher that ninety people had been killed in My Hoi and the NLF 
alleged that the number was ninety-two, figures which would have reminded Walsh of 
the reports of a massacre in Co Luy which had passed through South Vietnamese 
channels in the weeks after the operation in Son My.
21
  
   
Nevertheless, as Walsh returned to America early in January 1970 to join forces 
with Colonel Wilson, his conviction that there had been a second massacre rested upon 
the testimony of Nguyen Thi Bay, a ropemaker who had been classified by the 
Americans as a 'civil defendant': someone suspected of collaborating with the Viet 
Cong.
22
 Elements of Bay's story were consistent with what had been alleged by other 
Vietnamese sources and what Willingham had told Wilson about the events in My Hoi 
was not particularly convincing but, if the Army was to build a case against Willingham 
or anyone else in his platoon, Walsh and Wilson had to secure the co-operation of some 
of the Americans who had crossed the bridge into My Hoi.  
 
Had they been able to, Walsh and Wilson would probably have called Terry Reid 
as the first witness.
23
 Pressed for time, however, they questioned members of Bravo 
Company as they became available. Whilst he was in South Vietnam, Peers had directed 
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 Witness Statement of Nguyen Thi Bay, 17 December 1969; Peers, pp. 283-286. Mr Le and Mrs Kheo 
were also named in Lien's account: 'Son My Survivor's First-hand Account of Massacre'. 
22
  According to Greiner, about 56,000 people were classed as 'civilian defendants' between the beginning 
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 This assumes that Walsh and Wilson were aware of what CID was referring to as the 'Reid Allegation 
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Reid in the hearings conducted by Walsh and Wilson and that it was Morris G. Michener, rather than one 
of the questioners, who indicated that Reid was a member of Willingham's platoon. Testimony of Morris 
G. Michener to Peers Inquiry, 22 January 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/ Military_ Law/pdf/RDAR-
Vol-IIBook20.pdf. Perhaps some uncertainty remained about whether Reid had described the assault on 
My Khe 4. Although he had identified the company to which he belonged, Reid had not dated the 
operation in which, he alleged, civilians had been murdered and he had located it miles away from Son 
My. It might also be significant that, when Reid was interviewed by CID agent Robert E. Batley on 21 
January, he was not specifically asked about the events at My Khe 4. Testimony of Terrence J. Reid, CID 
Witness Statement.  
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that the Army should begin to trace the men who had served under Captain Michles at 
the time of the operation in Son My but, as Wilson interviewed Sergeant Wilhelm 
Dahner on 14 January, it was revealed that there had not been much progress. 'What we 
are trying to do actually', Wilson told Dahner, 'is fix the personnel assignment on 16, 17, 18, 
and 19 March.'24 All that could be gleaned from the allegations of the Vietnamese, 
Willingham's testimony to Wilson and the logs which had confirmed that Bravo Company's 
1st Platoon had operated in My Hoi on 16 March was that Michles, now dead, had led the 
company and the best that a search of the Army's records had produced was a roster 
showing the company's strength in October 1968. When Interview Team C began its 
work at the Pentagon, therefore, one of its priorities was to establish the identity of 
those who had landed in Son My on 16 March and to ask witnesses if they knew of the 
whereabouts of others who might have information about the operation.  
 
 The first four men to appear before Interview Team C were career soldiers who 
had postings in the United States in January 1970. Listed on the October 1968 roster as 
'Regular Army', they were easy to track down and Staff Sergeant Roy Lee Lias, who 
testified on Tuesday 13 January, might have become the first witness simply because he 
was stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia and had a shorter journey to make than the 
others: Dahner and two sergeants named Bogear and Vann.
25
 Lias, however, had been 
the leader of one of the rifle squads in Willingham's platoon and his testimony was to 
have an unexpected impact. 
 
When Wilson had questioned Willingham and the other witnesses during the 
Inspector General's investigation, it had been decided that 'pre-interrogation warnings' 
would not be given because, as he explained later, it 'was not a criminal investigation 
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 Testimony of Wilhelm Dahner to Peers Inquiry, 14 January 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_ 
Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook18.pdf.  
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but one designed to determine the facts' and 'Warning a witness at the beginning of the 
questioning that anything he said might be held against him would defeat the effort.'
26
 
Peers had adopted a different procedure and Wilson was required to inform Lias of the 
purpose of the inquiry and the sort of questions that he would be asked before advising 
him that 'at any time you want legal counsel, it will be provided'.
27
 Lias, who turned 
down the offer of legal counsel, was also told: 'If you do state anything that would tend 
to incriminate you, or place your position in jeopardy, this board will so inform you at 
the time and will at that time ask you again if you want legal counsel'.
28
 This advice, it 
transpired, was unnecessary because of the determination with which Lias evaded 
discussion of the details of the operation in Son My and Walsh and Wilson seem to have 
decided that the witness might have been intimidated by the pre-interrogation warning 
he had received. Subsequently, the men who appeared before Interview Team C were 
not advised of their rights unless they were suspected of an offence.  
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 Wilson, 'I Had Prayed to God That This Thing Would Be Fiction'. 
27
 Testimony of Roy L. Lias to Peers Inquiry, 13 January 1970. 
   Lias was first told that: 
 
   This inquiry was directed jointly by the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army 
for the purpose of determining facts and making recommendations concerning the My Lai [4] 
incident of 16 March 1968.  
   In conducting his investigation, General Peers determined that it was necessary to have a 
complete insight into the overall ground and air operations in the Son My Village area during the 
period of 16 to 18 March 1968. He, therefore, appointed this board referred to as Interview Team 
C, to question personnel of B/4/3, to prepare a complete description of the unit operations of the 
company. You may expect, possibly, General Peers or other members of his board to join this 
group at any time during the interrogation.  
   Your testimony will be taken under oath. A verbatim transcript will be prepared. A tape 
recording is being made in addition to the verbatim notes being taken by the reporter.  
   Although the general classification of the report will be confidential, it is possible that the 
testimony or parts of it may later become a matter of public knowledge.  
   During this interview, the board will follow a chronological sequence of questioning. The first 
series of questions will be concerned with training just prior to and after arrival in the Republic 
of Vietnam. The second series will inquire into the briefing prior to the combat assault which 
would probably have taken place on 15 March. And the third series will concern prior 
investigations or inquiries which may have been made into the task force operations during that 
period.   
 
All the witnesses who appeared before Interview Team C were similarly informed. Some were asked to 
read a document containing the information before they testified. A copy of the document was presented 
as Exhibit M-81 in Book 4, Volume III of the Peers Report, http://www.loc. gov/rr /frd/Military_Law/pdf/ 
RDAR-Vol-IIIBook4.pdf. 
   The procedures established for the interrogation of witnesses during the inquiry are explained in Peers, 
pp. 48-49. 
28
 Testimony of Roy L. Lias to Peers Inquiry, 13 January 1970. 
64 
 
Confronted by Walsh, Colonel Wilson and three other senior officers, Lias 
repeatedly stated that he could not recall what had happened in My Khe 4.
29
 Wilson, 
who usually led the questioning of the witnesses appearing before Interview Team C, 
began by asking Lias what his assignment had been on 16 March. Lias replied, 'Faintly 
remembering, sir, just another operation for us'. When Wilson moved on to questions 
about the training he had received in the handling of non-combatants and about the 
briefing he had received before the operation in Son My, Lias answered that he could 
not remember or that he was not sure. The question of the orders which had been given 
to the men who had assaulted My Khe 4 was an important one and Lias indicated that 
the platoon had usually been briefed by the platoon leader but, as he was not prepared to 
say with any certainty who his platoon leader was on 16 March or what the orders had 
been, this was not particularly helpful.
30
  
 
 In later interviews Wilson was able to persuade witnesses to remember the 
events of 16 March by reminding them of the casualties which the task force had 
suffered during the operation in Son My: especially memorable figures for most of the 
men in Willingham's platoon were Cochran and Milus, who had been killed, and Taylor, 
who had been wounded. At first, this strategy seemed to have failed because when he 
was asked to remember the occasion of Cochran's death, Lias responded 'I can't recall it, 
sir' but mention of Milus drew a different response. Lias told Wilson that he recalled the 
occasion of Milus' death because he had been the last person to talk to him.
31
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 The other officers were Lieutenant Colonel Noll, Major Thomas, who recorded the interviews, and 
Major Zychowski, the CID representative. Zychowski was present during some of the earlier interviews 
conducted by Interview Team C.   
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 Testimony of Roy L. Lias to Peers Inquiry, 13 January 1970. 
31
 Ibid. According to Michener, the next member of Willingham's platoon to be questioned, Lias and 
Milus had been close friends. Michener recalled that the day after Milus had been killed in a mortar 
attack, Lias assaulted a prisoner: 
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 Having coaxed Lias into this admission, Wilson returned to the question of the 
briefing and elicited from the witness the statement that 'I thought we was going into a 
sure death, but it wasn't that way at all. It wasn't what I built up in my mind.' How it 
was, however, Lias was unwilling to explain in any detail. He could not remember 
crossing a bridge or receiving any fire and, when he referred on several occasions to 
travelling across a beach, he was describing the events of the following day. Taking 
over from Wilson, Walsh challenged Lias with a persistence which might have 
suggested to the witness that his questioner had already arrived at some conclusions 
about what had happened at My Khe 4. First, he told Lias:  
I'd like you to focus your memory as much as you can on the operation of the 
first day where we understand that the first platoon moved over to the peninsula 
by itself while the rest of the platoon, rest of the company, was sweeping this 
area here, and your platoon moved in this area, not all the way down to the tip 
the first day, but covered a couple of villages in this area. And I'd like you to see 
what you can recall about that first day in your platoon. And you don't recall 
receiving any hostile fire? Do you remember killing any VC that day?  
 
When Lias replied 'I know we had some captive personnel', Walsh questioned him 
about the stages of the platoon's progress through the sub-hamlet: 'Now when you 
moved in, how did your platoon perform this? Did they move up to the village firing?' 
Having agreed that 'There was some firing as the first ones moved through', Lias was 
asked 'Did they toss grenades into hootches and clear them out as they went through?' 
His response, delivered with some hesitation, did not contradict the NLF's allegation 
that the Americans had 'tossed grenades into civilian shelters': 'I can't recall that they 
                                                                                                                                               
(Milus) was negro and him and Lias were real close. We were using (the prisoners) for human 
mine detectors again and we took these men down and we started searching the area. We got to 
the first row of hootches and evidentally he had been brooding about it all night and he just 
calmly - I can't say it was calm, but he lost his head and he switched his rifle around and starting 
hitting him over the head and he had to be forcibly restrained. 
 
Testimony of Morris G. Michener to Peers Inquiry, 22 January 1970. On the following day, Larry Holmes 
corroborated this aspect of Michener's testimony. Testimony of Larry G. Holmes to Peers Inquiry, 23 
January 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook19.pdf.  
 
66 
tossed - I know there was some bunker complexes ... I know they were destroyed.' 
Asked 'How were they destroyed?', Lias replied, 'Hand grenades I believe.'
32
  
 
 Walsh was able to extract the admission that Lias had seen a couple of dead 
bodies in My Khe 4 and the information that the point squad had led the platoon 
through the sub-hamlet. Pressed for details about the bodies, Lias claimed that, because 
he had not 'moved off the road', he had been unable to tell if the dead were men, women 
and children and, although My Khe 4 had not been the target of artillery fire on 16 
March, he suggested that the deaths were a result of 'one of the artillery preps'.
33
 
Walsh's attempt to find further corroboration of Bay's statement that she had been 
questioned about a booby trap evoked a denial but, usually, Lias pleaded the weakness 
of his memory. To Walsh's questions 'Do you recall seeing any VC killed that day?' and 
'You don't recall if your platoon killed any VC on that day at all?', Lias replied, 'I can't 
recall, sir.' Asked 'Did you see any soldiers in your platoon shoot any VC civilians that 
were in those villages?', he replied, 'No, sir, I couldn't recall.' He remained unmoved 
when, at last, he was confronted with Walsh's disbelief: 
Sergeant, your testimony is a little puzzling to me in that it would appear that 
your platoon encountered some opposition and reported killing some VC in that 
area on the first morning that you landed. But you recall - no opposition or 
seeing any bodies. Do you have any particular explanation about why you 
wouldn't have seen this? 
 
'No, no explanation', Lias responded and when Walsh added 'Is it possible that you 
could have seen it and just forgotten it?', Lias repeated, 'No, I can't recall any incidents, 
what happened, sir.'
34
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 Testimony of Roy L. Lias to Peers Inquiry, 13 January 1970. 
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 Lias' intransigence requires some explanation, if only because the men of 
Charlie Company seem to have been much more amenable when they were initially 
questioned. In Wilson's account of the Inspector General's investigation, for example, 
there is no indication that he found it difficult to persuade witnesses to recall the events 
at My Lai 4 and CID agent André Feher explained to Michael Bilton that he could not:  
remember any of the men of Charlie Company being hostile when I interviewed 
them. They all were cooperative and none of them refused to give me a 
statement … notwithstanding the fact that each one I interviewed was made 
aware of his constitutional right to remain silent.
35
  
 
Lias was not the only member of Willingham's platoon to claim that the events of 16 
March were beyond recall but he was particularly obdurate under interrogation, 
probably because he appreciated that his situation was especially difficult. As he began 
his testimony he could have had little idea of what the Peers Inquiry knew about the 
massacre at My Khe 4 but, like Calley, he was stationed at Fort Benning and it cannot 
have been lost upon him that all four of the men in Charlie Company who had been 
charged with murder were still in the Army. Reports of the charges against Charles E. 
Hutto and Gerald Smith had appeared a few days before and there was no sign that the 
                                                                                                                                               
unhelpfulness of the records which the inquiry had found but Lias told Wilson that he recognised 'quite a 
few of the names' and asserted, wrongly, that Cantu and Wilburn had been in his platoon.  
   Wilson also directed Lias to return on the following morning to make a second appearance before the 
inquiry but it was not until 14.55 on 14 January that he was questioned again. The wait did not improve 
Lias' memory. When Wilson read the extracts from Task Force Barker's log which described 1st Platoon's 
actions in My Khe 4, Lias responded: 'I don't recall.' Testimony of Roy L. Lias to Peers Inquiry, 14 
January 1970. 
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Greiner arrived at the similar conclusion that: 
 
In contrast to their officers, most of the GIs (in Charlie Compamy) had not worked out stories of 
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Army's investigations were losing their impetus.
36
 The consequences of co-operation, 
therefore, had become clear by 13 January.
37
 
 
 There was probably another force at work. The news that charges had been made 
against Calley and the others elicited a surprising reaction from the American people. A 
poll reported in a January 1970 issue of Time showed that 65 per cent of respondents 
thought that incidents like My Lai were 'bound to happen in a war' and the magazine 
noted that 'Americans are not particularly disturbed by the disclosure that U.S. troops 
apparently massacred several hundred South Vietnamese civilians at My Lai.'
38
 William 
Eckhart, recalling the public mood in early 1970, has gone further, arguing that the 
announcement of the charges relating to the massacre at My Lai reversed the usual 
attitude of many Americans:    
Under normal circumstances, a prosecutor's strongest ally is the civic virtue that 
witnesses have a duty to come forward and tell the truth. Unfortunately, such 
was not the case in My Lai. Most citizens simply wanted the problem to go 
away. Witnesses soon learned that all they had to do was to say that they 'could 
not remember' and they would avoid embarrassment and controversy. In fact, 
public peer pressure seemed to be on the side of non-co-operation.
39
 
 
This, Eckhardt has suggested, affected the investigation into the massacre at My Khe 4 
because: 
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69 
When Company C's … crimes were discovered ... the public's attitude was, 
'Well, you don't have to lie … all you have to do is say you don't remember … 
they can't do anything to you then.' And what happened in the midst of that you 
… began to have the investigation of My Khe 4 and it's no accident that all the 
witnesses just dried up.
40
  
  
 
 
 It is likely that the course taken by Lias and some of the others in the platoon – 
to present the events which had occurred nearly two years before in My Khe 4 as so 
unexceptional that they had faded from the memory – was encouraged by their 
recognition of the mood which Eckhardt has described. Another reason to keep quiet 
was identified by Larry Holmes when, towards the end of his testimony on 23 January, 
he asked Wilson: 
Something I wanted to ask. Like when you go into the service, you're taught to 
be quiet about what you do, right? That's what I was taught. Things that you do 
or supposed to do - quiet. Why did this all come about? A lot of these guys can 
get away - somebody started all of this. They weren't supposed to open their 
mouth to begin with, right?
41
 
 
Within the platoon, too, loyalties had developed which reinforced the idea that the code 
of the Army required silence. 'I don't mind talking', Holmes told Wilson, 'but I don't 
want to get a bunch of guys in trouble over something … These are guys I was over 
there with.'
42
  
 
Peers was to observe that 'the personnel composition of Company B contained 
no significant deviation from the Army-wide average and there was little to distinguish 
it from other rifle companies' but Willingham's platoon was untypical in several respects 
and a particularly strong set of loyalties seems to have evolved.
43
 There were only 
twenty-seven men in the platoon which was organised into a point team, a command 
group and two rifle squads, to each of which a machine gun team was attached. Ray 
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Tittle led the point team which was completed by Donald Hooton, Beverly Larche and 
Larry Taylor. With Willingham in the command group were Earl Rushin, the platoon 
sergeant; Peter Bretenstein, a Forward Observer for the Weapons Platoon who was 
attached to 1st Platoon; Henry Cardines, the leader of the machine gun teams; Richard 
Silva, the medic and the Radio Telephone Operators (RTOs), Mario Fernandez and 
Jimmy Jenkins. Lias and Rodney Linkous were the leaders of the riflemen: Cresencio 
Garcia; Homer Hall; Larry Holmes; Marvin Jones; Morris Michener; David Millsaps; 
Gregory Mossford; James Placek; Terry Reid and Amos Williams.
44
 The machine 
gunners were Joe Madison and Edward Milus, their assistants Jerry Warner and Leo 
Strachan Jr.
45
  
 
 The men in the point team were unusual. Walsh noted in the report that four men 
had 'voluntered to act as the platoon's permanent point element', a duty which was 
rotated in other units because it was so dangerous.
46
 As Homer Hall told Walsh and 
Wilson, 'you just didn't find men who volunteered to be point that way. We were proud 
of them.' Elsewhere in his testimony Hall explained:  
Those four men were real good. They would go into those foxholes or a hole 
there. You never knew if there was going to be booby traps there or not. It took a 
lot of courage to go into a place like that, and these four people did things like 
that.
47
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Within the platoon, as Walsh observed, the four men were 'widely respected … for their 
courage and their ability to locate mines and boobytraps'.
48
 Amongst the soldiers in 
Bravo Company's other units, however, Tittle's point team was perceived rather 
differently. 
 
 Robert Holmes was to tell a CID agent that 'It was common knowledge with all 
the men of the company that ... the point team for the 1st Platoon ... had shot many 
people indiscriminately' and James Braddock, another member of Bravo Company's 3rd 
Platoon, told Walsh and Wilson that 'They had a reputation of being really wild, they 
didn't like taking orders from the NCOs and officers.'
49
 Pressed by Wilson to explain the 
'kind of odd' phenomenon of a team that always walked point, Braddock responded: 
'They liked it, sir. They didn't like the platoon leader and they didn't like the platoon 
sergeant they had.'
50
  
 
 Several witnesses indicated that Larry Taylor had a particularly strong 
personality and he and the machine gunner Milus, who operated alongside the point 
team in My Khe 4, seem to have achieved almost mythic status. According to Larry 
Holmes:    
Taylor was idolized. He was like Milus to the soul brothers; Taylor was like this 
to us. Milus was their idol and he was ours. Maybe not our idol but we respected 
him a lot. Taylor was a good soldier and so was Milus. Both of them were very, 
very good soldiers. They knew what they was doing. Milus was the best 
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machinegunner we had. Taylor walked point constantly. That's all he ever did is 
walk point, him and Hooton.
51
        
 
Only hours before they heard Holmes' testimony, Walsh and Wilson had also been told 
by Braddock of the impact upon the platoon of the loss of Taylor, who was wounded the 
day after the assault on My Khe 4, and Milus, who was killed on 19 March:  
Taylor was a very popular man and so was Milus and I know the group that 
Milus used to hang around with all the time - as soon as we went back they 
started going on sick call - didn't want to go to the field anymore. And the point 
team disbanded after Taylor lost his foot.
52
  
 
 
 An indication of the esteem in which the two men had been held appeared when 
Jerry Warner, one of the assistant machine gunners, testified before the inquiry on 6 
February. Warner told Wilson of having heard that Taylor had shot a baby and Milus 
had cut a woman in two with machine gun fire at My Khe 4 prompting Wilson to ask, 
'What was the sentiment of the platoon towards this act? Was it the feeling that that was 
the way the operation was supposed to be conducted?' Warner replied: 'Well, some guys 
didn't like it. Me, the way I feel about it I mean, I didn't have no opinion about these 
things. I didn't form an opinion of it at all.' As Wilson tried to persuade Warner to 
condemn the actions attributed to Milus and Taylor, it became clear that the witness felt 
such loyalty towards the two men that he was prepared to argue that they had done 
nothing wrong: 
Warner: Well, sir, it wasn't any civilians, sir.  
Wilson: Well what was it?  
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Warner: In my idea - my point of view was this area was just enemy and their 
families, sir. This was one of our areas that we were supposed to clear.  
Wilson: But this isn't -   
Warner: (Interposing) Civilians, I wouldn't call them civilians, sir. I mean 
especially, you know, since they are all messed up with the communists, sir.  
Wilson: How about these about this big (indicating a small child) ? (Witness 
gives no response.) Well that's part of a family?  
Warner: Yes, sir. But in this same area, sir, I've had these little boys - from little 
boys, women - I've seen women on machineguns firing at us. I've seen little boys 
steal hand grenades. One of them tried to set a hand grenade off on my side. I've 
seen them steal hand grenades and stuff like that … Even down to babies.  
Wilson: But I'm talking about the babies and I'm talking about this statement in 
here that a baby was shot in the head.
53
 
 
 
 
 Willingham and, as Walsh and Wilson eventually concluded, the twenty-six men 
he had commanded on 16 March were the only American eye-witnesses to the events in 
My Khe 4. There were no photographs, what had been said by the Vietnamese could be 
dismissed as the accusations of the enemy and, although men from Bravo Company's 
other units were to testify that they had heard shooting from 1st Platoon's area on 16 
March, that members of 1st Platoon had talked afterwards of the number of Vietnamese 
killed in My Khe 4 and that the platoon, especially its point team, had a reputation for 
killing non-combatants, this was not proof of a massacre. After Lias, however, Walsh 
and Wilson were able to interrogate only fifteen of the other men in Willingham's 
platoon because Garcia, Milus and Mossford had been killed in Vietnam; Williams was 
in prison in Florida; Larche, Tittle, Millsaps, Reid and Strachan were not prepared to 
appear and, on the advice of their lawyers, Willingham and Taylor refused to answer 
questions. It was from the remaining fifteen that the inquiry had to find out what had 
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happened in My Khe 4 and to persuade them to identify as murderers men with whom 
they had served and for whom, perhaps, they continued to feel admiration. Even those 
who felt that what had happened at My Khe 4 was wrong found this a difficult step to 
take.  
 
The other witnesses who appeared on 14 and 15 January denied any knowledge 
of the events in My Khe 4 but Dahner, the company sergeant in March 1968, was of 
some help.
54
 He produced various documents containing information about the 
personnel in Bravo Company during the Son My operation, recalled that Silva and 
Taylor had been in Willingham's platoon and suggested that Walsh and Wilson should 
question Kenneth Boatman, who was attached to Bravo Company as a Forward 
Observer for an artillery unit, and Lawrence Congleton, Michles' RTO. In one respect, 
Dahner's testimony about Michles was important. He was the first to explain that it had 
been Michles' habit to brief his platoon leaders rather than the whole of the company 
and, as this was corroborated by other witnesses, it became a priority to establish the 
nature of the orders which Willingham had given to the men in his platoon.
55
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On Friday 16 January David Carter became the first civilian to testify before 
Walsh and Wilson. Carter had been the leader of Bravo Company's 3rd Platoon but an 
injury had prevented his involvement in the operation in Son My and he seems to have 
become the next witness because Dahner had been able to provide his address.
56
 
Nevertheless, his comments about Bravo Company's 1st Platoon, Captain Michles and 
Lieutenant Willingham were instructive. Like some of those who testified later, Carter 
identified the force of Milus' personality, describing him as 'a black ... in the 1st Platoon 
(who) was like the spirit leader of all the blacks in the company ... a mean son of a 
bitch. Big, ugly and mean.' He spoke, too, of hearing rumours that 1st Platoon had 
'killed civilians unnecessarily' before Willingham had taken over the platoon. These 
rumours were 'in connection with (an) operation ... in which Lieutenant Ross was 
wounded' and 'in reference to when Specialist Gleghorn was killed.' When Wilson 
observed that this sounded 'like a reprisal of some sort', Carter agreed.
57
 He made it 
clear, however, that Michles had frequently reminded the men in his company of the 
rules of engagement. 
 
 Carter's portrayal of Michles as an officer who wanted his men to follow the 
rules was reinforced when Captain Kenneth Boatman appeared before the inquiry three 
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days later. Boatman had been present when the platoon leaders had been briefed and 
had remained with Michles throughout the operation in Son My. Although he 
remembered that Michles had said that it was necessary to 'clean the place out', he 
declared that 'Captain Michles ... did not believe in killing people. I mean down-right, 
out-right killing. To me he was quite a scrupulous man.'
58
 Asked if there had been 'any 
mention about the inhabitants of the area', Boatman replied, 'Yes, sir. They were VC 
sympathizers' but to Wilson's next question, 'When he said  "Clean the place out" was 
he talking about the noncombatant inhabitants?', Boatman's response was unambiguous, 
'I don't believe he was talking about them, no, sir.'
59
 So important was this point that 
Wilson returned to it, asking: 'Did ... Michles at any time say anything about killing 
everybody in that area?' to which Boatman repeated his conviction that 'Captain 
Michles, I don't believe would say that' adding that he did not think Michles 'could ... 
have passed that meaning on in his briefing.'
60
 
 
By 19 January, therefore, Walsh and Wilson had heard nothing to suggest that 
Michles had, either directly or indirectly, ordered the killing of civilians in Son My and 
Carter and Boatman seemed to agree that Willingham would not have allowed his men 
to kill civilians. According to Carter, Willingham exercised 'complete control of his 
unit' and when Wilson revealed the allegation that ninety civilians had been killed in 
My Khe 4, Boatman replied: 'I don't think that Lieutenant Willingham would allow that 
... he would have known if that many people had been killed.'
61
 It could be argued that 
Carter's impression of Willingham had been formed after the operation in Son My, by 
which time Willingham was leading a platoon no longer built around the core of the 
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point team and Milus, and that Boatman was protecting his 'close friend' Willingham 
but after questioning six members of Bravo Company the inquiry had made little 
progress.
62
 The only support for Walsh's conviction that there had been a massacre in 
My Khe 4 was Carter's reference to the rumours about 1st Platoon before Willingham 
had taken over and a statement by Boatman that, when he passed through My Khe 4 on 
17 March, the sub-hamlet 'had been fully destroyed.'
63
 What the next witness had to say, 
however, was dramatic enough to persuade Walsh and Wilson to send for General 
Peers. 
 
On 22 January Morris Michener acknowledged that eighty-five civilians might 
have been killed by Willingham's platoon in Son My. His testimony corroborated much 
of Bay's account of the massacre in My Khe 4: he spoke of civilians being fired upon by 
some of the men in the platoon; of Taylor finding a booby trap; of hootches and bunkers 
being destroyed with explosives and of the point team shooting down anyone who tried 
to escape. He even suggested that rape had been attempted.
64
 Although nearly two years 
had elapsed since the operation in Son My, he remembered many of the men who had 
been in his platoon and identified Tittle, Hooton and Taylor as members of the point 
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I heard of one instance. One of the machine-gunners named Madison saw a naked woman run 
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team.
65
 It was also demonstrated that he objected to the killing of civilians and that he 
did not perceive them as hostiles. When he was asked if the platoon had killed any of 
the enemy during the action, he replied: 'Not to my knowledge, no, sir. Other than the 
people in the bunkers, sir ... It's not clear in my mind that they were enemy.' He added 
later: 'I heard about this woman getting killed and her just running out of the hootch. 
Nobody said whether she had a weapon or not. I don't know. I just didn't go for killing 
women and kids.'
66
 
   
There were two problems with Michener's testimony. The first was that he was 
confused about the chronology of the period, believing that it was after Taylor had been 
wounded on 17 March, the second day of the operation, that civilians had been killed. A 
consequence of this was that he located some of the the killings along a trail to the south 
of My Khe 4.
67
 The second was that he maintained that he had not seen anyone killed or 
any bodies during the operation and that he could only report what he had heard others 
talking about. Thus, when he was asked how he knew that eighty-five people had been 
killed, he responded: 'I didn't say I knew that. I said that is what I heard. I don't believe at 
any time during this discussion I said that I saw 85 people killed. That is just what I 
heard.'68   
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 Michener recalled that he had been briefed by Lias, his squad leader, and Willingham on the evening of 
15 March and that there was no resistance as the men were landed on the following morning. Although he 
thought it possible that a sniper might have fired one or two shots at the point team, he was not fired upon 
as he walked across the bridge towards My Khe 4. The hootches across the bridge were empty on 16 
March, according to Michener, whose testimony compressed all the significant events of the first two 
days of the operation into the second day. Thus, the attack on My Khe 4, finding a booby trap, the 
destruction of the bunkers, the call for more explosives, the appearance of the gunships after Taylor was 
wounded and the move south all featured in Michener's account of 17 March. His errors do not seem to 
have been deliberate. He might have wanted to admit that civilians had been killed in My Khe 4 without 
implicating his 'very good friend' Taylor but he was a particularly devious witness if he manipulated his 
evidence to that end. Ibid.  
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79 
Neither Walsh nor Wilson challenged Michener's insistence that he had not seen 
the shooting of the villagers or the destruction of the bunkers because he had been 
guarding the bridge near My Khe 4 and, later, leading the platoon to the south with a 
mine-sweeper.
69
 Walsh seems to have concluded that whilst Michener had made up his 
mind not to give evidence that could be used against any of the men in his platoon, he 
was prepared to tell the inquiry about his platoon's actions. Walsh's willingness to 
accept Michener's testimony on these terms was demonstrated when he reminded the 
witness that they were not in a courtroom and encouraged him to include hearsay in his 
testimony.
70
 Michener's response suggested that this was a reassurance he had been 
waiting for. He immediately told Walsh that he had: 
heard the fact that the point team, which as I said did all the demolition work, 
would go up to a bunker with their bombs and demolitions and throw it in and 
then if anybody came out they were shot to a man.
71
 
   
 
 Michener's testimony confirmed that the actions of Willingham's platoon 
required investigation. Walsh had asked him 'Were you talking to people about it? Did 
any of them say that that was not true or they didn't believe they were killed or did 
people pretty generally believe this?' and Michener had replied, 'It was pretty well taken 
for a fact. Yes, sir.' Before Larry Holmes appeared on the following day, Braddock had 
given Walsh and Wilson his opinions about the men in the point team who, he had 
heard, had been responsible for blowing up the bunkers during the operation but Holmes 
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 When Michener was called to testify again in March, Wilson was more sceptical. Testimony of Morris 
G. Michener to Peers Inquiry, 6 March 1970. 
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 Testimony of Morris G. Michener to Peers Inquiry, 22 January 1970. Walsh told Michener:  
 
I have the impression that you are reluctant to tell us that except which you actually saw with 
your own eyes. This is a good practice for anybody, but things that you heard may also be 
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Ibid. 
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80 
was to assert that others had been involved.
72
 He told the inquiry that the majority of the 
men in the platoon had fired at the people in My Khe 4 and that some of the men in 
Lias' squad had helped to destroy the bunkers. The importance of Holmes' testimony 
was that, unlike Michener's, it concerned an attack in which he had participated. 
 
  Holmes did not tell Walsh and Wilson of his belief that he had shot a woman at 
My Khe 4, a confession which he later made to a CID agent, but he described the way 
that the inhabitants of the sub-hamlet were 'running around like crazy people' as they 
were fired upon and he painted a vivid picture of the violence with which the attack was 
concluded: 'they brought in TNT. A chopper brought in TNT, a hundred sticks of it, a 
whole case of TNT, and it was thrown in bunkers and stuff, and blowing everything up 
and burning.
73
 On several occasions, he corrected himself or corrected the interpretation 
which had been put upon his words and it could be argued that his willingness to admit 
uncertainty contributed to his credibility as a witness. Initially, for example, he testified 
that the men in his platoon were told, either by Michles or Willingham, that because 
'leaflets and stuff' had been dropped in My Khe 4, 'Nobody was supposed to be there. If 
anybody is there, shoot them.' However, asked if he 'remember(ed) the words, "Kill all 
the people that were there. They're all VC"', Holmes accepted that: 'I can't say he said 
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 Testimony of James A. Braddock to Peers Inquiry. Braddock also testified that the company had 
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Wilson: Let me say this: we have no intentions of letting you continue without warning you that 
you do not have to say anything that would incriminate you. As I say, we're trying to find out 
what happened.  
Walsh: I think it's fair to say that you're not suspected of having committed any crime, having 
done anything wrong, but in the investigation we're trying to find out what happened in all 
aspects of it. I suggest that we go along and you tell us what you want to tell us. Don't tell us 
anything wrong, but if there is something you don't want to tell us, then don't.  
 
Later Wilson added: 'If there are questions we ask and you don't want to answer, don't answer. Then we 
will go on to other things, but it is important for General Peers to get the whole story on this thing.' Ibid. 
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kill all the people.'
74
 When he was pressed on the crucial question of enemy fire, he 
refused to commit himself, first reminding Wilson that 'I didn't say we received the fire' 
and later that 'I never said that we didn't receive fire, all I said was a lot of shooting 
going on before we got up there'. He also explained that 'because everything was mixed 
up', he did not know why the men had been ordered to stop shooting.
75
 Neither did he 
know whether the platoon 'was out of control' during the assault.
76
 
 
 As the platoon approached the bridge, Holmes testified, some of the men fired 
across it. Having reached the bridge, 'everybody tore their ass in gear' and began firing 
'pretty heavily' at My Khe 4. When the shooting died down Willingham ordered the 
machine gunners to 'spray the area' and afterwards the men walked in single file into the 
sub-hamlet. According to Holmes, Madison set up his machine gun and then: 
we started shooting … I don't know how many got killed. People were running 
around. I remember one incident: it seemed like people running even toward us 
on top of the hill and back towards the top of the hill. Maybe they were all 
mixed up too, didn't know where they were going. I remember several times 
people coming up over the hill too.
77
 
 
Having confirmed that people were shot 'when they would come up over the top of the 
hill', Holmes became reluctant to talk about the fate of the villagers: 'I don't know if we 
hit anybody, you know. I didn't - go up to look to see if anybody was lying up there.' 
Asked how many bodies he had seen he would only say 'I may have seen one or two. I 
don't know' and he would not admit that he had seen what had happened when the 
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 Ibid. The leaflets would have contained a warning to evacuate the area and such leaflets were 
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civilians in Son My would have gone to market on the morning of 16 March, an opinion which Medina 
conveyed to his men but Michles, apparently, did not. Interview Team C heard no references to the 
market as the convenient destination of the village's innocent civilians, a feature of the Bravo Company 
testimony which has not been explained by those, like Hodierne, who have argued that the men of the 
task force received the same briefing. Bilton and Sim, pp. 95-98.  
75
 Either the order had come from 'higher up', Holmes believed, or Willingham had ordered a cease fire so 
that 'the other guys could go in and start blowing things up'. Testimony of Larry G. Holmes to Peers 
Inquiry. 
76
 Ibid. 
77
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witnesses recalled the firing of Milus' gun.     
82 
bunkers were destroyed although he had heard, like Michener, that anyone coming out 
of a bunker was shot.
78
 
 
 By 23 January, therefore, it was becoming plain that Bay's account of the assault 
on My Khe 4 was fundamentally accurate. Heavy fire had been aimed at the inhabitants 
of the sub-hamlet, the hootches and bunkers had been destroyed and, it seemed likely, 
anyone trying to escape had been shot. This emphasised the importance of two 
questions: had Willingham's platoon been attacked and to what extent were the men 
responding to orders?
79
    
 
 On 26 January Walsh and Wilson questioned two more of the men who had been 
in Willingham's platoon. Homer Hall and Earl Rushin, the platoon sergeant, had 
travelled to Washington on the same plane and the two men had shared a hotel room on 
the night of 25 January. According to Hall, he and Rushin had discussed the operation 
'some' but 'We didn't go into any details, because like I say, I was just depending on you 
to refresh my memory. Like I say, a lot of things I just wanted to forget.'
80
 It transpired, 
however, that Hall remembered the attack on My Khe 4 very well and this probably 
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 Testimony of Homer C. Hall to Peers Inquiry, 26 January 1970. 
83 
explains why he was, as he admitted to Wilson, 'very tensed up' and worried that the 
questions of the Peers Inquiry might be the prelude to interrogation by another agency.
81
 
In his anxiety, Hall's response to questions about the orders which the men had received 
before the operation was less than clear, a response which was misinterpreted in the 
summary of his testimony provided in the Peers Report. Hall indicated that he had 
probably been briefed by Lias, his squad leader, by Willingham and by Michles, 
because this was the usual procedure before an operation, and then he testified that 'we 
were to leave nothing standing, because we were pretty sure that this was a confirmed 
VC village'. This was summarised in the Peers Report as 'They were told to leave 
nothing standing' but, as Hall's testimony reveals, he was referring to what 'some of the 
guys in the company (had) said' rather than the briefings he had received.
82
 
Significantly, Hall also stated that, whilst waiting for the helicopters to take them to Son 
My, 'We were instructed by Captain Michles not to, what you might say, shoot down 
anybody.'
83
 His description of the platoon's assault on My Khe 4 demonstrated that this 
instruction had been ignored.  
   
 Hall recalled that as the men walked down the trail towards the sub-hamlet they 
learned of the death of Lieutenant Cochran and then, according to the men in the point 
team, a grenade was thrown at them which failed to explode. Having crossed the bridge 
without incident, the platoon approached My Khe 4 in which 'roughly a dozen people 
(were) going about their business.' Rather than suggesting that what followed was a 
reaction to the news of Cochran's death, Hall testified that it was the platoon's habit to 
'clear the area with a machinegun' before entering a village. He described how, as Milus 
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84 
fired at 'Just anything that moved', the other men in the platoon joined in the attack. 
Wilson asked, 'Well, what happened when people came running out? Did they keep 
firing at them?' and Hall replied, 'Well, they were - yes, they were fired upon also.'
84
 
The shooting stopped, Hall stated, when Michles reminded Willingham, by radio, that 
civilians should not be killed but, by then, 'it was just - well, we had already pretty 
much shot the village up.'
85
 
 
 Although Hall 'couldn't say whether the lieutenant … told (Milus) directly to 
bring the machinegun', he was of the opinion that the order had emanated from 
Willingham.
86
 He also felt, however, that a lot of 'boys did get carried away' and he 
remembered that Milus, who had gone 'kind of crazy there', had been told by the 
lieutenant to calm down. Hall, who admitted that he had seen the bodies of women and 
children, perhaps three of them, in My Khe 4; that he had watched about a dozen people 
shot down as they tried to escape the hail of bullets from the machine gun and that the 
sub-hamlet had been 'flattened' with explosives, seemed torn between a desire to justify 
the assault and bewilderment at the the actions of his platoon.
87
 He repeated that a 
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 Ibid. Hall's attempt to justify the shooting presented a chilling picture of the platoon's mode of 
operation:  
 
you see, as I said, … there were trees, shrubbery, hootches. Maybe if one would run to another 
or something like that, you couldn't always tell what it was. You knew it was an individual 
running, but you couldn't tell if it was a man or a woman. And, of course, we engaged upon them 
whenever they would run like that. 
 
Ibid. 
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grenade had been thrown and commented on how 'We were anticipating just about 
anything' but he also testified: 
I don't know. Just to stand there and see a machinegun, I don't know, just 
repeatedly fire in to a village like that. In other words, anything that moves, you 
were to kill it, and we knew we were going to destroy or burn the hootches and 
everything. Of course, we had done that before, but never - well, this was a little 
bit larger than before.
88
   
 
 
 Hall recalled that he had helped to search some of the bunkers and that the 
platoon had been re-supplied with ammunition and explosives in order to destroy them 
but he claimed that the bunkers which he searched were empty and he made no direct 
reference to the killing of those who tried to leave their bunkers. He accepted, however, 
that he could still hear Milus firing 'at anything that moved' as he searched and he 
mentioned that a woman had been trapped when a bunker was blown up.
89
 Hall's 
testimony indicated, therefore, that women and children had been among the dead, that 
Milus had played a major role in the assault and that the platoon's actions at My Khe 4 
were uncharacteristic only in their scale.
90
 About Willingham's role in the killings and 
the presence of an enemy in or near My Khe 4, Hall's testimony was more equivocal but 
Walsh and Wilson might have anticipated that Earl Rushin would be able to fill in some 
of the gaps.   
 
 The platoon sergeant could have been expected to recall the operation with some 
clarity because he had been promoted to the position only twelve days before. Rushin, 
however, turned out to be the first of a trio of witnesses from Willingham's platoon 
whose testimony added little to the inquiry's understanding of what had occurred in My 
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Khe 4. Rushin was stationed at Fort Benning and, like Lias, he maintained that he could 
remember little of significance about the operation. He agreed that Willingham had 
briefed the squad leaders before the operation and recollected that the lieutenant had 
said that there were 'only VC' in the area but the inquiry was unable to learn from him 
what else had been said or if Willingham or Michles had spoken to the men as they 
assembled at the landing zone. Rushin also thought that he might have received by radio 
the news of Cochran's death and asserted that there was some sniper fire after the men 
left the landing zone but, because his position was at the rear of the platoon, he did not 
see what occurred as the men entered My Khe 4 and, although he had heard firing, it 
had stopped before he reached the sub-hamlet. Michles, Rushin asserted, had told 
Willingham by radio not to 'hurt the women and kids' and he speculated that Michles 
might have been responding to a report by Willingham that the platoon had found only 
women and children.
91
 Having reiterated that he could remember seeing no bodies when 
he entered the sub-hamlet, he was pressed by Wilson to explain the reports that the 
platoon had killed thirty-eight Viet Cong at My Khe 4: 'What if at that time somebody 
asked you how many Vietnamese the 1st Platoon had killed? At the time, do you think 
your answer would have been none?' As Lias had done, however, Rushin simply replied 
that he could not remember: 'It's funny, something that's back a while, something 
happened a while back, it's funny the things you can remember. I can remember a 
chopper coming in and them putting out chow … I don't remember it, I really don't.'92 
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 Testimony of Earl Rushin to Peers Inquiry, 26 January 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_ 
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When Walsh and Wilson questioned Joe Madison, the other machine gunner, 
and Peter Bretenstein, the Forward Observer, on 27 and 28 January, they encountered 
similar difficulties. Although Madison clarified the deployment of the machine guns 
during the 'Search and Destroy' mission on 16 March, he claimed that he had only a 
vague memory of being briefed by Cardines, the leader of the weapons squad, that he 
had been at the bridge, protecting the platoon's rear, when the shooting began and 
covering one of the approaches to the sub-hamlet when the hootches were searched.
93
 
He acknowledged that he had fired at some Vietnamese who were behind the dunes 
which separated My Khe 4 from the beach and that some of the hootches had been 
destroyed but, like Rushin, Madison told the inquiry that he could not 'recall seeing any 
bodies' and he rejected invitations to share what he had heard about the attack or offer 
an opinion about the reports that the platoon had killed thirty-eight Viet Cong. Asked by 
Walsh if he had heard 'any conversations ... among the men about how many VC were 
killed that day', Madison replied, 'We never did talk too much about that in our platoon' 
and when Wilson asked him to express an opinion, Madison told him, 'Your opinion's as 
good as mine.'94  
 
Although Bretenstein admitted that he had seen five bodies on the hill to the east 
of My Khe 4 and accepted that there had been shooting in the sub-hamlet and some 
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88 
blowing up and burning of the hootches, his account of the operation suggested, as 
Walsh pointed out to him, that it had been 'extremely uneventful.' Bretenstein, who had 
initially asserted that he did not 'remember the particular combat assault', continued to 
plead ignorance when he was confronted with a summary of the information which the 
inquiry had gleaned from previous witnesses and reminded that Willingham had 
'reported 38 VC killed'.
95
 He testified that he could not remember the men shooting as 
they approached My Khe 4, the use of a machine gun in the sub-hamlet or anyone shot 
as they left a bunker. Whilst he suggested that the platoon might have been fired upon 
before they crossed the bridge, he did not remember a grenade being thrown, 
Willingham ordering a cease-fire or any subsequent discussion of the operation.
96
 Only 
in one respect did Bretenstein influence the inquiry's ideas. He explained that, before the 
men had crossed the bridge, he had directed mortar fire on to the eastern bank of the 
river and that, because three of the five mortar rounds had failed to explode, Michles 
had transmitted an order to use a machine gun to fire across the river.
97
 
 
None of the eleven men who appeared before Interview Team C between 28 
January and 2 February had been in Willingham's platoon and their testimonies revealed 
little that Walsh and Wilson had not already learnt about the events in My Khe 4. It 
became clear, however, that Milus and others had talked with some freedom about what 
they had done on 16 March. At least three of the men who had served in Bravo's 3rd 
Platoon had heard that 'a lot of people' had been killed there and Ronald Esterling 
alleged that the 'whole company' was aware of what had been done. The stories which 
the three men had heard were not inconsistent: Walter Askew testified that 'about 60 
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people' were killed with explosives and machine guns; Esterling recalled that Milus and 
others in his platoon had boasted of shooting 'about 40 people' and Alfred Fields 
thought that Willingham's platoon had 'destroyed instead of searched', using rifles, 
machine guns and grenades to kill 'kids and stuff.' There was agreement that those who 
had told them about the killings had shown no remorse although Fields also suggested 
that Milus had been ordered 'to kill anything that moved'.
98
 On the other hand, 
Lawrence Congleton, who was present when Michles briefed his platoon leaders, 
testified that there had been no 'direct order' to kill civilians.
99
 
 
 More important than the testimony of these men about what had happened in 
My Khe 4 was the information, provided by Askew on 28 January, that Amos Williams 
was in Florida. Williams proved easy to find - he was in Putnam County Jail - and when 
he was interviewed by the Military Police on 29 January he gave the inquiry a new 
direction. Williams stated that he had heard that Donald Hooton had shot a baby in the 
face with a pistol at My Khe 4.
100
  
 
 On 3 February Mario Fernandez became the eighth member of 1st Platoon to 
testify. Peers was to note in The My Lai Inquiry that Fernandez was one of the two men 
who had provided 'the best information' about the assault on My Khe 4 and before 
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Bravo Company's 3rd Platoon;  John Mundy, the company's Executive Officer and John Ebinger.    
100
 Testimony of Walter A. Askew to Peers Inquiry. Dated 4 February 1970, the Military Police Report of 
the interview with Amos Williams is in CID Report of Investigation on Donald Hooton, 70-CID011-
00049, US Army Crime Records Center. Although the document has been redacted, a list of exhibits in 
the CID Report makes it clear that it is a record of an interview with Williams on 29 January 1970.    
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Wilson asked him if he knew 'anything about Hooton shooting a baby in the head, or 
anything like that', Fernandez had admitted that he had seen the bodies of fifteen to 
twenty people in the sub-hamlet and that most of them had been women and children.
101
 
He had described people being killed as they ran out of the hootches, identified Milus, 
Hooton, Taylor, Tittle and Lias as the men who were shooting at them and recalled that 
Hooton had talked about the Vietnamese who had been killed when the bunkers were 
dynamited.
102
 Later he asserted that the point team had destroyed the bunkers. 
Fernandez was, therefore, a key witness. He seemed to vacillate, however, between a 
desire to assist the inquiry and an unwillingness to testify against men with whom he 
had served. He claimed initially that he could not remember 'too well' who had been 
responsible for the destruction of the hootches and, although he was to tell a CID 
investigator in April 1970 that he had watched Hooton shoot a baby, he told Wilson on 
this occasion, 'No, sir. I didn't see it, but I heard it.' The disturbing exchange which 
followed suggested that Fernandez might only have taken this step because he thought 
that Hooton had not survived the war: 
Wilson: You did hear it? What did you hear?  
Fernandez: That he killed a baby.  
Wilson: Under what conditions?  
Fernandez: Well, just for fun I guess.  
Wilson: Do you know where Hooton is now?  
Fernandez: Right now? He didn't get killed or anything?
103
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 Peers, p. 190. Peers' identification of Linkous as the other witness from whom 'the best information' 
was received is puzzling because, aside from his account of the platoon's approach to the sub-hamlet, 
much of Linkous' testimony was vague. Perhaps it was his suggestion that Cochran's death had triggered 
the killings in My Khe 4 which Peers found convincing; Testimony of Mario Fernandez to Peers Inquiry. 
In conversation with the writer, Walsh agreed that 'Fernandez was the guy who gave us the most 
information.' 
102
 Fernandez also agreed that at least some of the men in the platoon had been untroubled by the killings, 
identifying Hall and Reid as men who had objected. He denied any recall of a woman being taken 
prisoner at My Khe 4. Testimony of Mario Fernandez to Peers Inquiry. 
103
 Fernandez was questioned twice by a CID investigator. On 24 February he stated that he thought he 
had seen Hooton shoot the child. When he was re-interviewed on 8 April, Fernandez confirmed that he 
had watched the shooting. Witness Statements, 24 February 1970 and 8 April 1970 in CID Report of 
Investigation on Donald Hooton, 70-CID011-00049, US Army Crime Records Center; Testimony of 
Mario Fernandez to Peers Inquiry. 
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 In other respects Fernandez's testimony was inconclusive. As Willingham's 
RTO, he had been present when the squad leaders were briefed and, during the assault, 
he and the lieutenant had usually been together. Despite this, his responses were 
contradictory when he was questioned about the orders which the men had been given. 
Asked what the men had been told 'to do with the people in the area that lived there', he 
replied: 'I'm not sure, but I think they said to kill them, you know? And that's what they 
did, but I'm not sure about it', adding that he did not remember such an order being 
passed on during the briefing. Later, however, he stated that the men had been told to 
'Kill everybody' and that 'Maybe (Willingham) gave the order. I think he gave the order. 
They gave the order to him, to kill and destroy everything.' Ambivalent about whether 
the men had been attacked as they approached the bridge and whether it had been 
Willingham or Lias who had ordered Milus to open fire, Fernandez was also reluctant to 
agree that Willingham had seen the bodies in My Khe 4.
104
 His answers suggest that he 
was trying to pick his way through what he perceived as a maze of conflicting moral 
imperatives: he wanted to reveal what had happened because he believed it to have been 
wrong; he wanted to protect his comrades by suggesting that they had been responding 
to orders and he wanted to protect the lieutenant who bore the responsibility if he had 
passed illegal orders to his men.
105
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 Testimony of Mario Fernandez to Peers Inquiry. Others had testified that grenades had been thrown at 
the men as they approached the bridge but Fernandez was the only witness to claim that they had 
exploded. Later he indicated that he was not sure what had happened. According to the testimony of 
Barry Marshall, a member of Michles' command group, however, Fernandez had mentioned a grenade 
which had failed to explode when he talked to Marshall on 17 March. Testimony of Barry P. Marshall to 
Peers Inquiry, 5 February 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_ Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook18. 
pdf.  
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 Other explanations of Fernandez's testimony are that he could not clearly remember some of the 
details of the operation or, because his first language was Spanish, he did not fully understood the nature 
of the orders at the time. He seemed to find it difficult, sometimes, to comprehend Wilson's questions and 
Linkous, who was to tell the inquiry that Fernandez had 'a bad Spanish accent', added that he would 
sometimes 'relapse into Spanish when he got excited.' The CID agent who interviewed him on 24 
February, however, observed that Fernandez spoke English 'only with a slight accent' and that he 
appeared to understand all the questions which he was asked. According to the agent, the difficulty was 
Fernandez's extreme reluctance to provide 'definitive' answers. Testimony of Rodney V. Linkous to Peers 
Inquiry, 16 February 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd /Military_Law/ pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook19.pdf. 
Witness Statement of Mario Fernandez, 24 February 1970 in CID Report of Investigation on Donald 
Hooton, 70-CID011-00049, US Army Crime Records Center. 
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 It is clear, nevertheless, that it was Fernandez's testimony which led to 
Willingham being charged, seven days later, with the 'unpremeditated murder of 20 
Vietnamese individuals'. Before Walsh and Wilson had an opportunity to build a 
stronger case by questioning more of the men who had been at My Khe 4, there were 
another twelve members of Bravo Company to be interviewed. Of the twelve, only 
Luther Myers of the Weapons Platoon admitted to hearing any talk about the killings on 
16 March. Appearing on the same day as Fernandez, Myers agreed that there had been 
'rumors going around' about a lot of people, including women and children, being shot 
by Milus and the point team. He had also been told, however, that they had been 
responding to enemy fire and this must have underlined the importance, now that the 
inquiry had obtained solid evidence of the killing of women and children in My Khe 4, 
of establishing whether or not Willingham's platoon had been attacked.
106
 This and the 
question of the orders which the platoon had received had evoked contradictory 
testimony and the appearance of Jerry Warner on 6 February emphasised how difficult 
it was going to be to find answers to these questions.     
 
 Warner was Madison's assistant on the machine gun attached to Linkous' squad 
and he confirmed that he and Madison had been covering the bridge as the point team 
and Lias' squad entered My Khe 4. He was, with some difficulty, persuaded to record 
                                                 
106
 Testimony of Luther C. Myers to Peers Inquiry, 3 February 1970 at http://www.loc. gov/rr/frd 
/Military_Law/ pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook19.pdf. Daniel R. Houghton and Stephen M. Miller were the other 
members of the Weapons Platoon to testify on 3 February 1970. The witnesses who appeared on 4 
February were Cecil W. Huffman and David L. Kingsby of the Weapons Platoon, Samuel E. Long and 
Johnny J. Shifley of 2nd Platoon. Shifley opined that 'The 1st Platoon was always good at shooting at 
ghosts' and he also recalled that some of the men in 1st Platoon had, on one occasion, forced four 
Vietnamese to walk point for them with the result that they had detonated a mine. Testimony of Johnny J. 
Shifley to Peers Inquiry, 4 February 1970 at http://www.loc. gov/rr/frd /Military_Law/ pdf/RDAR-Vol-
IIBook21.pdf. In addition to Marshall, Harry E. Parker and Michael B. Mahr of 3rd Platoon and Willie J. 
McKenney of 2nd Platoon appeared on 5 February. McKenney testified that he had seen members of 1st 
Platoon mistreating prisoners after the death of Milus. Testimony of Willie J. McKenney to Peers Inquiry, 
5 February 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd /Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook21.pdf. Arthur M. 
Moreno appeared, before Warner, on 6 February. 
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what he had heard from his position at the bridge and what he had been told later. It had 
been rumoured, he told the inquiry, that as many as 300 people had been killed in My 
Khe 4, a number which he claimed to be impossible because, when he walked down the 
trail towards the sub-hamlet, he had seen no bodies. He had heard, he admitted, a lot of 
shooting and explosions and been told that Milus had cut a woman in half with machine 
gun fire, Taylor had shot a baby and there had been people inside the bunkers when they 
were destroyed.
107
 Although he intimated to Walsh that he would not have obeyed an 
order to fire upon women and children, Warner's contention that there had not been any 
'civilians' in My Khe 4 revealed that he was not prepared to condemn the actions of 
some of his comrades and his insistence that 'I didn't actually see it … I couldn't say that 
anybody actually did this or anything like this' ensured that he would not be asked to 
testify against anyone.
108
 When he tried to recall the circumstances which led to the 
killings in My Khe 4, however, he seems to have been sincerely puzzled.  
 
Warner asserted that 'we weren't fired on but once' and that this had been as the 
platoon moved away from the landing zone but he also testified that when he was at the 
bridge, he 'heard some firing ... I'm not sure whether we were getting fire or what.' 
When he was asked if he had been given 'orders from anybody to go and kill everybody 
in the village', he replied that although he had not, he did not know if others in the 
platoon had received such an order and he referred to a rumour that Michles had ordered 
the killings 'over the radio' to avenge the death of Cochran who had been Michles' close 
friend. He explained that there had been orders to 'recon by fire' before and after the 
bridge had been crossed which raised the possibility that civilians might have been hit 
by accident but he affirmed that the killings by Milus and Taylor had been 
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 Testimony of Jerry Warner to Peers Inquiry. He also agreed that a woman had been forced to walk 
point, that Taylor had found a booby trap and that the platoon had been re-supplied by helicopter. 
Warner's explanation that Madison and he had formed one machine gun team and Milus and Strachan the 
other clarified this aspect of the platoon's organisation.   
108
 Ibid. 
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'deliberate'.
109
 He was not sure of where Willingham had been during the attack or to 
what extent Willingham had directed the assault. The extent of his confusion was 
demonstrated when it was suggested that 'maybe some of the men thought that they 
were supposed to kill everybody that was in the area.' He responded, 'I don't think a - I 
think it came - maybe they had orders to do it - I don't think they - cause usually they 
don't do that.'
110
  
 
 Anthony Anderson, who appeared after Warner on 6 February, was someone 
else who had heard about Milus and his machine gun. A member of the Weapons 
Platoon, Anderson had fired the mortar rounds, some of which were 'dud', to cover 
Willingham and his men as they crossed the bridge. Subsequently he asked Milus about 
the shooting in My Khe 4 and, Anderson alleged, Milus had boasted of how he had 
killed a pregnant woman at a range of 150 metres. Anderson had also heard a rumour 
that a baby had been shot with a pistol, either by Hooton or Taylor.
111
 Robert Holmes, 
who testified on the following morning, seems to have anticipated the rumours. He told 
Wilson that 'The first thing that came to my mind' when he heard Willingham reporting 
the platoon's kills over the radio 'was whether they were civilian or whether they were 
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 Ibid. The tactic of 'reconning by fire' was mentioned by several of those in Willingham's platoon. They 
apparently interpreted it as a licence to fire in any direction at any time. How the use of this tactic in 
inhabited areas was consistent with the need to prevent accidental killings was not explained. Franklin 
McCloud, the leader of Bravo's 3rd Platoon, told Wilson that this procedure was not permitted 'if there 
was a village or anything nearby' but Willingham's men seem to have made a habit of ignoring this 
prohibition. Testimony of Franklin A. McCloud to Peers Inquiry, 11 February 1970 at http://www.loc. 
gov/rr/frd/ Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook22.pdf. 
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 Testimony of Jerry Warner to Peers Inquiry. 
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 Testimony of Anthony Anderson to Peers Inquiry, 6 February 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr 
/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook22.pdf. 
95 
VC.'
112
 According to Marvin Jones, the next witness from Willingham's platoon, 
however, the rumours had no foundation.
113
  
 
 Jones testified that 'nothing sticks in my mind' about the briefing or the 
operation and expressed the opinion that the reports of his platoon killing thirty-eight 
Viet Cong were 'exaggerated' because he had only seen one body.
114
 He had heard that a 
grenade had been thrown as the men approached the bridge but he did not think the 
platoon was fired upon as the bridge was crossed and he maintained that he had little 
idea of what had happened in My Khe 4 because, once he had crossed the bridge, he and 
other members of Lias' squad had been told to guard an area near the bridge. The 
shooting that he had heard was, he believed, some of the men 'reconning by fire' and 
when Wilson asked him what he had been told about the events in the sub-hamlet, he 
answered 'There was nothing unusual, nothing that I would try to remember. I can't 
remember nothing exceptional that they would say that I wouldn't know.'
115
 
 
Leon Mercer, one of Michles' RTOs, and Jimmie Jenkins, Rushin's RTO, 
testified on 9 February, the day before Willingham was charged with murder. Although 
Mercer found it hard to distinguish between the first two days of the operation in Son 
My and Jenkins was an initially reluctant witness, their recollections of the 
communications between Michles and Willingham indicated that, whilst Michles' 
message to the task force that there had been no women and children killed at My Khe 4 
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 Testimony of Robert D. Holmes to Peers Inquiry. Holmes, Larry L. Hatch and Brice E. Whittaker, 
who also testified on 7 March, had served in Bravo's 3rd Platoon. Hatch thought that, before one of the 
operations in Son My, the order had been to kill everyone because only the enemy would be in the 
village. He could not remember, however, who had said this. Testimony of Larry L. Hatch to Peers 
Inquiry, 7 February 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr /frd/Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook22.pdf. 
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 Walsh was not present at the questioning of any of the witnesses on 7 February and, thereafter, he took 
part less frequently in the interviews of the men from Bravo Company.  
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 The body was that of a woman, who Jones speculated, had been killed by artillery fire. He also 
testified that he had seen a child whose arm had been shot off at the shoulder. Testimony of Marvin B. 
Jones to Peers Inquiry. Vo Thi Lien's account of the massacre included a reference to a boy called Thanh 
whose arm had been 'sliced off by a bullet.' 'Son My Survivor's First-hand Account of Massacre'. 
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 Ibid. 
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might have been a fabrication, he had warned Willingham on at least two occasions that 
women and children were not to be hurt. Indeed, according to Mercer, Michles 'time and 
time again ... told his (men) to make sure you know what you're shooting. Be careful. 
We don't want to hurt innocent people.'
116
 Such testimony suggested that, if the men in 
My Khe 4 had been ordered to kill anyone they found, the responsibility was 
Willingham's.
117
    
 
His recall of the radio messages which had passed between Michles and 
Willingham was not the most significant aspect of Jenkins' testimony, however. As 
Wilson explained to Peers, who was asked for the second time to hear the testimony of a 
member of Willingham's platoon, it was also Jenkins' contention that: 
a boy named Larry Holmes and two other men whom Jenkins cannot recall 
opened fire, at 25 to 30 meters, on a woman and two children. He had told 
Holmes before this happened that he had gotten a communication from Captain 
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 Testimony of Leon R. Mercer to Peers Inquiry. Franklin McCloud, the leader of Bravo's 3rd Platoon, 
testified on 11 February that Michles had ordered his platoon leaders to destroy buildings and seal off 
bunkers and tunnels. He also recalled, however, that Michles had instructed his platoon leaders to collect 
the inhabitants of 'Pinkville' and to consider them, irrespective of age or gender, as Viet Cong suspects. 
He explained that the inhabitants had been repeatedly warned that this would be the outcome if they 
stayed in their homes. McCloud added that he had not expected to find a substantial enemy force because 
previous operations had found only 'a bunch of old women and little-bitty kids' in the area. He did not 
suggest that there had been orders to kill everyone and, when his platoon searched My Lai 6 on 16 March, 
the inhabitants were collected and screened. McCloud's testimony and the conduct of his platoon suggest 
that the massacre in My Khe 4 was not a consequence of Michles' briefing to his platoon leaders. 
Testimony of Franklin A. McCloud to Peers Inquiry.  
   Jenkins, who had attended the briefing, did not think that Willingham had given an order to his squad 
leaders to kill anyone. He even felt that the lieutenant had said that the 'villages' they passed through 
should not be destroyed. Testimony of Jimmie L. Jenkins to Peers Inquiry. 
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 Jenkins, as Warner had done, described how rifle fire had been received as Willingham's men passed 
to the south of My Lai 1 on their way to the bridge. The summary of Jenkins' testimony states that 'a 
request for gunship support' was denied but this mis-represents what he said. Jenkins could not recall the 
request for gunships or the mortar fire. His suggestion that the rifle shots had not come from My Khe 4 
was reasonable. They coincided with the detonation of the mine which killed Cochran on the outskirts of 
My Lai 1 and it might have been there that a sniper was hiding.  
   Mercer remembered that Willingham had requested gun ships because his men had come under fire 
from a sniper but he could not confirm that this had happened on 16 March. In the account which 
Willingham had given to Wilson, sniper fire had prompted him to request gunship support. When that 
was refused, mortars had been fired which failed to explode and Michles had then recommended the use 
of a machine gun to clear the approach to the bridge. 
   Jenkins agreed with Mercer that Michles had told Willingham to take care of the sniper and that, later, 
Michles had warned Willingham on two occasions not to kill women and children. Again the summary of 
Jenkins' testimony is somewhat misleading. It states that Michles warned Willingham not to kill women 
and children before the platoon crossed the bridge. Jenkins, however, testified that Michles repeated the 
warning after there had been some shooting in My Khe 4. Testimony of Jimmie L. Jenkins to Peers 
Inquiry; Testimony of Leon R. Mercer to Peers Inquiry. 
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Michles, the company commander, not to fire on civilians unless they were 
combatants. And second is the point that Lieutenant Willingham was told that 
morning that the VC KIA body count was mostly noncombatants.
118
 
 
These revelations were not obtained without difficulty. Wilson, in Walsh's absence, 
conducted almost all the questioning and, at first, his attempts to persuade Jenkins to 
talk about the events in My Khe 4 were frustrated by the witness' insistence that he 
could not remember them, a loss of memory which he attributed to a wound he had 
suffered in Vietnam.
119
 Apparently Wilson sensed that Jenkins, whose anxiety during 
the interview seemed to affect him physically, was susceptible to pressure and the 
determination with which he interrogated the RTO contradicts the assertion made by 
Greiner that 'the questioning of those involved (in the massacre at My Khe 4) was not 
carried out with the necessary vigour'.
120
 'You were right there', Wilson told Jenkins, 
and: 
If there has been anybody that has been in here that has been right on that spot 
with the type of equipment that would know what is going on, it's you. If there is 
a key man in this particular - as to what happened in that particular location, it's 
you. You're the radio man, you have the radio equipment, you know the 
communications that are going on, and you're there. And we've had other people 
who weren't as well off as you are as far as communications and position go that 
saw bodies.
121
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 Jenkins' testimony on the first of these points was unambiguous. Having identified Larry Holmes as 
one of the men who had opened fire, the witness and Wilson had the following exchange:   
 
Wilson: No question of identification?  
Jenkins: No, sir, it wasn't. I could tell it was a woman and two little kids.  
Wilson: No hostile action?  
Jenkins: No, sir. All they was doing is came over to use the latrine. That was it. Just about all the 
firing had stopped at that time after I spread the word to hold fire. When they came over, they 
seen them and fired at them, cut them down.  
 
   When Jenkins was asked if he thought that Willingham knew that women and children had been killed 
in My Khe 4, he replied, 'Yes, sir, he did' and explained that he had heard the point men reporting a body 
count to Willingham and informing him that 'the biggest part of them was women and children.' Wilson's 
summary of this, that Willingham knew that a majority of the dead reported by the point team were 
noncombatants, presupposed that women and children could not be considered as enemies. Testimony of 
Jimmie L. Jenkins to Peers Inquiry. 
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 Ibid. Jenkins stated: 'We were supposed to search the village out and everything and wait for further 
orders. As far as I know, I don't remember finding anything. That's about all I can remember as far as that 
was' and later he pleaded, 'I can't remember there being any fire or not, sir. As soon as I got hit, I can't 
remember nothing that far back.'  
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 Greiner, p. 217. 
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 Testimony of Jimmie L. Jenkins to Peers Inquiry. 
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 Eventually, Jenkins admitted that his platoon had a record of indiscriminate 
killing and that, although Tittle had heard Michles' warning that women and children 
should not be harmed, the point team had begun shooting before crossing the bridge and 
destroying the bunkers. When Wilson asked 'Did they call them out first, or did they just 
throw the demo in there?', Jenkins explained that 'They just threw it in there without 
calling them out ... They didn't want them still alive.' Jenkins also testified that the 
platoon had not been fired upon at the landing zone, as the bridge was crossed or in My 
Khe 4.
122
 Having implicated Hooton, Tittle and Taylor as well as Larry Holmes, Jenkins 
had become, like Fernandez, a crucial witness. Had Holmes still been in uniform, it is 
likely that he would have been charged and when Hooton and Taylor made subsequent 
appearances before the inquiry, each was warned that he was suspected of the murder of 
Vietnamese civilians. Jenkins' testimony was unlikely to result in the conviction of 
anyone in the point team, however. He had no offered no direct evidence of civilian 
deaths when explosives were thrown into the bunkers and his testimony was vulnerable 
because of his admission that his memory had been affected by the wound he had 
suffered in Vietnam 
 
 In the light of Jenkins' testimony, it might seem strange that, two days later, 
Wilson recommended to Peers that Interview Team C should curtail its activities on 13 
February. Perhaps Wilson anticipated that the announcement of the charges against 
Willingham would make later witnesses even less likely to co-operate with the inquiry. 
If so, he would have had grounds for arguing that he was proved correct. Of the ten 
witnesses who appeared between 14 February and 24 February, seven were members of 
1st Platoon but the testimony of only one of them contributed significantly to the 
                                                 
122
 Ibid. Jenkins also recalled the landing of the helicopter, a woman who had been forced to walk point 
and an admission by one of the men, whose name he maintained he could not remember, that he had 
killed an old man and a baby.  
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inquiry's understanding of the operation in My Khe 4 and there was little that would 
help to build a case against any of those suspected of offences there.  
 
On the weekend of 14 and 15 February, Wilson was in the mid-west 
interviewing James Placek and Larry Taylor. As he returned he might have wondered 
whether he should repeat his recommendation that further investigation of the events in 
My Khe 4 should be left to CID. Placek, who testified that he had spent most of the day 
patrolling the beach to the east of My Khe 4, had presented an unconvincing account of 
an assault on a fortified bunker by Milus and the point team which ended with the 
killing of a Vietnamese male and Taylor, who was warned that he was suspected of 
'Wrongful destruction of a village and the murder of Vietnamese civilians', refused to 
answer questions on the advice of a military lawyer.
123
 Back in Washington six days 
later, Willingham took a similar course. Confronted by Peers, MacCrate, Walsh, Wilson 
and Colonel Miller and informed that he was 'suspected of the offense of murder of 20 
unnamed Vietnamese civilians in the area of Son My', Willingham made, on the advice 
of his lawyers, only the single statement that: 'subsequent to the completion of the 
operation 16-18 March, I was never interrogated by any superior officer in Task Force 
Barker or any other member of an echelon of command, other than Colonel Wilson on 8 
May, 1969.'
124
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 Testimony of James E. Placek to Peers Inquiry, 14 February 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military 
_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook20.pdf and Testimony of Larry H. Taylor to Peers Inquiry, 15 February at 
ibid. Placek also testified that he had heard sniper fire at the landing zone, remembered a Vietnamese 
woman with Taylor and seen the body of a dead woman in the sub-hamlet. He also recalled that 
ammunition had been found in one of the bunkers and flown out by helicopter.   
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 It had become Colonel Miller's responsibility to study the evidence gathered by the Peers Inquiry in 
order to 'identify everyone whom he felt had been derelict in the areas of reporting, investigations, and 
other military types of offenses.' Peers, p. 214.  
   Robert A. McKinley, Willingham's civilian attorney explained that: 
 
We have had no opportunity to examine the transcript of any testimony of witnesses who have 
appeared here, or who have appeared before Colonel Wilson at a prior investigation when he 
was investigating this matter I believe as a member of the Inspector General's Office. At 0910, 
approximately, this morning, Colonel Miller was kind enough to lend us a transcript of Captain 
Willingham's testimony of 8 May 1969 before Colonel Wilson. I only mention this sir, because I 
don't want this inquiry or board to have any thoughts that would indicate any lack of 
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The day before Willingham's brief appearance, Wilson had interviewed Henry 
Cardines and Richard Silva. Each had claimed that they found it difficult to separate the 
events of 16 and 17 March and that they could not remember any Vietnamese being 
killed in My Khe 4. Wilson repeatedly pressed Cardines, who had been the leader of the 
platoon's weapons squad, telling him that 'this would have been one of the biggest days 
in combat of your career' and reminding him that: 
this is a village where there wasn't anybody but the platoon there. This is the day 
when you walked across that concrete bridge. Because there was a hell of a lot 
of firing going on over there and there was a lot of demolition going on ... 
Lieutenant Cochran was killed that morning ... Lieutenant Willingham reported 
large amounts of KIAs there.  
 
None of this had any impact. Asked if he remembered, Cardines replied, 'No, sir, to tell 
you the truth.'
125
 
 
 Rodney Linkous had been more forthcoming when he appeared on 16 February. 
He had given a detailed account of the platoon's approach to My Khe 4, recalling the 
sound of the explosions from My Lai 1, the firing of the mortar and the crossing of the 
bridge. It was his impression that 'It was pretty quiet with us' until the point team and 
Lias' squad moved into My Khe 4. His testimony about what happened afterwards, 
predictably, was less helpful. The inquiry had found that those who had not taken part in 
                                                                                                                                               
cooperation. We have not. It is a question of timing. I would like to state that I have advised 
Captain Willingham as his attorney, as has Captain Allen, that we would suggest that he not 
testify or answer questions. 
 
Testimony of Thomas K. Willingham to Peers Inquiry, 20 February 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/ 
Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook20.pdf.  
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 Testimony of Henry D. Cardines to Peers Inquiry, 19 February 1970 at ibid. Cardines recalled no more 
than the bridge and hearing talk of a grenade that failed to explode.  
   Silva testified that Willingham had been told by Michles, by radio, 'If there is any resistance, wipe it 
out'. Otherwise, as the summary of his testimony demonstrates, he provided no information about the 
operation in My Khe 4: 
 
The witness knew of no Vietnamese being killed, of no firing or explosions, or of no captured 
equipment. He did not recall any incoming mortar rounds, or any hand grenades being thrown at 
the unit. He did not remember seeing any bodies that day. 
  
Testimony of Richard Silva to Peers Inquiry, 19 February 1970 at ibid. 
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the destruction of My Khe 4 were unable or unwilling to describe the actions of the men 
who had. Thus Linkous told Wilson that, whilst he and his squad stayed near the bridge, 
the remainder of the platoon moved out of sight. As they did so Linkous heard an 
intense burst of firing and then, during the next ninety minutes, occasional shots. He and 
his squad were asked to send their grenades forward and when, eventually, he moved 
towards the sub-hamlet, he saw that hootches were burning and that bunkers were still 
being destroyed with blocks of TNT. Later, he heard that between 150 and 175 people 
had been killed but he only saw two or three bodies on the rise leading towards the 
beach and when Wilson asked him if he believed that anybody was in the bunkers, he 
replied, 'I couldn't tell you about that, sir. I didn't hear anything, and I didn't see 
anything.'
126
 
 
At first Linkous was prepared to justify the platoon's actions. To Wilson's 
question, 'What do you believe happened in that village?', he responded, 'I believe if 
they did kill any women and children, it's probably because they didn't see the children 
and sometimes they do use women for combat.' He also testified to hearing what he 
assumed was enemy fire while he was on the eastern side of the bridge and recalled that 
'the men (who) had been in the village' had described how fire had been received from 
the slope where he had seen the bodies. Apparently Wilson sensed that Linkous was not 
entirely convinced by this explanation and he managed to find an approach which 
persuaded Linkous to offer an alternative: 
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 Testimony of Rodney V. Linkous to Peers Inquiry, 16 February 1970 at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/ 
Military_Law/pdf/RDAR-Vol-IIBook19.pdf. Linkous testified that he had not moved into the centre of 
My Khe 4 but he thought that it consisted of forty to fifty hootches. Others had indicated that it was 
smaller and in another respect his testimony differed from that of most of the other witnesses. He recalled 
that Willingham had briefed the whole platoon and that the mission had been to 'Search and Clear' rather 
than 'Search and Destroy'. He also denied any knowledge of the rumours that Milus had cut a woman in 
half with machine gun fire and that a child had been shot 'in its mother's arms'. He agreed that Taylor had 
held a woman captive until the next day and that a helicopter had arrived as he and his squad had moved 
away from the bridge.  
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Wilson: Do you believe that the 1st Platoon or elements of the 1st Platoon were 
mad enough or angry enough at this particular area or this particular group to go 
over here and bring noncombatants under fire?  
Linkous: I think they could have, because Lieutenant Cochran was killed and he 
was well liked. He had gotten along with the company from the very beginning, 
and it was almost a year and a half then, and very possibly they could have.  
Wilson: Now, Lieutenant Cochran was not around the 1st Platoon.  
Linkous: He had charge of the one platoon.  
Wilson: I am talking about when he was killed.  
Linkous: I still think they could have taken it out on somebody else.  
Wilson: How did they know about it?  
Linkous: It came across the radio.  
Wilson: The whole platoon knew about it?  
Linkous: Yes.  
Wilson: Everybody got mad about that?  
Linkous: Definitely. In Hawaii he was the 1st Platoon leader.
127
 
 
The inquiry had not previously received such a clear expression of the idea that 
Cochran's death had been the trigger for the killings in My Khe 4, a version of events in 
which the platoon leader was no more than a bystander. When Wilson asked if there 
was any indication that the men's reaction might have been based upon an order issued 
by Willingham, Linkous denied this and, having described how, on the following day, 
the platoon had burned the dwellings they found as they moved southwards, he added: 'I 
don't think anybody got any instructions at all. I think we went through and somebody 
started doing it and everybody took it up.'
128
 
 
Although this was not how the assault on My Khe 4 was portrayed by Donald 
Hooton when he testified the next day, he did imply that Cochran's death had changed 
the nature of the operation. He asserted that the platoon's original objective had been to 
destroy a bunker complex in My Khe 4 and that an additional order to destroy the sub-
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 Towards the end of his testimony, Linkous was asked for his opinion of Fernandez. His response was 
unambiguous: 
 
Wilson: Do you think he is an honest man?  
Linkous: I think he is fairly honest, yes, sir.  
Wilson: He is the one that described seeing these 15 to 20 women and children - 
Linkous: (Interposing) I'd say if he saw them, he saw them, sir. 
 
Ibid. 
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hamlet had been passed to the point team after the news was received that Cochran had 
been killed. He went on to describe a firefight which began after the bridge had been 
crossed and continued while the point team advanced with Milus' assistance, destroying 
bunkers with explosives as they did so. According to Hooton, it was probably 
Willingham who eventually called a cease fire and Michles who, during the afternoon, 
issued an instruction in the afternoon to burn the hootches. Significantly, however, he 
did not know who had ordered the destruction of My Khe 4 and he was uncertain about 
the source of the enemy fire.
129
  
 
Hooton, who was warned that he was suspected of the murder of Vietnamese 
civilians and provided with an Army lawyer, was the only one in the point team to 
answer any of the inquiry's questions and like the others in the team, he refused to make 
a statement to a CID investigator. It seems unlikely that Wilson was convinced by 
Hooton's description of the firefight in My Khe 4, a description which was not 
supported by the preponderance of the evidence that the inquiry had gathered.
130
 The 
dubious nature of Hooton's testimony was confirmed in May 1971 when he gave an 
entirely different account of the operation to Seymour Hersh.
131
 What he told the 
inquiry was limited anyway: either of his own volition or on the advice of a lawyer who 
seemed increasingly determined to silence his client, he refused to answer questions 
about what had happened after the initial burst of firing; the way that a bodycount was 
arrived at; the use of a Vietnamese woman as point; Michles' anxiety about the killing 
of non-combatants or rumours within the platoon about the unnecessary killing of 
                                                 
129
 As the point team moved towards the bridge, Hooton testified, Tittle saw a grenade which had been 
thrown in their direction. It failed to explode and, until the bridge was crossed, the platoon did not receive 
any fire. He recalled that mortar shells had been fired across the river immediately before the news of 
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 Walsh arrived after Hooton had begun his testimony and left before it was over.  
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 Elements of the account which Hooton had given Hersh appeared in 'Coverup-I' and Cover-Up. 
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civilians. Probably the most useful piece of information he provided was his 
identification of Beverly Larche as the fourth member of the point team.
132
 
 
Homer Hall and Morris Michener were questioned again in March as the inquiry 
sought to clarify the movements of the different elements of the platoon in My Khe 4 
and to elicit testimony that might confirm Willingham's role in an operation in which at 
least twenty Vietnamese, most of them women and children, had died. Perhaps there 
was also a feeling that Hall and Michener had seen more of what had happened than 
they had admitted and, because each had expressed disquiet about the actions of the 
platoon, they might be persuaded to add to the accounts which they had given in 
January. Neither Hall nor Michener, however, were able to resolve the contradictions 
which had emerged in the statements made by fifty-eight members of Bravo Company. 
The task of developing a record of the events in My Khe 4 from these statements and 
some of those which had been made by Vietnamese witnesses fell to Walsh who, in his 
chapter on Bravo Company's actions in Son My between 16 and 19 March, affirmed 
that there was 'considerable evidence' of the killing of 'a number of Vietnamese women 
and children' and that 'testimony and circumstantial evidence strongly suggest(ed) that a 
large number of non-combatants were killed during the search' of My Khe 4.
133
 He also 
admitted that uncertainty remained about some aspects of the operation: when, if at all, 
the platoon had been fired upon and what had caused some of the men to open fire upon 
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 Testimony of Donald R. Hooton to Peers Inquiry. Uncertainty about the identity of the men who had 
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 Goldstein et al., p. 168. In conversation with the writer, Walsh observed that 'writing wasn't (Wilson's) 
strong point.' 
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the sub-hamlet. The broader question of why civilians had been killed in My Khe 4 he 
left unanswered.   
 
In The My Lai Inquiry Peers recalled that others had advised him that he should 
not include in his report a chapter which he had planned to call 'Why My Lai?' because 
it was such a complicated question to answer. There was no 'single reason' for what had 
happened and 'what may have influenced one man to commit atrocities had had no 
effect on another'.
134
 Because he was determined to provide 'some kind of explanation', 
Peers decided to identify the 'principal causes' and he listed thirteen 'significant factors' 
in the report, with the qualification that 'there were (other) facts and circumstances 
which could be said to have had a major influence upon the event' and an acceptance 
that the attempt to explain 'why Son My happened' was 'not intended to be exhaustive, 
nor ... definitive.'
135
 The title of the chapter became 'Significant Factors Which 
Contributed to the Son My Tragedy' in the final report but, as its original title 
anticipated, it concentrated upon the relevance of the thirteen factors to the massacre at 
My Lai 4 and did not develop a separate explanation of the behaviour of Willingham's 
platoon. 
 
Under the heading 'Plans and Orders', the first of the thirteen factors, Peers 
declared that 'There is substantial evidence that the events at Son My resulted primarily 
from the nature of the orders issued on 15 March to the soldiers of (the) task force', that 
these orders were 'embellished and ... misdirected' and that an understanding was 
'conveyed ... to a significant number of soldiers in C Company that only the enemy 
remained in the operational area and that the enemy was to be destroyed.' The evidence 
does not encourage the application of such an explanation to the massacre at My Khe 4. 
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If Michles' briefing was responsible for what had happened there, why had the 
inhabitants of My Lai 6 not been killed by Bravo Company's 3rd Platoon? Whilst 
Medina had gathered the men of Charlie Company together before the operation to 
stress that there would be no civilians in My Lai 4 and, some testified, to point out that 
this was an opportunity for revenge, it was clear that Michles had not. Instead, he had 
briefed his platoon leaders and rather than demonstrating that he had 'embellished and ... 
misdirected' the orders he had received, the testimony suggested that his men were 
aware that Michles was firmly against the mistreatment of non-combatants.
136
  
 
Walsh and Wilson had been unable to establish what Willingham had told his 
men before or during the operation or the extent to which the actions of his platoon in 
My Khe 4 had been a response to his orders. Most of the testimony indicated that there 
had been nothing unusual about Willingham's instructions to his squad leaders before 
the operation. What had happened after the men had landed in Son My was less clear. 
Some had testified that an order had been received to destroy My Khe 4 but whether 
Willingham had been the source of such an order and when it had been issued remained 
a mystery. It was also possible that those who had testified to hearing such an order 
were trying to shift the responsibility for the killings to their superiors.
137
 More certain 
was that, by the time they arrived at the outskirts of My Khe 4, at least some of the men 
in Willingham's platoon were accustomed to ignoring the rules of engagement.
138
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 According to a survey of public opinion in December 1969, a significant number of Americans would 
have understood if the men had killed Vietnamese civilians because they had been ordered to. The survey 
found that 'One of the principal justifications' of the killings at My Lai 4 'was the idea that orders must be 
followed' and that only 27% of the men who were interviewed would have refused such an order. Edward 
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 Peers' list of significant factors included a 'Lack of Affirmative Command and Control' and a 
'Permissive Attitude'. Under the first heading the general expressed surprise that 'not a single commander 
under company level' arrived in Son My on 16 March to take control of what had apparently turned into a 
major action but he did not comment on the possibility that Willingham's men had been allowed to 
operate without proper restraint. Under the second heading, he referred to a history of criminal activity by 
members of Charlie Company which had gone unchecked but asserted that 'There was no evidence 
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Several of them had told the inquiry about how there had been 'reconning by 
fire' in the sub-hamlet but Hall had gone further in January, indicating that it had 
become the platoon's habit to 'clear the area' with a machine gun before entering a 
village. When Fernandez was interviewed by a CID agent in February, he explained that 
'As the point team neared the village, they opened fire on the village, just spraying 
generally in that direction, with no specific targets' and that he did not 'believe that any 
orders to open fire were ever given, since it was standard practice for the point team to 
fire on a target as they neared it.'
139
 A more surreal example of the freedom with which 
the men opened fire was provided during Michener's second appearance before the 
inquiry as he told Wilson what he and Williams had been doing while they guarded the 
bridge: 
Michener: We were target practicing at the ducks out in the river. 
Wilson: Target practicing at ducks?  
Michener: Yes.  
Wilson: With M-16s?  
Michener: Yes ... shooting about 6 inches away from them, making them fly.  
Wilson: Was this before or after the firing in the village?  
Michener: After.  
Wilson: After the majority of this firing in the village stopped, did you hear 
sporadic, or intermittent firing, or was it all just one big volume, mad minute of 
fire, and then everything stopped?  
Michener: I can't recall whether I did or not.  
Wilson: Well, you were probably pretty well occupied with those ducks?  
Michener: Possibly, yes, sir. We just fired maybe, oh, four or five rounds apiece.  
Wilson: I was just wondering if the boys in the village down there were a little 
edgy about that firing back there at the river?  
... 
Michener: No. They knew that we were back there. They probably figured that 
we were just, you know, reconning by fire or something. Sergeant Rushin did 
come over and ask us what we were shooting at, and we told him ducks, and he 
made us stop it.
140
   
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
developed to indicate the existence of a permissive attitude among key members of B Company.' 
Goldstein et al., pp. 203-204. 
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 Witness Statement of Mario Fernandez, 24 February 1970 in CID Report of Investigation on Donald 
Hooton, 70-CID011-00049, US Army Crime Records Center. 
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 Testimony of Morris G. Michener to Peers Inquiry, 6 March 1970. Michener's absorption with the 
ducks suggests that he thought an enemy presence unlikely.  
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 It did not require an order from an officer, therefore, to persuade the men in 
Willingham's platoon to fire their weapons.
141
 There was evidence, moreover, that anger 
or anxiety might have provided them with an additional stimulus on 16 March.
142
 
Linkous had agreed that the men might have been affected by the news that Cochran, 
their former platoon leader, had been killed and others had admitted that they had been 
so nervous about what they would find in Son My that, as Hall told Wilson, 'any type of 
fire, anything we seen we would have to shoot it or it would get us.'
143
 Re-interviewed 
in March, Hall testified that a 'footprint' would be enough to convince the men that they 
were surrounded by the enemy, a comment which suggests that, lacking effective 
leadership, there were men in the platoon for whom rules of engagement had become an 
irrelevance.
144
 That the men also fed each other's fears about what might be found in 
Son My was illustrated by an exchange between Wilson and Placek: 
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 When he was re-interviewed Hall gave a more detailed account of his thinking as he approached My 
Khe 4:   
 
We never did see the one that threw the grenade. I never did see him. The point man may have. 
Tittle or somebody saw it, but anyway ...when all this happened, I guess in a way, it kind of gets 
you uneasy ... The movements that were going on in the village, we just perceived that it was a 
VC village. There seemed to be different types of tracks. Like I said, when you're over there a 
while you feel like you develop an ability to read a VC footprint or something like that. They 
always seemed to wear a type of a tennis shoe or something. It just looked like a VC village to 
us, I mean entirely …  
 
Testimony of Homer C. Hall to Peers Inquiry, 3 March 1970. 
   Greiner has observed that the rules of engagement which the US Army adopted in Vietnam were 'open 
to interpretation'. He also noted that, in a war in which small units had a major role, it was the 
109 
Placek: They said everybody in the area was considered VC.  
Wilson: Everybody in the area was VC?  
Placek: Right. 
Wilson: Now, was this in the briefing or was this general talk?  
Placek: This was general talk.
145
 
 
 
 
 Such 'talk' was important. Peers concluded that the attitude of the soldiers in 
Task Force Barker towards the area of Son My and its inhabitants had contributed in 
different ways to what had occurred.
146
 The report noted that 'The Son My area was 
populated principally by VC, their sympathizers and supporters, and their respective 
families' and that the men in the task force thought of the 'area and its population … as 
belonging to the enemy.'
147
 For at least some of the men, suspicion of the inhabitants of 
Son My was supplemented by a  perception of the Vietnamese people as 'dinks', 'gooks' 
or 'slopes' who lived a lower order of existence and, paradoxically, any hostility towards 
the Vietnamese who lived in Son My might have been reinforced by the attitude of a 
South Vietnamese government which believed the area to be 'long-standing VC-
controlled territory' and treated it as a free fire zone.
148
 The testimony of the men in 
Willingham's platoon demonstrates that most of them shared the feeling that the people 
in My Khe 4 were 'Viet Cong' and that, like others in the task force, they 'had little 
apparent understanding of the probability that a significant part of Son My's unarmed 
                                                                                                                                               
commanders of platoons and companies who had to interpret the rules and ensure that their men followed 
their orders. Greiner, p. 19 and p. 99. 
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From what I understand of the mission we were to a - since we were getting in all this heavy 
enemy traffic in there. We were to clear this out so this wouldn't happen again, you know, so that 
we wouldn't have this problem. 
 
Testimony of Jerry Warner to Peers Inquiry. 
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population were(sic) dominated by the VC'.
149
 Some, like Michener and Reid, seem to 
have shared the view of their company commander that a distinction ought to be drawn 
between combatants and non-combatants but, as Peers observed, it was not clear that 
'the various commanders in TF Barker had detected (the) general feeling of mistrust and 
… attempted to prevent it from developing into a dangerous tendency to categorize all 
Vietnamese, not specifically identified otherwise, as being the "enemy".
150
  
 
 Whilst Peers complained in his report about the 'failures in leadership' which 
appeared to 'have had a direct bearing on the events of Son My', his assessment of 
Michles was generally positive.
151
 He noted that Michles had a reputation as a 
'scrupulous' man and concluded that Bravo's leader was 'a conscientious career officer 
who enjoyed the respect and esteem of most of his men.'
152
 In Charlie Company, 
according to Peers, the abuse of Vietnamese civilians had not been challenged but 'the 
evidence indicate(d) that ... Michles neither condoned nor tolerated mistreatment of 
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Wilson: Did they say anything, for example, about the people having been warned to leave the 
area and that anybody left there would be a VC or a VC sympathizer?  
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Vietnamese.'
153
 Although there was, indeed, convincing testimony to this effect, it was 
not entirely consistent with the rumour that members of Bravo Company's 1st Platoon 
had killed non-combatants in previous operations, a rumour which Peers did not 
mention. If Michles was aware of the platoon's reputation, it might explain the repetition 
of his message to Willingham that women and children should not be harmed, a 
message which would have become urgent when he heard heavy gunfire in My Khe 
4.
154
 Whether he was aware of the rumour or not, it is apparent that there were a number 
of men in Willingham's platoon who remained unaffected by any attempts which 
Michles had made to impress upon them the importance of distinguishing between 
combatants and non-combatants.
155
    
 
Of Willingham's responsibility for the killings in My Khe 4, either because he 
ordered them or because he failed to prevent them, Peers had little to say. Elsewhere in 
the Peers Report, he described Willingham as 'quiet, intelligent, but basically not 
motivated towards a career as an Army officer.'
156
 His more general observations that 
there was no 'evidence to suggest that any of the B Company platoon leaders were 
particularly weak or strong as combat leaders' and that they 'apparently commanded a 
reasonable degree of respect from their men and had the fortitude to discipline them 
when required' were not obviously true of Willingham.
157
 In command of a platoon in 
which another set of leaders and loyalties was already well established, the 
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inexperienced Willingham apparently found life difficult.
158
 According to Braddock, the 
lieutenant was unprepared for the challenges of leadership and uncomfortable with his 
men:  
Willingham came in and he didn't have any confidence to trust himself. And he 
stayed away from the 1st Platoon as much as possible ... he posed the image of 
the type of man that you wouldn't want to go in to combat with. Whether he had 
2 years or 2 weeks … we thought he was sort of a flop.159  
 
 
 Willingham's decision to delegate the briefing of the men to the squad leaders, a 
decision which seems to have ensured that a clear set of orders was not given, offers 
some support for Braddock's assertion that the lieutenant lacked confidence. 
Furthermore, the men's apparent uncertainty about Willingham's role in My Khe 4 and 
about his attitude to what happened there suggest that he was not a commanding 
presence.
160
 As Larry Holmes explained to Walsh, Willingham must have made some 
decisions but to what extent he was in control was hard to judge:  
Walsh: In your opinion, that thing that happened the first day, was that just 
something where the platoon just kind of went out of control, or was that 
something that they were just following orders from the platoon leader?  
Holmes: Well, I don't know if you can say it was out of control or not.  
Walsh: Well, was the platoon leader trying to stop the people from firing at the 
people on the hill, or was he directing them to do it or what?  
Holmes: I didn't see nobody wave to me or anybody else, and I was in the back. 
The guys out front - the lieutenant, he had to give the word calling for the ammo 
and the TNT. He had to give the word, so he must not have been rejecting it too 
much.  
Walsh: You don't have any impression that he was real angry at everybody after 
that first day, do you?  
Holmes: No, I wouldn't say he was angry with them. Maybe he was, but he 
didn't show he was angry.
161
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the rear … One of the guys walked back.' Hersh, 'Coverup-I'. 
161
 Testimony of Larry G. Holmes to Peers Inquiry. Holmes revealed a view of the lieutenant as a leader 
who might be influenced when he testified that he had asked Willingham if he could 'go up and help a 
little bit', apparently intending to move towards the beach in search of more victims. Willingham's 
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Hall had indicated that Willingham was not in complete command of the initial assault 
in which a lot of 'boys did get carried away' and Milus went 'kind of crazy' but 
Fernandez felt, like Holmes, that the lieutenant had exercised some control over the next 
stage of the operation, ordering the men to stop firing in order to search the bunkers and 
making the call to request a re-supply of explosives.
162
 It is possible, therefore, that 
Willingham was initially overtaken by events and that later he sought to re-assert his 
authority by organising what, he perhaps sensed, was going to happen anyway: the 
destruction of My Khe 4.
163
  
 
 The testimony of the men in Bravo Company's 1st Platoon is sufficiently 
contradictory to allow a variety of explanations of their conduct on 16 March but it is 
highly unlikely that the men were simply following the orders of the company 
commander. Probably the most 'significant factor', unmentioned by Peers, was the 
                                                                                                                                               
response - he told Holmes to 'shut up and stay where I was at' - demonstrates that he was trying to 
maintain discipline. 
162
 Testimony of Mario J. Fernandez to Peers Inquiry. When he made his second appearance before the 
inquiry, Hall depicted Willingham as a more assertive leader. Asked if he believed 'that the point was 
called out of the village before the machinegun started firing', he answered 'I believe they were' and that 
'It may have been the lieutenant' who called them back:  
 
because the point was pretty well forward. I believe I'm correct when I say that they were being 
called back, because they were getting ahead of the platoon. Lieutenant Willingham was trying 
to keep the platoon together in kind of a coordinated movement here. 
 
Hall also thought it likely that Willingham had watched the point team destroying the bunkers. Testimony 
of Homer C. Hall to Peers Inquiry, 2 March 1970. By the time that he was interviewed by CID, eleven 
days later, Hall was portraying Willingham as the source of the order to open fire upon My Khe 4. 
Whether the changes in Hall's testimony reflect an improving memory, a greater readiness to tell the truth 
or an increasing willingness to shift the responsibility for the attack on My Khe 4 to his lieutenant is 
difficult to decide. 
163
 In Charlie Company, Greiner has speculated, 'Chumminess with the troops meant keeping them happy 
by giving them a free rein' and it is possible that Willingham was pursuing a similar strategy. It does not 
appear amongst the explanations of the massacre at My Khe 4 which Greiner offers, however: 
 
 The order radioed by the company commander Michles was unambiguous: 'Don't hurt the 
women and kids!' The order was not obeyed - for reasons which to this day remain a mystery. 
Some of those taking part claimed that the unit was fired on by snipers … It is highly improbable 
that Captain Michles revoked his order; possibly Lieutenant Willingham ignored his superior 
and countermanded it himself. Mutiny with murderous intent is even a possibility: neither 
platoon leader Willingham … nor the sergeant assigned to him had control over their unit.  
 
Greiner, p. 198 and p. 214. 
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platoon's internal dynamic: some of the men under Willingham's command had become 
a law unto themselves, determined to exact retribution for Cochran's death and, perhaps, 
to live up to their reputation as killers.
164
 Whether he was a bystander, a participant or a 
leader who directed the destruction of My Khe 4 and its inhabitants, however, 
Willingham was responsible for his men if he knew or should have known what they 
were doing and whilst stronger cases might have been made against Hooton, Taylor or 
Holmes, the lieutenant had still been in the Army on 10 February and they had not.
165
 
Despite the inconsistency of the testimony elicited by the inquiry, the Judge Advocate 
General, the Provost Marshal and the Army General Counsel were persuaded that 
enough evidence had been gathered to charge Willingham with unpremeditated 
                                                 
164
 Peers noted in his report that 'TF Barker had some men who had been law violators and hoodlums in 
civilian life and who continued to exercise those traits … after entering the Army.' In The My Lai Inquiry 
he described these men as 'almost gangsters' and observed that 'In the absence of effective leadership by 
junior officers and NCOs some of the lower ranking enlisted men probably followed along with these 
hoodlums.' None of these men are identified in the report but it is possible that he was referring to 
members of Willingham's platoon. Goldstein et al., p. 194; Peers, p. 231. 
   Charlie Company's 'Prior Failure to Close with the Enemy' had been a source of frustration which, Peers 
believed, some of its men had sought to relieve during the assault on My Lai 4. He did not point out the 
obverse of this, that Bravo Company's 1st Platoon had a reputation, possibly undeserved, for finding and 
killing the enemy and that it was to maintain this reputation that My Khe 4 was attacked with such 
violence. Goldstein et al., pp. 195. 
   It is also interesting that Cochran's death and the other losses suffered by 2nd Platoon during the attempt 
to enter My Lai had, according to Walsh, 'a demoralizing effect not only upon the remainder of the 2nd 
Platoon but also upon the members of (Bravo's) 3rd Platoon, Weapons Platoon, and command group'. 
Rather than 'demoralizing' them, the news of the losses seems to have inspired some of the men in 
Willingham's platoon to seek revenge. Ibid., p.172. 
165
 Prompted by the charges against Medina, the leader of Charlie Company, the nature of an officer's 
responsibility for the actions of his men was to become the source of much debate in 1971. As Eckhardt 
explained in 'My Lai: An American Tragedy', the Department of the Army's Field Manual made it clear 
that: 
 
a military commander may be responsible for war crimes committed by subordinates … "if he 
has actual knowledge, or should have knowledge … that troops … are about to commit or have 
committed a war crime and he fails to take … reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law 
of war".  
 
This standard of command criminal responsibility was 'legislatively uncodified' in 1970, however, and the 
judge in the Medina case instructed the jury that the defendant could only be found guilty if it was proved 
that he had 'actual' knowledge of what was happening in My Lai 4. Belknap, p. 232. Willingham was only 
in command of twenty-six men but it would have added significantly to the prosecution's difficulties if it 
had been necessary to prove his 'actual' knowledge of what was happening in My Khe 4. Eckhardt 
considered the implications of the Medina case in more detail in 'Command Criminal Responsibility: A 
Plea for a Workable Standard'. 
   Hooton and Taylor had been warned that they were suspected of murder and Larry Holmes might have 
been charged with, at least, attempted murder on the strength of Jenkins' testimony. Had he survived the 
war and remained in the Army, it seems likely that Milus would have been charged although his 
comrades might have testified rather differently had he still been alive.   
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murder.
166
 Having studied the evidence collected by the Peers Inquiry, Colonel Miller 
concluded in March that Willingham should also be charged with misprision of a felony 
and submitting false reports.
167
 
  
  Walsh and Wilson's investigative effort was not well-received by everyone: 
'Later', Walsh has recalled, 'it came to my attention that there were people in the Army 
that thought (the investigation) was a mistake'.
168
 The conclusions of the Peers Report 
which, Oliver has observed, 'proved profoundly discomfiting to an army leadership 
which was otherwise endeavouring to present the massacre at My Lai [4] as an event 
almost entirely inexplicable in terms of its own institutional culture', were harrowing 
enough but the evidence of a second massacre undermined the defence that Charlie 
Company had been a rogue unit and was especially disturbing because it suggested that 
a different sort of atrocity had taken place.
 169
 The 'full story' of the massacre at My Khe 
4 might not have been told but the consequence of the charges against Willingham and 
the testimony which indicated that women and children had been killed by men in his 
platoon was a criminal investigation that might bring one or more of those responsible 
into a court room, an outcome which would have ensured that the actions of 
Willingham's platoon, like those of Charlie Company, were subjected to detailed 
analysis.   
                                                 
166
 Peers' observation in The My Lai Inquiry that 'it was highly unlikely that (Willingham) would have 
been prosecuted at all' had the charges not been laid before he left the Army implies a recognition that the 
evidence collected by Walsh and Wilson was not conclusive.  
167
 According to Miller, there was evidence to show that Willingham had knowingly made false reports 
about the killing of enemy soldiers in My Khe 4 and also that, aware of the presence of women and 
children amongst the dead, he had lied to Michles about this. If he had deliberately submitted false reports 
to conceal the crimes of his men, he was guilty of the misprision of a felony. Memorandum: 'Review of 
Evidence Obtained by the Peers Inquiry, 11 March 1970' in 'Col. H. Miller's Report to TJAG on 
Offenses', Box 27, Peers Inquiry Administrative and Background Materials Files (Closed Inventory), 
RAS, RG319, NARA. 
168
 Walsh in conversation with the writer. 
169
 Oliver, The My Lai massacre in American history and memory, p. 72. Hébert's sub-committee was to 
report in July 1970 that what had happened at My Lai 'was so wrong and so foreign to the normal 
character and actions of our military forces as to immediately raise a question as to the legal sanity at the 
time of those men involved.' Investigation of the My Lai Incident: Report  ... Under Authority of H. Res. 
105, p. 53. If this conclusion were to be convincing, it could only be applied to one unit of men. 
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CHAPTER II: CID INVESTIGATION OF  
THE MASSACRE AT MY KHE 4 
 
William Eckhardt observed in 'My Lai: An American Tragedy' that 'Passage of time is 
the enemy of justice.' Willingham was charged with murder nearly two years after he 
and his men had landed in Son My and those who conducted the criminal investigation 
of the massacre at My Khe 4 would probably have shared Eckhardt's view that 
'reconstructing a battlefield incident some two years after the fact was extremely 
difficult.' Without a forensic examination of the crime scene, the bodies of the victims 
or the weapons which might have been used, the CID reports which provided what 
Eckhart described as the 'factual basis for prosecution' had to be based upon the 
statements of the men in Willingham's platoon, the evidence of others in Bravo 
Company and the testimony of survivors of the massacre.
1
 A further handicap was that 
investigators could not insist that civilians subjected themselves to questioning. They 
cannot have been encouraged either by an awareness that, even if overwhelming 
evidence of guilt was found, the prosecution of Hooton, Larry Holmes or anyone else 
who had left the service was unlikely.
2
  
  
Nevertheless, once Tufts' hand was forced by the charges against Willingham, 
the CID ground into action. By 13 February the testimony of those members of Bravo 
Company who had appeared before Walsh and Wilson had persuaded CID that it was 
necessary to investigate allegations that 'criminal acts were committed' by Willingham, 
Larry Holmes and Hooton and a statement had been taken by a CID agent from Robert 
Holmes which contained an assertion that Hooton had spoken of how 'he had killed 
                                                 
1
 Eckhardt, 'My Lai: An American Tragedy'. 
2
 Peers noted in The My Lai Inquiry that CID had 'no power to question civilians except on a voluntary 
basis'. Peers, p. 19. 
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women and children, cut off a few ears and cut off some fingers during (the) operation' 
in Son My.
3
 By 11 February, most of the men who had been in Willingham's platoon 
had been identified by Walsh and Wilson but, unlike those working under Peers, CID 
was not able to arrange for witnesses to be brought to the Pentagon and agents had to 
conduct the majority of interviews in the homes of the witnesses. The logistic problems 
associated with this were increased by a departure from CID's usual practice of having 
witnesses interviewed by investigators from the nearest army base.
4
 The questioning of 
those who might have detailed information about the massacre at My Khe 4 became 
primarily the responsibility of a single agent, Thomas J. Porter, a strategy intended to 
ensure that witnesses were confronted with an investigator who had a clear 
understanding of the evidence which had already been collected.
5
 Porter's efforts were 
supplemented by the work of those agents who traced others who had served in Bravo 
Company and took statements from them. According to a 'Talking Paper' sent by Tufts 
to the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel in July 1971, CID's investigation into 
Bravo Company's activities became a major enterprise: a total of 158 interviews were 
conducted, ninety-three with men who had served with Bravo Company and thirty-eight 
with Vietnamese nationals.
6
 
                                                 
3
 'Talking Paper', 13 February 1970. Subject: Son My in CIP 180 XI-1-5: Captain Thomas K. 
Willingham, RPI, NARA; Robert Holmes, Witness Statement, 11 February 1970. 
4
 Interviewing the witness at home was not always the best arrangement. When Agent Byers interviewed 
Thomas Trujillo, Jr., for example, he was not able to take a written statement from the former member of 
Bravo Company's 2nd Platoon, 'due to the presence of dogs and lack of a table on which to place a 
typewriter.' Byers, Investigator's Activity Report, 8 April 1970 in in Box 8, Folder 36, Papers of Four 
Hours in My Lai, LHCMA, KCL; the difficulties resulting from the practice of having witnesses 
interviewed by investigators from the nearest army base are noted in Nelson, p. 27. 
5
 That interviews with those who had information about the actions of Willingham's platoon was left to 
Porter is demonstrated in the record of his activities in early April 1970. Porter wrote in his Report File: 
'Discussed lead with (Agent) Buglio. Buglio had made initial contact with Raysor but, since Raysor had 
information relative to 1st Plt, B/4/3, of which Buglio was uninformed, Buglio had deferred the interview 
until Raysor could be interviewed by Porter.' CID Report File: Raysor, Thaddeus E. in Box 8, Folder 36, 
Papers of Four Hours in My Lai, LHCMA, KCL. 
6
 Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel: 'The CID Investigation Concerning the Conduct 
of B/4/3rd Infantry and A/3/1st Infantry at Son My', 6 July 1971in Box 7, Folder: Release of Peers Report 
to the Public, 13 November 1974, RAS, RG 319, NARA. Which of the Vietnamese witnesses constituted 
the thirty-eight referred to in this memorandum is something of a mystery. According to a list dated 2 
April 1970, CID agents had conducted thirty-three interviews with Vietnamese civilians formerly resident 
at My Hoi. 'Fact Sheet: Son My Investigation', 2 April 1970. The witness statements recording the 
outcomes of thirty-two of them are in Box 02, Folders 6-8, MLC, TVA, TTU. (There is no record of the 
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Such activity is in sharp contrast to CID's earlier response to Bay's allegations of 
a massacre in My Hoi. The requirements of the My Lai 4 investigation were so 
overwhelming in December 1969 that agents had not even able to keep track of Bay.
7
 
She had remained in hospital until 30 December but when an agent tried to re-interview 
her in March 1970, he found that the authorities had no idea of where she had gone. 'All 
efforts', the agent reported, 'failed to disclose the whereabouts of Bay'.
8
 This is not the 
only sign that agents' attention was elsewhere. The instruction, issued on 20 December, 
that they should take 'separate statements whenever individuals have information about 
events at My Lai [4] and Co Lay [2]', was not always adhered to, as the statement made 
by Tran Dau on 2 January 1970 to Agent Arvil J. Kirk, Jr. illustrates.
9
 More significant, 
is Feher's inability, twenty years later, to remember 'having pointed the way to a second 
massacre' by taking Bay's testimony.
10
 Although he recalled 'vaguely that it was 
mentioned by some of the survivors during the interviews', Feher's memory of such talk 
was that it was no more than 'a rumor'.
11
 Whilst the passage of time might have blunted 
Feher's memory, it is hard to imagine that he would have forgotten the impact of Bay's 
testimony had he known about it in any detail.
12
 Feher's ignorance of the steps which 
the Peers Inquiry took so rapidly, it seems, was a consequence of his absorption with the 
My Lai 4 investigation and, perhaps, of the inquiry's failure to keep CID apprised of the 
progress it was making in its investigation of the massacre at My Khe 4.
13
 According to 
                                                                                                                                               
interview with Tran Thi Mien.) At least eight other Vietnamese witnesses told CID investigators of 
hearing rumours of a massacre in My Hoi or Co Luy, however, and the list of thirty-three names does not 
include the women interviewed by Feher in December 1969: Bay, Nguyen Thi Hong or Nguyen Thi Hien.  
7
 The agency's response to the allegations in Kamm's story might be further evidence of this. 
8
 Investigator's Statement by Arvil J. Kirk, Jr., 16 March 1970 in Box 02, Folder 08, MLC, TVA, TTU.  
9
 Witness Statement of Tran Dau. This contained information about the massacres in My Lai 4 and My 
Hoi.     
10
 Feher's undated letter to Michael Bilton. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 As Feher's thirty page letter to Bilton demonstrates, he was able to recall aspects of his contribution to 
the investigation of the massacre at My Lai 4 in some detail. Ibid.  
13
 Feher's ignorance extended to a feeling that the second massacre was not 'ever thorough(sic) 
investigated', a surprising notion in the light of the CID's subsequent investigation of the massacre at My 
Khe 4. This is another reminder of the extent to which the massacre at My Lai 4 could monopolise the 
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Tufts, the CID maintained 'a cooperative stance with the … Peers Inquiry' but, as the 
process by which the inquiry heard about Bay's allegations suggests, the relationship 
was not always a close one.
14
 
 
That there had been a massacre at My Hoi had been repeatedly asserted by the 
Vietnamese. The allegations in the Census Grievance Report, the complaint which Tan 
had conveyed and the accounts of the operation which had been disseminated in NLF 
'propaganda' had been corroborated by the statements which Feher had taken. On 18 
January 1970 a CID agent had spoken to six Vietnamese from Co Luy who, like Tran 
Dau and Nguyen The, had heard rumours that people had been killed there.
15
 After 
Tufts had made the investigation of the massacre at My Khe 4 a priority, however, CID 
                                                                                                                                               
attention. Ibid. Peers might have based his conviction that Feher 'strongly suspected that more had taken 
place in the Bravo Company area than had thus far been brought to light' on his reading of Feher's 
summary of Bay's testimony.  
14
 'The CID Investigation of the Son My Incidents', 31 December 1970. On 17 December 1969 Tufts had 
initiated two memoranda: one agreed to provide the Peers Inquiry with copies of CID Fact Sheets and 
Talking Papers and the other clarified the channel of communication between the CID and the staff group 
established by the Army to monitor the progress of the Son My investigations. It is possible, therefore, 
that there had been criticism that the CID was not sufficiently forthcoming. Memorandum for Record, 
Subject: Compliance with and Intent of C/S Referral Slip #48692 - Daily Situation Report, 17 December 
1969 and Memorandum for Record, Subject: Fact Sheet and Talking Paper Distribution, 17 December 
1969 in Folder 2, Box 2, HTA, LC, UMSCL, AA. There are some signs of co-operation. The Daily 
Journal of the CID's task force in Vietnam recorded on 6 January that Peers had 'furnished copies of 
proposed questions for Co Lay [2] inhabitants if interviewed'. Daily Journal of the CID Task Force in 
Vietnam, 6 January 1970.  
   Even if the Peers Inquiry did not share what Walsh had learned about the location of My Hoi and the 
distinction between Co Lay and Co Luy, it is remarkable that it took at least some members of CID so 
long to grasp the geography of the area. In February, Kamm's article was still being treated with 
scepticism because 'There is no Coluy west of My Lai [4] and Co. B, 4th Bn, 3d Inf operated east of My 
Lai [4] near the hamlets of My Khe [4] of Co Lay.' 'Reid Allegation (Co Lay/Co Luy)', 12 February 1970 
in War Crimes Allegations - 9; Reid Allegation (Co Lay/Co Luy).  
15
 Witness Statement by Juel M. Moses. Rather than recording the statements of the six witnesses 
separately, Moses produced one statement which indicated that Pham An, Vo Binh, Duong Thi My, Ngo 
Bac, Le Thi Thong and Nguyen That were former residents of Co Luy who 'had heard rumours that some 
of the people living in the area were killed' and that they had no other information. When he was 
interviewed again on 10 March by Coy Wells, however, Ngo Bac stated that he had lived in My Hoi and 
that, having spent the day fishing, he had returned to find that the sub-hamlet had been burned and that 
five members of his family had been killed by grenades as they hid in a bunker. Witness Statement of 
Ngo Bac, 12 March 1970 in Box 02, Folder 07, MLC, TVA, TTU. (As the testimony of the Vietnamese 
was interpreted by an American soldier, notes were taken by the CID agent conducting the interview. 
Later, a witness statement was prepared by the agent. Thus, the date of the interview was often earlier 
than the date of the statement.)  
   Bac's failure to volunteer this information in January might have been because he was not questioned 
with sufficient care and Moses' decision to produce a single statement to record the testimony of six 
witnesses might reflect CID's lack of interest. CID was still concentrating its efforts on the investigation 
of the killings at My Lai 4 in January. There are other possibilities: in January Bac might have been 
scared to talk about what had happened in My Hoi or in March he might have fabricated his testimony.   
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turned its attention to finding Vietnamese who had lived in My Hoi and during a period 
of five days in March, CID investigators Arvil Kirk and Coy Wells took statements 
from thirty-three Vietnamese who had information about the attack there.
16
 As a CID 
Fact Sheet noted in April 1970, 'Most of the persons interviewed alleged relatives had 
been killed by American soldiers (and) a majority stated their relatives had been killed 
in their family bunkers.'
17
 
 
Nine of those interviewed by Kirk and Wells testified that they had been in My 
Hoi when it was attacked. Seven of the survivors were female, most of the males having 
been at their work as fishermen on the morning of 16 March 1968, and their testimony, 
which was consistent, was corroborated by seventeen witnesses who, absent during the 
massacre, saw some of the victims and the devastated sub-hamlet later. A seventy-two 
year old survivor called Le Thi Hien. for example, told Wells that she had hidden in a 
bunker with three children near the beach when she saw American soldiers crossing the 
bridge towards My Hoi.
18
 She had watched the soldiers burning the houses and, after 
they left, she had seen over twenty corpses. Amongst the dead were her daughter-in-law 
and four grand-children and she explained that they had been killed in a bunker by a 
grenade and by rifle fire. According to Hien and seven other witnesses, ninety-seven 
bodies were counted in My Hoi.
19
 Similar testimony was given by Nguyen Thi Roi, a 
forty-year old woman who had seen many bodies in My Hoi after the assault. Roi had 
                                                 
16
 It is possible that CID was prodded into action by NBC which, on 18 February, had broadcast a news 
item about the massacre at My Khe 4 which featured interviews with survivors. NBC's story is considered 
in Chapter IV. 
17
 'Fact Sheet: Son My Investigation', 2 April 1970. The summary relates to allegations of killings in My 
Hoi, Binh Dong and Binh Tay. 
18
 Witness Statement of Le Thi Hien, 15 March 1970 in Box 02, Folder 07, MLC, TVA, TTU. The word 
'bunker' appeared frequently in the translation of the statements by the Vietnamese and the testimony of 
the men in Willingham's platoon. Whilst the women and children at My Hoi seem to have perceived a 
'bunker' as a place to shelter, it is clear that American soldiers thought, with some justification, that a 
'bunker' was somewhere that an attacker might hide.   
19
 Amongst those who agreed that a count of ninety-seven had been made were Nguyen Thi Roi, Pham 
Thi Chut and Nguyen Thi Huu. Their witness statements, all dated 15 March 1970, are in ibid. Pham Thi 
Mai testified to an estimate of ninety-eight and Do Thi Sanh thought that she had seen between seventy-
five and one hundred bodies scattered around in My Hoi. Witness Statement of Pham Thi Mai, 15 March 
1970 in ibid; Witness Statement of Do Thi Sanh, 16 March 1970 in Box 02, Folder 08, MLC, TVA, TTU. 
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hidden in the brush when she saw about twelve soldiers crossing the bridge and watched 
as soldiers threw grenades into the bunkers, sometimes dragging the wounded out to 
execute them.
20
 Another survivor, forty-eight year old Nguyen Thi Huu, described how 
several who tried to leave the bunkers were shot and grenades were thrown into the 
bunkers to kill those who remained inside. She also testified that 'the story was all over 
the village' that Bay, who Huu knew as Nguyen Thi Ty, had been 'raped by Negro 
soldiers.'
21
 This was verified by three witnesses, amongst them Bay's mother, who told 
Wells that they had heard about the rape.
22
 Two of the survivors, sixteen year old Le Thi 
Hot and thirteen year old Nguyen Thi Tiec, told Jackson that they had been wounded 
when grenades were thrown into the bunkers where they had sought refuge and both 
exhibited scars.
23
     
     
 Several witnesses offered an accurate estimate of the number of soldiers in the 
unit which had carried out the attack and eleven of those interviewed by Kirk either 
stated that there had been no Viet Cong in My Hoi or that they did not know anything 
about them.
24
 Only Pham Hang and Pham Thi Mai, who was interviewed by Wells, 
acknowledged that Viet Cong cadre had been in the sub-hamlet. Hang thought that there 
had been two cadre who had left three days before the beginning of the operation in Son 
                                                 
20
 Witness Statement of Nguyen Thi Roi. 
21
 Witness Statement of Nguyen Thi Huu. A photograph of Bay, taken during the operation in Son My, 
was identified by Nguyen Thi Chi who explained that Bay, which means seven in Vietnamese, was a 
nickname given to Nguyen Thi Ty because she was her parents' seventh child. Witness Statement of 
Nguyen Thi Chi, 15 March 1970 in Box 02, Folder 07, MLC, TVA, TTU.  
22
 Bay's mother, Pham Thi Mong, confirmed that Bay was her daughter's nickname. Although she had not 
been in My Hoi on the day of the massacre and had never returned there, she had heard that Bay had been 
raped. Neither Mong nor any of the other witnesses had seen Bay since 16 March 1968. Witness 
statement of Pham Thi Mong, 15 March 1970 in ibid.  
23
 Witness Statements of Le Thi Hot and Nguyen Thi Tiec, 15 March 1970 in ibid.   
24
 Nguyen Thi Cuong testified that she had watched between twenty and thirty soldiers cross the bridge, 
Nguyen Lung claimed that he had seen, from his fishing boat, thirty soldiers making the crossing and 
Nguyen Thi Chanh had heard that about thirty American soldiers had come to My Hoi. Witness Statement 
of Nguyen Thi Cuong, 15 March 1970 in ibid; Witness Statements of Nguyen Lung and Nguyen Thi 
Chanh, 16 March 1970 in Box 02, Folder 08, MLC, TVA, TTU. Lung's testimony evoked Kirk's 
scepticism. He noted that Lung was almost blind but admitted that the witness' eyesight might have 
deteriorated since March 1968. 
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My and Wells recorded a statement by Mai that 'A Viet Cong cadre had been operating 
in the area and had killed several persons.'
25
 The testimony of the former residents of 
My Hoi, therefore, confirmed much of what had been said by some of those in 
Willingham's platoon: there had not been a battle with the Viet Cong; the dead were 
mainly women and children; grenades had been used to destroy the bunkers; those who 
tried to escape had been shot and the sub-hamlet had been destroyed.
26
 The testimony 
also offered an explanation of the soldiers' claims that they had not seen many bodies in 
My Hoi. It was because many of the victims had died in the bunkers. 
  
 Like the Peers Inquiry, CID concluded that there had been a second massacre in 
Son My although it was more conservative in estimating its extent, reporting that 
'approximately 20 noncombatants were killed by members of the 1st Platoon at ... My 
Khe 4'.
27
 The difference between the two estimates reflected different attitudes towards 
the testimony of the Vietnamese. Walsh did not dismiss the Vietnamese testimony 
indicating that approximately ninety non-combatants had been killed at My Khe 4 but 
the CID's conclusion was based upon the testimony of members of Willingham's 
platoon, one of whom had spoken of seeing up to twenty bodies in My Khe 4.
28
 Tufts 
had sent a memorandum to the Provost Marshal General on 17 February 1970 in which 
                                                 
25
 Witness Statement of Pham Hang, 16 March 1970 in Box 02, Folder 08, MLC, TVA, TTU; Witness 
Statement of Pham Thi Mai. It seems likely that Kirk routinely questioned those he interviewed about the 
presence of the Viet Cong in My Hoi and that Wells did not. The only reference to the Viet Cong in the 
statements which were recorded by Wells was made by Pham Thi Mai who might have volunteered the 
information that she had. 
26
 My Hoi was apparently perceived by most of the men in Willingham's platoon as smaller than is 
suggested by the testimony of the Vietnamese, some of whom estimated that it had 200 inhabitants. 
Witness Statement of Pham Thi Mai and Witness Statement of Le Tich, 15 March 1970 in Box 02, Folder 
07, MLC, TVA, TTU. This is not a significant inconsistency because, as their testimony to the Peers 
Inquiry indicated, most of the Americans saw only parts of the sub-hamlet. 
   It might be argued that there was another discrepancy. Most of the Vietnamese witnesses described the 
destruction of the bunkers but not the initial volley of rifle and machine gun fire. As those who were in 
the open and able to see what was happening were probably killed, however, it is unsurprising that there 
were only occasional references to the firing which occurred before the destruction of the bunkers began. 
Amongst those who did make such a reference were Bay and Pham Thi Mai. Witness Statement of 
Nguyen Thi Bay, 17 December 1969; Witness Statement of Pham Thi Mai.       
27
 Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel: 'The CID Investigation Concerning the Conduct 
of B/4/3rd Infantry and A/3/1st Infantry at Son My', 6 July 1971. 
28
 Bay had told Feher that ninety civilians had been killed at My Hoi and Mario Fernandez had testified 
that he had seen 'About 15 or 20 people killed' there.  
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he warned that Vietnamese testimony about the massacre at My Lai 4 might have been 
'exaggerated or fabricated … possibly for personal gain, sympathy, or political 
purposes' and he pointed out that intelligence sources had 'classified some of the 
interviewees as Viet Cong, Viet Cong sympathizers, and civil defendants.'
29
 He and his 
investigators seem to have harboured similar suspicions about the Vietnamese who 
provided information about the events at My Hoi, perhaps interpreting the consistency 
of their stories as evidence of a conspiracy.
30
  
 
 Feher, who took statements from many who said that they were survivors of the 
massacre at My Lai 4, was another sceptic. He pointed out to Bilton that the witnesses 
were paid to make the journey to Quang Ngai and that 'They all had the same story.'
31
 
Neither Feher nor others who doubted the evidence of the Vietnamese have explained 
why the similarity of the witnesses' stories should be interpreted as evidence of 
conspiracy rather than evidence that the witnesses were telling the truth but it should be 
noted that those who made statements about the events in My Hoi did not tell exactly 
the same story. With the exception of the four women who told Wells that they had 
known Bay, one of whom was Bay's mother, the witnesses who identified the victims of 
the attack named entirely different people, never corroborating another's statement that 
a particular individual had been killed.
32
 This is less surprising than it may appear and, 
indeed, it suggests the veracity of the testimony. Thomas McGreevy, CID's Chief 
Investigator in Vietnam between December 1969 and March 1970, produced a 
statement on his return to America at the beginning of April 1970 in which he explained 
that:  
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 Col. Henry H. Tufts, 'Memorandum: Census of Civilian Casualties - My Lai 4', 17 February 1970 in 
Box 8, Folder 63, Papers of Four Hours in My Lai, LHCMA, KCL.  
30
 General Abrams, Westmoreland's successor as the Army's Chief of Staff in 1972, was similarly 
suspicious. According to Walsh, Abrams 'made no secret of the fact that he thought the whole 
investigation (by Peers) was a terrible mistake' and that 'too much credit had been given to testimony by 
the Viet Cong people.' Walsh in conversation with the writer. 
31
 Feher's undated letter to Michael Bilton. 
32
 This was also a feature of the testimony offered by survivors of the massacre at My Lai 4. 
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The inability of many Vietnamese interviewees from Son My to identify other 
residents of their own sub-hamlets or to evidence any familiarity with sectors of 
their sub-hamlets more than 50-60 meters from their own homes was difficult to 
understand until repeated experience ... provided convincing evidence that the 
degree of family insularity was of such a nature as to make it unusual for the 
interviewees to provide reliable data except in respect to their own families and 
near-by neighbours.
33
 
 
 
 American investigators did not find it easy to interview the inhabitants of Son 
My. As McGreevy observed: 'the people speak the Vietnamese language, but a 
corrupted version, that is comprehensible by other Son My residents, but was very 
difficult for the interpreters of the CID team to understand' and 'The investigators and 
interpreters were sometimes uncertain as to whether the Vietnamese ... clearly 
understood the difference between statements of fact based on personal knowledge and 
statements of fact based on what the interviewees had heard from other persons.'
34
 
Nevertheless, the stories which the investigators were able to elicit, with the aid of the 
interpreters, from those who had lived in My Hoi matched the testimony of those like 
Fernandez, Jenkins, Hall, Holmes and Michener who had acknowledged that civilians 
had been killed by Willingham's platoon. 
  
 CID's reluctance to accept what had been said by Vietnamese witnesses about 
the extent of the killing at My Hoi was not crucial to the outcome of its investigations  
because none of them were able to identify the killers or to establish Willingham's role 
in what had happened. Nearly two years had passed and the survivors, some of whom 
were still children, had been terrified by an assault on their homes which had driven 
most of them into hiding. Bay, who had given the most detailed account of the massacre 
before she disappeared, had offered only a very general description of the men who had 
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 Investigator's Statement by Thomas J. McGreevy, 3 April 1970 in Box 8, Folder 55, Papers of Four 
Hours in My Lai, LHCMA, KCL. 
34
 Ibid. 
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captured and assaulted her.
35
 Recognition that the testimony of the Vietnamese was not 
going to assist the prosecutors is to be found in the CID's Report of Investigation on 
Hooton. It was recorded that agents had interviewed 'About 38 Vietnamese Nationals, 
reportedly knowledgeable of the My Khe [4] incident', during the investigation but that 
this 'extensive ... activity' had 'disclosed nothing of value.'
36
 What had been underlined, 
however, was the nature of the operation which had been conducted in My Hoi. There 
might be disagreement about the number of victims but it was clear that Willingham's 
men had fired upon the sub-hamlet and that grenades had been thrown into the bunkers 
in which women and children were sheltering. Whether it could be proved that 
Willingham had ordered the killing or that, in the absence of the enemy, he was aware 
that elements of his platoon were murdering unresisting civilians depended upon the 
testimony of his men.     
 
 Like Walsh and Wilson, CID found that some of the men in Bravo Company's 
1st Platoon refused to talk about what had happened at My Khe 4. Neither Willingham 
nor anyone in the point team was prepared to make a statement. David Millsaps and Leo 
Strachan, Jr., neither of whom had appeared before the inquiry, were interviewed but 
their testimony was not decisive. Millsaps stated that he had seen a few bodies in the 
sub-hamlet and agreed that bunkers had been blown up and houses burned. Strachan, 
who was interviewed twice, agreed that there had been some bodies, four or five of 
                                                 
35
 If Bay or any of the other survivors had been able to make such an identification and a trial had ensued, 
prosecutors would have faced the prospect of trying to secure the conviction of an American veteran with 
evidence offered, in translation, by a Vietnamese who would probably be depicted by the defence as a 
member of the NLF.   
36
 CID Report of Investigation on Donald Hooton, 70-CID011-00049, HTA, LC, UMSCL, AA. The 
statements made by Vietnamese to CID agents on 14 March 1970 had demonstrated the nature of the 
assault conducted by Willingham's platoon. Even if these statements had been available for inclusion in 
the report, however, it seems unlikely that Peers would have used them. In the preface to Volume IV 
Peers explained that whilst 'the Vietnamese testimony was of some value to this investigation, the 
inclusion of their statements in this report was not considered essential.' Peers Inquiry of the Massacre at 
My Lai, Vol. IV: CID Statements, p. i. The testimony of some of the Vietnamese witnesses to the Peers 
Inquiry was included in the Peers Report and Walsh referred in some detail to Bay's testimony in the 
chapter about My Khe 4 in Volume I.  
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them, near the bunkers in My Hoi and that the bunkers had been destroyed. He added 
that Willingham had ordered the point squad to destroy a bunker from which a man 
'kept popping up'. They both maintained that they had not seen any indiscriminate 
killing.
37
 Others, like Cardines and Rushin, continued to declare that they could not 
remember much about the operation. With one exception the statements of those who 
appeared willing to co-operate remained contradictory, the effect of the 'passage of time' 
upon their memories or a desire to keep themselves or someone else out of trouble 
leading to crucial gaps in their testimony.
38
 Eckhardt, who supervised the prosecution of 
those charged with offences at Son My, commented fourteen years later that: 
I spent tens of thousands of dollars trying to trace down everything that we 
could trace (about the massacre at My Khe 4). I looked at all the information that 
came out of that particular thing. The investigators went after every particular 
source we knew that would talk about it.
39
 
 
These efforts led only to CID's conclusion on 23 April 1970 that Donald Hooton had 
murdered a child at My Khe 4, a conclusion which, because Hooton was a civilian, 
ended the matter. 
 
 The critical evidence against Hooton was provided by Mario Fernandez who, 
during a second interview with Porter, acknowledged that he had 'witnessed Hooton 
shoot and kill an unidentified Vietnamese boy at My Khe [4] on 16 Mar 68 … with 
either a .45 caliber pistol or M-16 rifle', an eye-witness account which was supported by 
the hearsay testimony of Robert Holmes, Amos Williams
 
and Larry Holmes who also 
stated that Hooton had been armed with a .45 calibre pistol in My Khe 4.
40
 On 21 April, 
the day after CID discussed the evidence against Hooton with a representative of the 
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 Summary of testimony by David Millsaps and Leo Strachan, Jr. in CID Report of Investigation on 
Thomas Willingham, 70-CID011-00039, HTA, LC, UMSCL, AA. 
38
 The men in Bravo Company's other units could contribute only hearsay or context. Statements about 
Milus, the point team and the rumours which had circulated after the attack on My Khe 4 had helped 
Walsh and Wilson to understand what had happened there but such statements were not going to secure a 
conviction in a court room.  
39
 Anderson, p. 58. 
40
 CID Report of Investigation on Donald Hooton, 70-CID011-00049, HTA, LC, UMSCL, AA. 
Fernandez was interviewed by Porter on 24 February 1970 and 8 April 1970. 
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Judge Advocate General, the case against Larry Holmes was 'administratively closed' 
because of 'insufficient evidence', a coincidence which suggests that there had also been 
some discussion of the evidence against Holmes.
41
 It is possible that Holmes' status as a 
civilian played some part in the discussion. Despite CID's conclusion that Hooton had 
committed a murder, he would not be charged because he was a civilian and it might 
have been suggested that there was little point in pursuing an investigation against 
Holmes which, irrespective of CID's conclusion, would not result in criminal 
proceedings. Holmes had admitted shooting a woman and Jenkins had testified to the 
Peers Inquiry that Holmes and two other men had shot at a woman and two children 
while they were defecating but Jenkins' allegation was denied by Holmes and no one 
had testified that Holmes' actions had resulted in murder.
42
 The evidence against him 
was considered inconclusive and the case against Holmes became one of those listed 
under the heading 'Unfounded/Failed to Prove or Disprove' in CID documentation.
43
  
 
The charges against Willingham which had triggered the CID investigation were 
dismissed by General Connor on 9 June for lack of sufficient evidence, a decision which 
Peers found 'difficult to understand' and others have found suspicious. In War Without 
Fronts Greiner has maintained that there are grounds for suspecting that 'the 
investigations into My Khe [4] fell victim to a concerted intervention by the military 
leadership and the White House', supporting a notion originally floated by Hersh in his 
articles in The New Yorker in January 1972 by pointing out 'the speed with which ... 
Connor hastened to exonerate Thomas Willingham' and adding that 'While no evidence 
in his favour had been produced in the interim, all charges against him were lifted (in) 
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 Witness Statement of Larry Holmes, 6 March 1970 in ibid. 
43
 'Weekly Son My Talking Paper', 19 June 1970 in Folder 2AA, Box 2, HTA, LC, UMSCL, AA. 
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June 1970.'
44
 Whilst the refusal of the Nixon administration to support military lawyers 
who sought to recover jurisdiction over ex-servicemen prevented action against Hooton 
and might have discouraged further investigation of the complaint against Larry 
Holmes, it was the testimony of the men in his platoon, rather than external pressure, 
which led to the dropping of the charges against Willingham.
45
 CID had indicated at the 
beginning of April that it was unlikely to find evidence of Willingham's guilt and 
Connor's decision was in line with CID's eventual conclusion that it had been unable:    
to prove or disprove that … Willingham, allegedly with no apparent 
provocation, ordered (his men) to indiscriminately fire their weapons on the 
village of My Hoi killing an undetermined number of Vietnamese 
noncombatants (and) that … Willingham ordered members of his command to 
destroy approximately 8-10 bunkers with grenades and demolitions, resulting in 
the deaths of an undetermined number of unidentified Vietnamese 
noncombatants.
46
  
 
 
Greiner's acceptance that Army investigators 'could not … rely on either forensic 
evidence, ballistics expertise or clues left behind at the scene of the crime' and his 
identification of the unhelpfulness of witnesses who 'either maintained that they could 
no longer remember anything, gave monosyllabic answers which could only be taken to 
mean that they were not going to provide any information (or) refused to make 
statements out of consideration for their comrades' reveals an awareness of the 
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 Greiner, pp. 321-322. Elsewhere Greiner maintains that 'instances of manipulation of the criminal 
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 Asked by the writer if, as the chief prosecutor of the Son My cases, he was aware of an attempt by his 
superiors to influence the outcome of any of the investigations arising out of the operation in Son My, 
Eckhardt replied: 'No one ever pressured me.' 
46
 On 6 April 1970 CID reported to the Army's Staff Monitor Section that the case against Willingham 
had an estimated conclusion of 'Unfounded'. Rather than hastening to exonerate Willingham, Connor 
waited until CID had interviewed the eighteen men in his platoon from whom statements, sometimes 
more than one, were obtained. 
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difficulties confronting those who were trying to build a case against Willingham. He 
also recognised that 'even comparatively fruitful examinations … failed to do justice to 
legal requirements … because statements contradicted each other.' As the administrative 
review of the lieutenant's conduct in My Khe 4 reveals, it was this feature of the 
testimony provided by the men in Willingham's platoon which afforded their leader a 
defence, not only against the original charges of murder but also against the subsequent 
charges that he had lied about the outcome of the operation and failed to report the 
crimes committed by his men.
47
  
 
The administrative review of Willingham's case was one of thirteen carried out 
in 1971 by the Office of the Judge Advocate General at Westmoreland's request. 
Intended to determine whether those cleared of offences arising out of the operation in 
Son My had, nevertheless, fallen short of the desired professional standards, the reviews 
recommended whether or not administrative action should be taken against those who 
were either in the Army or in the Army Reserve. In arriving at the conclusion that 
administrative action against Willingham, who was an officer in the Reserves, could not 
be justified, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew B. O'Donnell considered the evidence relating 
to each of the charges which Willingham had faced and noted its weaknesses.
48
  
 
O'Donnell began his discussion of the charges by observing that 'Investigation of 
the incident at My Khe [4] was hampered by the fact that apparently only ten men 
directly participated in the search and destruction of the subhamlet' and that the eight 
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 Greiner, pp. 298-299. Greiner's claim that 'no evidence in (Willingham's) favour had been produced in 
the interim' ignores the testimony of those like Lias who stated that the men had come under fire at My 
Khe 4. Lias' statement on 19 February that 'just another routine mission' had taken place in My Khe 4 was 
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indiscriminate killings' by Willingham's platoon. Son My Army Staff Monitor Summary, 5 March 1970 
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 It is possible that O'Donnell's argument was informed by a document, probably written in late 1970, in 
which Colonel Eckhardt, the chief prosecutor, explained the decision to drop the charges against 
Willingham. Eckhardt has attempted, without success, to find a copy of this document on the writer's 
behalf. 
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who had survived 'either refused to testify or disclaimed any recollection.'
49
 It was the 
inconsistency of the testimony made by those who claimed that they were able to recall 
what had happened in My Khe 4 which made it impossible to sustain the charges 
against Willingham, however. The lieutenant would have been guilty of murder if he 
had 'ordered an act inherently dangerous with wanton disregard for human life' but, as 
O'Donnell noted, there was 'little evidence that Willingham in fact ordered the firing' 
because, whilst those witnesses who alleged that Willingham had given the order did so 
'on the basis of surmise', other witnesses thought that Milus or Lias had initiated the 
firing.
50
 He might also have been found guilty of murder if the evidence showed that he 
had failed to control his men but, although this was a conclusion to which much of the 
testimony pointed, others had stated that the platoon had 'received fire from the village 
and opened up in response'.
51
 This testimony complicated the task of proving that 
Willingham had failed to report felonies committed by his men because, although there 
was 'evidence of isolated crimes and a suspicion of large-scale killing', there was also 
the possibility that there had been an enemy presence which justified an aggressive 
response. In such a context, the lieutenant might have been unaware that crimes had 
been committed.
52
 Even more difficult to prove was the nature of the reports which 
Willingham had made to Michles. The testimony of the RTOs about the 
communications between Willingham and Michles was imprecise and, in the absence of 
any evidence from Michles, it could not be established that Willingham had denied the 
killing of any women and children by his platoon or exactly how he had reported the 
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 'Administrative Review of Son My Cases: JAG 1969/8751', 26 April 1971.The review does not identify 
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 Ibid. 
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 In the light of the judge's instructions to the jury in the Medina case, it is likely that, had Willingham 
been court-martialled, the prosecutors would have had to prove that he had actual knowledge of what his 
men were doing. 
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platoon's successes. Although Fernandez had testified to Willingham's awareness that 
most of the dead had been women and children, it could be argued that 'Viet Cong 
combatants could include women, and possibly children'.
53
  
  
 Greiner has complained that 'One searches the files in vain for any balanced 
analysis of the findings ... put forward by the Peers Commission' and cited the approach 
to be found in Willingham's administrative review as evidence that the Army was 
determined to find a way to exculpate Willingham.
54
 O'Donnell, whose argument was 
based on the criminal investigation conducted by CID rather than Walsh and Wilson's 
work, was not seeking to provide a 'balanced analysis' of what had been discovered 
about the operation in My Khe 4, however. He was required to explain in purely legal 
terms why the charges against Willingham were not supported by the evidence and, 
elsewhere in War Without Fronts, Greiner seems to accept that there was no need for 
the Army's leaders to intervene in the Willingham case because the 'refusal … to give 
evidence' of some of the men in Willingham's platoon ensured that the Army had 
'nothing to fear'.
55
 
  
 To reject the notion that the investigation into what had occurred at My Khe 4 
was deliberately subverted is not to claim that Army leaders were unhappy with the 
outcome of the Willingham case.
56
 Although there was some disagreement about its 
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 Documents reporting testimony which denied that crimes had been committed at My Khe 4 reveal the 
enthusiasm with which some in the Army conveyed such information. Lias' testimony that 'just another 
routine mission' had taken place in My Khe 4 was described as a 'highlight' in the Son My Army Staff 
Monitor Summary dated 5 March 1970 and on 11 April 1970 a memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of 
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extent, the Peers Inquiry, CID and the Vietnamese agreed that there had been a 
massacre at My Khe 4 and a trial would have revealed not only that there had been a 
second massacre but that the killings carried out by members of Willingham's platoon 
could not be explained in the same way as the killings at My Lai 4.
57
 Many Americans 
had persuaded themselves that the soldiers at My Lai 4 had behaved as they did because 
they were following orders but at My Khe 4 the killing might have begun despite the 
orders of the company commander. Worse, perhaps, was the suggestion that 
Willingham's platoon had not acted uncharacteristically at My Khe 4: there was 
testimony which suggested that firing at inhabited areas, killing civilians and forcing 
villagers to act as mine-sweepers were common practices. Without a trial, it was less 
likely that the platoon's conduct would become a topic of interest and analysis.  
 
 Eckhardt has argued in 'My Lai: An American Tragedy' that the function of the 
prosecutor is not only to bring the guilty to account but to deter others from committing 
similar crimes and that 'Publicity, flowing from the very act of prosecution, fuels the 
engines of prevention that is the chief goal of prosecution.'
58
 In the absence of a court 
case arising from the killing of non-combatants at My Khe 4 and with the Army 
reluctant to publicise what had occurred there, it was left to America's reporters to ferret 
out the story and bring it to the attention of the American people. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
news that 'only the point team, four individuals, actually went into the village to search it … All have 
been interviewed; none has admitted to indiscriminate killing or implicated other team members.' 'Fact 
Sheet: Son My Investigation', 11 April 1970. 
57
 Oliver has pointed out that with the prospect of an end to the draft, the Army's 'long-term survival 
depended upon the consonance of its own reputation with the aspirations and values of the nation's young 
male citizens and - at least as pertinently - those of their parents' and that this was one of several reasons 
why 'the army command was anxious to maintain the distinction between the norms of military conduct 
and the actions of Calley and his men.' News items about a second massacre threatened such a distinction.  
Oliver, The My Lai massacre in American history and memory, p. 70.   
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CHAPTER III 
THE MASSACRE AT MY KHE 4 IN THE PRINT MEDIA  
 
The American media did not identify My Khe 4 as the site of an alleged massacre until 
February 1970 although references to Willingham and his platoon appeared in print 
within hours of their attack on the sub-hamlet in March 1968 and, in military 
newspapers, versions of their action continued to be celebrated for several months. That 
action was usually presented in the context of Task Force Barker's assault on Son My 
but a cursory glance at the accounts in the military press would have revealed that there 
was something out of the ordinary about the activities in which Willingham and his men 
had engaged. As the story of the massacre at My Lai 4 began to unfold in November 
1969 amidst considerable confusion about the geography of the area, the suggestion that 
a massacre had taken place in the hamlet of Co Luy surfaced in the English newspaper 
The Times and press reports in America indicated that the killings in Son My had 
occurred in several different places including one called My Hoi. By the end of 
November, Terry Reid had told a reporter in Wisconsin that, whilst serving in the same 
brigade as Lieutenant Calley during the first half of 1968, he had witnessed a massacre 
although the ensuing story, which was picked up by AP, asserted that the massacre had 
occurred to the north-west of Chu Lai, a town miles to the north of Son My. Further 
references to Co Luy in December alerted the Army to the possibility that a massacre 
had occurred there. In February 1970 newspapers covered the Army's decision to charge 
Willingham but it was a televised news report on NBC which established that the Army 
suspected a massacre had occurred at My Khe 4.
1
 The dropping of the charges against 
Willingham in June 1970 seemed to end a story which had never quite been told, one 
that was not to receive detailed treatment in print until Seymour Hersh published the 
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 NBC's report, which included interviews with Vietnamese witnesses to the massacre at My Khe 4, was 
screened on 18 February 1970. It is explored in detail in Chapter IV.  
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lengthy articles entitled 'Coverup-I' and 'Coverup-II' in The New Yorker in January 
1972.  
 
 Hersh's articles were written after he had secured 'a complete transcript of the 
testimony given to the Peers Inquiry' and 'volumes of other materials' gathered by Peers, 
including a copy of the final report in its entirety. He had seen various CID documents 
and, in May 1971, he interviewed two members of Willingham's platoon: Terry Reid 
and Donald Hooton. 'Coverup-I' provided much of the substance of the chapter entitled 
'The Other Massacre' in Hersh's Cover-Up: The Army's Secret Investigation of the 
Massacre at My Lai 4 which was published in March 1972. By then four years had 
elapsed since the massacres in Son My.  
 
 In The Republic of Mass Culture, Baughman complained that 'Without the 
limitation of time and the imperative for the visual that so handicapped television, 
newspapers should have better served Americans in covering the Vietnam War'.
2
 Only 
The New York Times, America's 'newspaper of record' and one of the few to run a 
bureau in Saigon, was excepted from Baughman's criticism.
3
 Most of the others, he 
noted, 'relied on the major wire services' for copy, a strategy leading to the printing of 
stories that 'lacked coherence or context', a charge Baughman also levelled at the 
television networks which, like the wire services, 'merely described individual 
encounters and posted body counts of the enemy.'
4
 That the stories relating to the 
massacre at My Khe 4 which appeared in America's newspapers and news magazines 
between November 1969 and June 1970 seem to have been written without reference to 
each other might not, therefore, be a source of surprise although Baughman might have 
expected The New York Times to perform more effectively. There were plenty of 
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3
 Ibid., p. 126; ibid., p. 118. 
4
 Ibid., p. 118. 
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indications that civilians had been killed at My Khe 4, especially if note was taken of 
what the Vietnamese had to say, and readers of America's newspapers and news 
magazines were presented with a good number of them between November 1969 and 
February 1970. Nevertheless, the only sustained account of the massacre at My Khe 4 to 
emerge before 1972 was the televised report by NBC in February 1970. Constrained by 
factors which had hampered journalism in Vietnam throughout the war, focused upon 
what Calley and the soldiers of Charlie Company had done at My Lai 4 and encouraged 
by the Army to ignore the distinction between the two massacres, reporters failed to 
write the stories which would have provided a context for the clues that appeared.  
 
In Big Story, an analysis of the American media‟s coverage of the Tet Offensive 
and its aftermath which was published in 1977, Braestrup challenged the idea that so 
many American reporters were roaming around in South Vietnam in 1968 that the 
American public received an abundance of information about events there. He pointed 
out that „American newspapers are primarily locally oriented businesses, and resources 
are allocated accordingly‟ and that in Vietnam, „all but a handful of newspapers and 
broadcast organizations left foreign news coverage to the tightly budgeted AP, UPI, or 
Reuters - or to the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, or Washington Post news 
services.‟5 This meant that 'in terms of resident representatives of "major media" - those 
news publications, news agencies, and TV networks with national U.S. audiences - 
there were perhaps 60 newsmen in all' in South Vietnam in early 1968. As an indicator 
of what Braestrup describes as the „“fact-finding” manpower‟ available in Vietnam, 
even this was misleading. The impact achieved by this group was limited because, 
rather than sharing out the workload, reporters worked in competition with each other. 
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Fearful of missing out on a story carried by a rival, they tended to pursue the same 
stories.
6
  
 
As reporters concentrated upon what was happening at Khe Sanh and the effects 
of the Tet Offensive in March 1968, those stories did not include the activities of Task 
Force Barker, „off the beaten track‟ in Quang Ngai and an element of the Americal, a 
division which, according to Braestrup, was „neither “glamorous” nor conveniently 
accessible to newsmen.‟7 For coverage of those events which had not secured the 
personal attention of journalists, the news media continued to use the reports issued by 
the military as the basis of their stories, despite the increasing scepticism with which 
such reports were viewed. Military sources provided the substance of the accounts about 
the operation in Son My which were carried by the wire services and The New York 
Times in March 1968.
8
 Features of these accounts which ought to have evoked 
suspicion went unremarked and, consequently, the Army's version of events had a 
potential audience of millions: AP serviced 1,262 American newspapers and 3,221 
television or radio stations; UPI material was used by 1,200 newspapers and 3,200 
broadcasters and, although The New York Times had a circulation of less than 900,000, 
its news service had 320 clients.
9
  
 
                                                 
6
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stories carried by the wire services are considered in more detail later in this chapter. 
9
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Official South Vietnamese sources were unlikely to contradict the US Army, 
especially with a story which was to the discredit of the Americans. The daily 
communiqué issued by the South Vietnamese military, which Braestrup described as 'a 
highly laundered version of reality', and the bulletins issued by Vietnam Press, the news 
agency run by the South Vietnamese government, provided most of the material for 
stories about the war in those Saigon newspapers which were printed in English: the 
Saigon Post, the Vietnam Guardian and the Saigon Daily News.
10
 Braestrup noted that 
ARVN spokesmen were 'cautious and non-committal' and that there was little prospect 
of benefiting from unofficial contact with men in the lower ranks of the South 
Vietnamese military because of the 'language barrier'.
11
 Thus, it took 'a lot more time, 
risk and effort to get the Vietnamese story from the Vietnamese.'
12
   
 
When American reporters arrived in Son My in November 1969, aware at last 
that there was a major story to be pursued, they entered a world of which they had little 
direct experience. Braestrup‟s observation that 'No American reporter spoke 
Vietnamese in early 1968' reveals the conviction of the nation‟s news media that the 
important stories in Vietnam had people who spoke English at their centre, a conviction 
based upon the preferences of their audiences.
13
 A report by David Hoffman which 
appeared in The Washington Post in November 1969 introduced the statements of 
„former Vietcong guerrillas‟ who had assisted with the burying of the dead at My Lai 4 
with the qualification: „The quotations are inexact because of translation difficulties‟, an 
inexactitude which continued to impede the attempts to discover what had happened in 
Son My and one which made the task of identifying the location of the killings carried 
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out by Willingham‟s platoon especially difficult, as the Army had discovered.14 The 
conversion into English spelling of the place name or names used orally in a 
Vietnamese dialect might vary according to the translator and the American reporters 
who arrived in Son My lacked the means to overcome such confusions: local knowledge 
or local contacts. Even a skilled translator faced the additional difficulty of 
communicating the perspective of a Vietnamese villager to an American. Uncertainties 
relating to time, distance and direction compounded misunderstandings. On those 
occasions when communication was established, reporters tended to react with 
scepticism to allegations of American abuses: few of them were prepared to be accused 
of having been taken in by enemy propaganda.   
  
 By the time that articles began to appear in American newspapers about the 
charges which had been made against Willingham, the story of the My Lai Massacre 
had been running for three months. There was little likelihood that the Willingham story 
was going to supplant the Calley story in the American press, if only because Calley 
was accused of killing a lot more people.
15
 There were no photographs of what had 
happened in My Khe 4 to compare with those which Ronald Haeberle had taken at My 
Lai 4 and no confessions that women and children had been murdered to match those 
made by Paul Meadlo and other members of Charlie Company.
16
 And, perhaps because 
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they were exhausted by the story of what Americans had done in and around My Lai 4 
or because they felt that many of their readers would not welcome the recital of another 
catalogue of the horrors perpetrated by the nation's soldiers, many reporters were less 
than enthusiastic in their pursuit of the story of the massacre at My Khe 4: a story which 
had been waiting to be told since March 1968. 
 
 Nigel Nicolson has written that 'War ... is the activity of man about which more 
lies are told than about any other‟ and the earliest reports of Task Force Barker's assault 
on Son My, because they relied upon information provided by the Army, offer little to 
contradict this claim.
17
 The wire services in Saigon and The New York Times led the 
way, putting out stories which described, in different degrees of detail, the actions of the 
two companies involved in what appeared to be a significant American victory. 
According to Braestrup, the basis for an AP story about the killing of '128 Vietcong 
guerrillas' in a coastal area six miles to the north-east of Quang Ngai was a 'completely 
misleading' communiqué issued by Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) 
on the evening of 16 March 1968.
18
 The two companies were not named in the 
communiqué which referred only to 'elements of the Americal Division's Light Infantry 
Brigade' but equal importance was accorded to the role played by Bravo and Charlie 
companies. The company which was 'involved in the search-and-destroy mission' and 
'inserted into the area at 0910 ... east-northeast of the point of original contact' and 
which, like the other company in action, 'engaged the enemy in sporadic contacts 
throughout the day', was Bravo.
19
 Like the communiqué, AP identified Bravo's 
contribution without naming the companies: 'A second company was dropped by 
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helicopters two miles to the north an hour later and heavy fighting broke out as the 
guerrillas tried to escape the tightening vise.'
20
  
 
 The communiqué also triggered a story entitled 'G.I.'s, in Pincer Move, Kill 128 
in a Daylong Battle' on the front page of The New York Times on 17 March. Although 
there was no specific reference to Willingham's platoon, the story noted that a second 
company had been involved and that the fighting took place in an area of 'sand dunes 
and scrub brush', a detail which was used elsewhere to describe the location in which 
Willingham's platoon had been in action.
21
 Other newspapers were less impressed by 
Task Force Barker's operation. Neither the Chicago Tribune nor the Los Angeles Times 
picked it up and, as Braestrup pointed out, the 'desk-edited version of the AP My Lai 
story' which appeared in The Washington Post was 'used inside the paper'.
22
 
 
 More detailed accounts of the action were provided by UPI. In these, Bravo, or 
more particularly Willingham's 1st Platoon, became the focus, a shift of emphasis which 
prompts the question: where did these accounts originate? UPI distributed a lead by 
Thomas Cheatham during the evening of 16 March which, Braestrup suggests, was 
written 'after a telephone call' to the Americal's Public Information Office (PIO).
23
 The 
companies were still not named but two paragraphs provided a version of what had 
happened at My Khe 4:  
A platoon led by 2nd Lt. Thomas K. Willingham of Clark, New Jersey, 
came under almost immediate guerrilla fire when it landed on the sand dunes 
just outside My Lai. 
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 Willingham asked for and received support from helicopter gunships, 
and he said the firepower from his men and the choppers killed 30 guerrillas by 
body count before the Vietcong broke and ran for tunneled hiding places.
24
 
 
Later that night UPI put out a more sensational description of the events in 'Pink 
Village' which, once again, presented Willingham and his platoon as the central figures 
in the action:  
 On the northern coast, units of the Army's 11th Light Infantry Brigade 
scrambled from helicopters that pounced on the sand dunes just outside 'Pink 
Village', My Lai. U.S. artillery gave them covering fire. 
 But 2nd Lt. Thomas K. Willingham of Clark, New Jersey, leader of one 
of the first assault platoons, reported his men came under almost immediate 
guerrilla fire from the fortified village. American helicopter gunships swung in 
low and peppered the communists. 
 Willingham's platoon charged. The Vietcong broke and ran for their 
hide-out tunnels. Six-and-a-half hours later, 'Pink Village' had become 'Red, 
White and Blue Village.'
25
 
 
Braestrup's concluded that this, like the earlier UPI story, was based on information 
received from sources at the Americal, in this case a handout which emanated from the 
division's Public Information Office in Chu Lai.
26
  
  
 Convinced that the UPI stories were a misrepresentation of the massacre at My 
Lai 4, Braestrup noted that there were 'In fact ... no sand dunes and no resistance at My 
Lai itself.'
27
 His failure to notice that UPI had focused upon the actions of Bravo 
Company's 1st Platoon rather than what had happened in My Lai 4 is characteristic of 
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the way that reporters often missed the distinction between the massacres in Son My 
although Braestrup's work was published in 1974, three years after the release of those 
sections of the Peers Report which ought to have clarified the matter for him: the UPI 
stories were actually misrepresentations of the massacre at My Khe 4; where there were 
sand dunes and where, just as in My Lai 4, unresisting Vietnamese civilians had been 
killed.
28
  
 
 Braestrup was content to trace the source of the UPI stories to the Americal's 
PIO but he might have gone further. When the story about Calley broke in November 
1969 it stimulated some interest in the ways that the attack on Son My had been 
originally reported in March 1968. On 26 November The New York Times, which had 
originally portrayed the operation as an important victory, defended itself with a UPI 
piece entitled 'Army Reported Killing 128 of Enemy at Song My'. This emphasised that 
its front page story in March 1968 had been based entirely on information provided by 
the Army.
29
 The Chicago Tribune, meanwhile, found that it had an exclusive on its 
hands. Employed on the editorial staff of the Tribune was an ex-soldier called Arthur 
Dunn who, in his capacity as an Army information officer in the 11th Light Infantry 
Brigade, had written a press release about the assault on Son My which he had 
conveyed by telephone to Americal's headquarters on the evening of 16 March. Slightly 
altered, Dunn's release appeared in the Americal's daily news letters and in its weekly 
newspaper The Southern Cross. The release was also the basis for the UPI stories which 
focused upon the actions of Willingham's platoon. 
 
 Interviewed for the front page by two of his colleagues at the Tribune, Dunn 
recalled that his report had been based 'on information supplied him thru(sic) routine 
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channels' although he did not 'remember specifically who gave him the version of the 
battle he used', that he 'wrote one or two pages, because it was the biggest action we'd 
had' and that what he had written and communicated to divisional headquarters at Chu 
Lai by telephone had appeared in 'somewhat edited form' in the divisional newsletter on 
the following day.
30
 The section of the report in the newsletter which deals with 
Willingham's platoon makes it clear that the UPI stories had their origin in Dunn's work: 
A platoon of 'Barker's Bastards' from the 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry was airlifted 
into a position south of My Lai. The unit, led by 2LT Thomas K. Willingham … 
engaged an unknown number of enemy along the beach one half mile south of 
the village. When contact was broken 30 Viet Cong lay dead. 
 Early in the afternoon the platoon observed enemy soldiers escaping into 
a tunnel complex. Eight of the enemy were killed and web gear, hand grenades, 
and small arms ammunition was recovered.
31
 
 
That the texts of the newsletter and the UPI stories were based upon Dunn's release is a 
comparatively minor point although his explanation that he had used 'information 
(which) had been forwarded thru channels' and conveyed to him by officers in the 
operations center suggests that, at some point in the chain of communication which 
connected Willingham, Michles and Barker, the meagre details reported in the Army 
logs were elaborated upon.
32
 More interesting is Dunn's recall of his feelings about the 
release after he had written it.     
  
 Dunn told his colleagues at the Tribune that he knew the release 'was fishy as 
soon as I wrote it … One-hundred and twenty-eight killed, and only three weapons 
confiscated - that doesn't jibe'.
33
 He expressed the opinion that 'civilian reporters … 
would have wanted to know why there were so few weapons captured with such a high 
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body count' and that 'a good reporter would have uncovered the story.'
34
 The newsletter 
based upon Dunn's release credited Willingham's platoon with the killing of 38 Viet 
Cong and the recovery of 'web gear, hand grenades, and small arms ammunition'; but 
not a single gun. It is surprising, therefore, that Dunn recalled only Calley and his men 
as objects of suspicion: 'I don't remember if I used Calley's name in the release, but I 
probably did … I tried to get as many names into my releases as possible. And 
everybody in the operations center knew that it was Calley's platoon up there.'
35
 The 
newsletter distributed by the Americal on 17 March, however, names not Calley but 
Willingham and it is the actions of Willingham's platoon which are described in detail.
36
  
 
 A similar pattern can be observed elsewhere. The actions of Willingham's 
platoon are highlighted in much of the reportage which appeared in the military press, 
an ingredient in the Army's version of events duly cited in newspaper articles which 
investigated the original reporting of the attack on Son My. The unusual nature of those 
actions seems, however, to have aroused little interest. The New York Times noted that 
Willingham and his platoon had been referred to in a story entitled 'US Troops Surround 
Reds, Kill 128' in the Pacific edition of Stars and Stripes on 18 March 1968 and there 
might have been a trace of scepticism in the paraphrase of the reference offered by the 
Times: 'Another platoon under Second Lieut. Thomas Willingham was said to have run 
into enemy fire when airlifted into a southern beach area and to have killed 30 there and 
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eight more in "an enemy underground complex."'
37
 Elsewhere, the persistent and often 
detailed references to Willingham and his men in the military's original reports were 
cited without comment by those newspapers which looked at them.  
 
 An example of this is to be found in a reference in the Chicago Tribune to a 
story credited to Jay Roberts, who was under Dunn's command at 11th Brigade's 
headquarters in Duc Pho. Accompanied by the photographer Haeberle, Roberts had 
spent most of the morning with Charlie Company in My Lai 4 on 16 March. Before 
mid-day the two men flew to My Lai 6 where they found Michles and Bravo Company's 
other platoons. Michles might have told Roberts about 1st Platoon's successes at this 
point and Roberts might have conveyed what he had heard to Dunn in time for his 
superior to write that evening's release. According to Dunn, however, when Roberts and 
Haeberle 'came back from the operation late that afternoon … they were reluctant to 
talk about it.'
38
 Nevertheless, Roberts was required to produce a story for Trident, the 
weekly brigade newspaper and six days later 'TF Barker Crushes Enemy Stronghold' 
appeared on its front page.
39
  
 
 Parts of the story were written by Roberts but the opening paragraphs and the 
section about Willingham and his platoon were lifted from the divisional newsletter 
which Dunn had prepared. Pursuing the investigation of the military's original reporting 
of the 'Pinkville Incident' on its front page, the Tribune noted that the account in Trident 
had 'listed no enemy or civilian deaths' in My Lai 4 and that of 128 enemy deaths, 'only 
15 … are attributed to C Company'. Willingham's men, on the other hand, had killed 
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thirty-eight Viet Cong and the Tribune quoted or paraphrased almost everything in the 
Trident about their action: 
 A platoon from the 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry, which was supporting C 
Company's sweep thru the hamlet, 'was airlifted into a position south of My Lai. 
The unit, led by 2LT Tom Willingham, engaged an unknown number of enemy 
along the beach one half mile south of the village. When contact was broken 30 
Viet Cong lay dead.' 
 The story said Willingham's platoon later killed eight Viet Cong while 
searching tunnels in the area and web gear, grenades, and small arms 
ammunition were recovered.
40
 
 
Having established that the report in the Trident had misrepresented the actions of C 
Company, that Willingham's platoon had claimed to have killed thirty-eight Viet Cong 
although not a single gun had been recovered and that, according to Dunn, 'if civilian 
reporters had been in the area that day they would have been as skeptical of the figures 
as I was', the Tribune ignored the obvious conclusion: that there were questions to be 
asked about what Willingham's platoon had done 'along the beach' in Son My.
41
 How 
many of its 800,000 readers drew this conclusion for themselves it is impossible to 
say.
42
 
 
 Roberts provided other versions of the story for publication in the USARV 
Reporter. Like the report in Trident, these versions emphasised the part played by 
Charlie Company but there was sufficient detail to suggest that Willingham's platoon 
had been involved in a fight of some magnitude. On 27 April a report headlined „Men 
Of Task Force Barker Kill 128 VC In Running Battle‟ included these paragraphs:  
Another platoon of infantry-men was airlifted to an area south of the 
village along the beach and immediately ran into enemy fire. The enemy fled, 
leaving 30 dead. 
                                                 
40
 'Army's Side of Pinkville Incident Told'. Dunn told his interviewers that Roberts had copied the first 
two paragraphs of 'TF Barker Crushes Enemy Stronghold' from his release. There is no indication that the 
origin of the section about Willingham's platoon was discussed. Peers apparently missed Dunn's 
contribution to the Trident story. He identified Roberts as its author in The My Lai Inquiry. Peers, p. 103. 
41
 'Army's Side of Pinkville Incident Told'. 
42
 Braestrup indicated that the Tribune had a circulation of 805,000 in 1968. Braestrup, p. 10. 
148 
 The platoon continued to move up the beach, where they saw enemy 
soldiers slipping into tunnels. Eight VC were killed and the tunnel complex was 
found to be a hospital and storage area.
43
 
 
And at the beginning of June the story appeared again with a little more detail: 
Another platoon was airlifted to an area south of the village along the 
beach. This unit, under 2nd Lt. Thomas Willingham, immediately ran into 
enemy fire. When the VC fled, they left 30 dead. 
 The platoon then continued to move up the beach, where they saw an 
enemy soldier slipping into a tunnel. The tunnel turned out to be an enemy 
underground complex, where the platoon killed eight VC.
44
 
 
 
 This was not the first time that the men of Bravo Company's 1st Platoon had 
attracted the attention of the military press. The 11th Brigade‟s PIO had celebrated their 
performance in Son My during the operation which had taken place on 23 February, 
before Willingham's arrival in the field. A press release had recorded that seven 
members of Bravo Company were awarded medals for acts of bravery during the 
operation and 1st Platoon‟s involvement was highlighted: 
Later in the day the 1st Platoon of B Company began receiving heavy automatic 
weapon and mortar fire. Unable to manouver or withdraw because of the intense 
fire, platoon leader 1LT John Spraggins asked for volunteers to charge the 
entrenched enemy position. When eleven had responded, the now famous „Dirty 
Dozen‟ made its historic assault, penetrating the enemy perimeter and scattering 
its defenders. 
 During the assault, machinegunner SP/4 Edward Milus and assistant 
gunner SP/4 Joe Madison rushed to the front of the advancing dozen and set up a 
base of fire which forced the enemy down and allowed the others to secure the 
position. 
 For their bravery, LT Spraggins was awarded the Silver Star and 
Specialists Milus and Madison Bronze Star Medals for valor.
45
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In November 1969 The New York Times made a brief reference to Bravo's involvement 
in this operation and to a claim made in the Pacific edition of Stars and Stripes that the 
company had killed 80 Viet Cong on this occasion.
46
 The Times did not suggest that the 
military's version of the action might be unreliable.  
  
 Amidst the welter of information and supposition about the killings in Son My 
printed in America during November and December of 1969, South Vietnamese sources 
provided some direct indications that a second massacre had occurred. The first hint of 
this in the American press appeared in The New York Times on 17 November in a report 
by Henry Kamm. Charged by his newspaper to pursue the Calley story in South 
Vietnam, Kamm was one of the first American journalists permitted to visit the village 
of Son My and, because he was prepared to take seriously what the Vietnamese from 
the village had to say, his account was accurate in several respects. Basing his story 
upon information he had received from a farmer named Do Hoai which had been 
corroborated by other villagers, Kamm reported that „Americans forced the villagers to 
gather in one place in each of the three clusters of houses that formed part of the village 
of Songmy. The settlements bore the names of Tucong, Dinhhong and Myhoi.‟ The 
reference to Myhoi was confused because, in the next paragraph, Kamm noted that „The 
three death sites were about 200 yards apart‟ and there is further evidence in his report 
of the geographical uncertainty which plagued American attempts to establish what had 
happened in Son My. Headlined „Vietnamese Say G.I.‟s Slew 567 in Town‟ on the front 
page, the story‟s continuation on page two was headed „Vietnamese Assert G. I.‟s 
Killed 567 Unarmed Civilians in Village‟ whilst the opening sentence read: „A group of 
South Vietnamese villagers reported today that a small American infantry unit killed 
567 unarmed men, women and children as it swept through their hamlet on March 16, 
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1968.‟47 In November 1969 the Americans had not appreciated that Son My was a 
village, rather than a town, that it was divided into four hamlets and that the inhabitants 
had their own names, sometimes different ones, for the smaller communities within 
each of the hamlets.
48
 Nevertheless, what Kamm had been told was important. 
 
 A story entitled 'Thieu Weighing Statement on Charge' published four days later 
suggests that Kamm had found at least one source in the South Vietnamese army who 
had seen the letter written by Lieutenant Tan in April 1969 in which Tan complained 
about American soldiers who had killed 490 civilians in Son My, 400 in Tu Cung and 
90 in Co Luy. Kamm cited a 'responsible South Vietnamese official' who claimed that 
'the number of victims was between 450 and 500' rather than 567 and 'reliable sources' 
who had seen a letter of complaint by Tan.
49
 It was, however, an English newspaper 
which first alleged that a massacre had taken place at Co Luy. Unfortunately, a mistake 
was to undermine the seriousness of the allegation. 
  
 In „On-the-spot record of „massacre‟ is found‟, published in The Times on 24 
November, Fred Emery revealed that, like Kamm, he had become aware of the 
existence in South Vietnam of documents which showed that in March and April of 
1968 the Americans had been accused of killing hundreds of civilians in Son My. 
Emery either saw a copy of the statement signed by Rodriguez or he was told about it 
because he was aware of the complaints made by Lieutenant Tan, Son Tinh's district 
chief, and he knew that Rodriguez had prepared the American response to those 
complaints, an important detail which Peers did not learn until he visited South Vietnam 
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in late December.
50
 It is hard, therefore, to understand the error in Emery's paraphrase of 
Rodriguez's statement. Emery reported that Rodriguez: 
relates that the Son Tinh district chief received a letter from the Son My village 
chief reporting people‟s complaints that 400 persons had been killed by 
Americans in Tu Cung … and 900 people killed in Co Luy hamlet near by. 
 
Why did 90 become 900? Whether Emery misunderstood what he was told by a 
Vietnamese source, the figure was misprinted or there was some other explanation, the 
effect of the mistake was to make the allegation easier to dismiss as enemy propaganda. 
Even so, Emery's report offered a further suggestion that a second set of killings had 
occurred, killings which had been concealed more effectively than those perpetrated at 
My Lai 4: 
As for the killings in the hamlet of Co Luy, razed like many others in the plain 
of rice paddies north of Quang Ngai, there has been no mention of them since, 
though several officials, who fear to be identified, said they believed they had 
happened.
51
 
 
 
  
 Whilst newspapers on either side of the Atlantic began to pick up clues that 
there had been a second massacre, the North Vietnamese were pressing the point that 
American policy in Vietnam was to blame for the killings and that the 'massacre of 
civilians … was not merely the result of criminal acts by one American unit'.52 A 
communiqué released from Hanoi on 29 November described the 'extremely disgusting 
act' in Son My as a 'premeditated crime committed under the policy of the commanders' 
and argued that it was 'not an isolated act of some irresponsible individuals'.
53
 This was 
a direct challenge to the position which the Nixon administration and the US Army 
were taking. Ronald Ziegler, Nixon's press secretary, and Stanley Resor, Secretary of 
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the Army, had made statements on 26 November which emphasised that what had 
happened in Son My was a single incident and Resor had commented: 
 I have reviewed what we know of the incident at Mylai with a number of 
officers who have served in Vietnam. It is their judgment - a judgment which I 
personally endorse and share - that what apparently occurred at Mylai is wholly 
unrepresentative of the manner in which our forces conduct military operations 
in Vietnam.
54
 
 
 
 
It is surprising, therefore, that America's enemies seemed uninterested in 
establishing that there had been two massacres in Son My, especially because the story 
of the killings most widely disseminated by the North Vietnamese was told by Vo Thi 
Lien, the girl who had survived the massacre at My Khe 4. Instead of demonstrating that 
a second massacre had taken place, the communiqué described Lien as a witness of 'the 
massacre' at Son My. 
 
 Lien was only eleven in March 1968 but, having been taken to the north later in 
the year, she proved so eloquent that in December 1969 she was sent to the Soviet 
Union to talk about what had happened to her. In 1970 she spoke in Scandinavia and 
East and West Germany. How she was presented is demonstrated by the report which 
appeared in Hanoi's Vietnam Courier on 1 December 1969. Although Lien's account 
dealt exclusively with what happened at My Hoi, the report was headlined 'Son My: 
Survivor's First-hand Account of Massacre' and the implication was, again, that a single 
massacre had occurred in the village.
55
 The example set by the North Vietnamese was 
followed by the American press when it noted Lien's travels. She was described as a 
survivor of the massacre at My Lai when The Washington Post devoted eighty words to 
a story entitled 'Women Go on Tour, Tell of Massacres' on 14 January 1970 and when 
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UPI covered Lien's visit to Moscow in December and her appearance at a press 
conference in Stockholm at the end of January.
56
 
 
 Even those on the American left who were convinced that the massacre at My 
Lai 4 was not an isolated act seem to have missed the significance of Lien's story. Anti-
war activist Cora Weiss, who had met Lien in North Vietnam, returned to America with 
a letter from Lien which the defence lawyers in the trial of the Chicago Seven wanted 
Weiss to read to the jury in its English translation. The judge in the trial sustained the 
objection of the prosecution to the letter but did allow the translation to be read into the 
trial record in the absence of the jury. The letter began:  
I am Vo Thi Lien, twelve years old, a native of My Hoi Block, Song My 
Village, Quang Ngai province. I have survived the murder by GI's of 502 
inhabitants of my village early last year. My Hoi alone lost 87 people …57    
 
The rest of Lien's letter, which was also released in South Vietnam by the Liberation 
Press Agency on 3 January 1970, provided a detailed account of her experiences during 
and after the massacre at My Khe 4 but the importance of what she had to say was 
obscured by its presentation and reception as an account of what had happened at My 
Lai.
58
  
 
 Despite the willingness of the North Vietnamese to accept that what had 
happened in Son My constituted a single incident, by the beginning of December 1969 
it was being suggested to more and more Americans that the killing of civilians in Son 
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My had not been restricted to the inhabitants of My Lai 4 or Tu Cung. On 30 November 
The Washington Post, which had almost half a million readers, quoted a former 
Vietcong named Nguyen Bat who thought that the total of dead in Son My was 517, 
only 370 of whom had been killed in Tu Cung.
59
 In the issue of Newsweek dated 1 
December, Paul Brinkley-Rogers reported an encounter with Do Hoai, the farmer who 
had spoken to Henry Kamm, and informed the news magazine's two and a half million 
readers of Hoai's claim that 567 had died in Son My: 370 in Tu Cung; 22 in Dinh Hong 
and 175 in My Hoi.
60
 On 3 December a story by Henry Kamm in The New York Times 
cited a witness of the massacre in Tu Cung named Mr Cha who estimated that only 100 
civilians had died there. However, the newspaper's readers were told that Cha had heard 
that a further 117 people had been killed elsewhere in Son My.
61
  
   
  President Nixon‟s first public statement about the killings at My Lai 4 might 
have been intended as a counter to these reports. In a news conference on 8 December 
he asserted that „so far everything indicates‟ the massacre to have been „an isolated 
incident‟.62 This was a line of argument which the president could scarcely avoid 
because, as Oliver has noted:   
if the massacre was cast as anything other than the aberrant act of a rogue 
company, it would neutralize one of the principal justifications advanced by the 
president for staying the course in Vietnam, a justification forcefully reiterated 
in his recent 'silent majority' address: that a communist victory would result in a 
bloodbath.
63
 
 
Nixon made his appearance at the news conference, however, with the knowledge that 
the position which he and the Army had adopted was under threat. Less than twenty-
four hours after Resor‟s statement that what had „apparently occurred at Mylai‟ was 
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„wholly unrepresentative of the manner in which our forces conduct military 
operations‟, Terry Reid had walked into the offices of The Paper in Oshkosh, 
Wisconsin. Reid wanted to talk about what he had seen during his tour in Vietnam and 
the operation which he wanted to describe in detail was the massacre at My Khe 4.  
 
 Reid told The Paper that he had often witnessed the deliberate killing of 
Vietnamese civilians by soldiers in his unit. He had been prompted to come forward, he 
said, by media reports of the Calley case. Based on the interview he gave, a front page 
story headlined 'Fond du Lac GI says Viet slaughter "common"' appeared in The Paper 
on 28 November 1969, only four days after Paul Meadlo had confessed to killing 
women and children at My Lai 4 on national television and three days before the issue 
of Life which included Ronald Haeberle's photographs of the massacre went on sale.
64
  
  
 The story cited Reid's claims that he 'witnessed many civilians being shot down 
like clay pigeons', that the actions of his comrades had 'turned my stomach' and that he 
and others had 'seen at least 100 Vietnamese lying in rice paddies shot - women taken 
for intercourse and then shot' during his tour of duty with the 11th Brigade. He alleged 
that 'In the first firefight our company encountered my platoon alone accounted for 40 
kills. Yet no one in my platoon saw a body', possibly a reference to the operation in 
which Spraggins, Milus and Madison had received decorations for valor. The story's 
focus, however, was provided by Reid's description of another operation: 
We landed in choppers in a minefield. Two or three of our fellows touched land 
mines and were blown up. Our platoons went in different directions. 
 Ours was nearest a village, about 200 yards away. We shot into the 
village at people walking around. There you are with machine guns and they 
have none. 
 We counted 60 bodies - women, children, and maybe a few old and 
decrepit men.  
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 I couldn't take it so I went back to the rear with my grenade launcher. 
Afterward some of my platoon buddies said, 'You should have seen Jug with 
that machine gun.' 
 Jug, Reid reported, was killed later in an engagement. 
 After all this was done, word came up from the captain at the rear that no 
women were to be shot.
65
 
 
Thus, the first American account to challenge the official version of Bravo Company's 
activities in Son My, the version generated by the Americal's PIO in March 1968 on the 
basis of the reports made by Willingham, was available to Peers only two days after he 
began his inquiry. Reid accurately recalled the casualties inflicted upon members of the 
company by the mines which exploded in the vicinity of My Lai 1, 1st Platoon's 
separation from the remainder of the company, the approach to My Khe 4 and the initial 
shooting into the sub-hamlet by men in his platoon. He estimated the extent of the 
killing, identified the dead as consisting mainly of women and children and revealed the 
conviction of some of the men that 'Jug', a nickname given to the machine gunner 
Milus, had played a leading role in the shooting of the villagers. Finally, he indicated 
that his captain had passed word that women were not to be shot.         
 
 That no one connected Reid's story to the massacre at My Khe 4 until later can 
be partially explained. Important details were missing. Apparently Reid was not specific 
about the date of the operation, although he made it clear that it had occurred during 
1968 before his discharge in August of that year. There was also confusion about its 
location.
66
 The story in The Paper pointed out that Reid and Calley had served in the 
same brigade but it added the qualification that 'Reid's outfit ... was serving in another 
area northwest of Chu Lai'. This placed the assault described by Reid in a different 
province, miles away from Son My.  
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 It seems that Reid, who was willing enough to recall other details about the 
action with accuracy, was either confused about where the helicopters had taken his 
company on 16 March or misunderstood by his interviewer.
67 
Nevertheless, The Paper 
identified Reid as a member of 'Company B, 4th Batallion(sic), 3rd Infantry' and the 
connection that this was the unit which had accompanied Charlie Company into Son My 
on 16 March should not have been difficult to make.
68
 Army investigators had been 
aware of Bravo's participation in the operation in May 1969 and newspaper stories were 
naming the unit as one which had taken part in the assault on Son My as Reid's story 
was published around the country.
69
   
  
 Perhaps Reid's visit to the newspaper office in Oshkosh had rather more impact 
than he had anticipated. A description of the article which had appeared in The Paper 
was distributed by AP and the story was taken up by a number of newspapers including 
The Washington Post which on 29 November printed a five paragraph summary of the 
interview which Reid had given to The Paper.
70
 The Post placed the killings 'about 50 
miles north of Mylai' but, like The Paper, identified Reid as a member of 'Bravo 
Company, 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry'.
71
  
 
 Subsequently, details of Reid's allegations were included in a news summary 
prepared for President Nixon. A White House memo, dated 2 December 1969 and 
signed by John R. Brown III, was sent to Dr. Kissinger citing some of Reid's allegations 
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and concluding with the President's request for a report 'on whether the Department of 
Defense expects more of these exposes(sic).'
72
 Kissinger passed the matter on to 
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird who replied to him on 11 December that: 'The 
Department of Defense has no knowledge of the incident described by Mr Reid'. Laird 
added: 'I am informed by the Department of the Army that the Office of the Provost 
Marshal General has been receiving similar allegations from a variety of sources since 
the My Lai story broke in the press'  and that 'these allegations are being investigated.' 
Indeed, on the same day, Laird wrote to the secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air 
Force requesting that his department be provided 'with all pertinent facts pertaining to 
each investigation as it begins, progresses and is completed.'
73
 In the Army, this task 
was to become the responsibility of the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group which 
collected information about war-crime allegations for the next five years.
74
  
  
 On 5 December 1969, a lengthy article about the My Lai Massacre entitled 'An 
American Tragedy' appeared in Time in which Reid's allegation received a further 
airing. Puzzlingly, the location had altered but the substance of the accusation remained: 
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Terry Reid, 22, a former infantryman in the same Americal Division (as the men 
of Charlie Company) claimed last week that he counted '60 dead bodies - 
women, children and maybe a few old and decrepit men' after US troops had 
shot up a village 130 miles south of My Lai in early 1968.
75
 
 
 
 Thus, Reid's account of the massacre at My Khe 4 reached Nixon, Kissinger and 
Laird and details of the interview he had given were distributed nationally by AP and to 
four million readers of Time.
76
 However, because of his failure to date the operation, the 
confusion over its location and the missed clue of his unit designation, the connection 
with the killings in Son My was obscured. It was not until 21 January that Reid was 
interviewed by a CID agent, by which time he had decided that he was not prepared to 
talk to the Army.
77
     
 
 Had Peers and his assistants had more time to study the newspapers and news 
magazines, they might have realised the relevance of Reid's story at the beginning of 
their investigation. Instead, it was a story which appeared in The New York Times on 7 
December which persuaded the Army that Bravo Company's role in the operation in 
Son My required attention. The story suggested that 'the largest number of killings' in 
Son My had 'occurred not in the hamlet of Tucung but in a section of (the) village 
known as Coluy'.
78
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 Written by Henry Kamm, 'Study Finds High Songmy Toll' was based upon 
information gathered by a 'fact-finding committee of the South Vietnamese House of 
Representatives'. Either the committee's information was flawed or something was lost 
in translation because there are errors in Kamm's story: he calculated that over 300 
killings might have taken place in Co Luy and located these killings 'about two miles 
west of Tucung' rather than to the east. Nevertheless, Kamm was on the right track. 
Civilians had been killed in Co Luy, which was 'near the South China Sea', and he was 
correct in his assertion that Tan had written a report alleging that the Americans had 
killed up to 500 villagers in Son My.
79
 The reporter's observation that 'four of the five 
representatives on the committee' which had carried out the investigation 'come from 
Quangngai Province and have access to the best information available to the most 
knowledgeable people in the region' added to the impact of his story.
80
 Directed to 
investigate, Peers responded with a cable requesting urgent enquiries which reached 
General Abrams, commander of MACV, on 11 December: 
 Considerable concern being expressed about a recent news article which 
stated that the largest number of killings did not occur in Tu Cung [My Lai 4 - 
spelled Tucung in news article] but in Co Luy [spelled Coluy in news article]. 
Further, article states that 145 dead may be accurate for Tu Cung but the total 
reaches the figure 450 to 500 if Co Luy is added. Co Luy is identified in article 
as two miles west of Tu Cung. Colay is approx two miles east of Tu Cung. 
 ... The commander of the 11th Inf Bde, Col Oran Henderson, prepared a 
report dated 24 April 68 ... which contained a copy of an unsigned statement 
dated 14 Apr 68. This statement alleges that on 16 Mar 68, 400 civilians were 
killed in Tu Cung hamlet and 90 more were killed in Co Lay. 
 Bravo Company, 4th Battalion 3d Infantry was operating on the Co Lay 
Peninsula during this period under the operational control of Task Force Barker. 
The casualties officially reported by Bravo Company were 38 VC KIA on 16 
Mar ... There was no mention of civilian casualties. 
 ... Request all information concerning the allegations made in news 
article and referenced report be provided this investigating group at earliest 
date.
81
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 Kamm's story and the 'considerable concern' relating to the actions of Bravo 
Company which it prompted are not mentioned in the explanations which Peers later 
provided of how the massacre at My Khe 4 had come to his attention. In a de-briefing 
interview at the end of his career in 1977 he recalled that 'on the 9th of December' he 
had been required to make a report to members of the Armed Services Committee of the 
House of Representatives and that: 
By that time we had been a little over a week in taking testimony, so I was able 
to give them quite a bit of the story as to what I knew up to that time of the 
incident itself. We only knew ... that Charlie(sic) Company had been involved in 
something - we didn't have any reason to suspect that Bravo Company, further to 
the east, was in any way involved.
82
 
 
It is conceivable that Peers was alerted to Kamm's story after his appearance before the 
congressional members but in The My Lai Inquiry, which was published in 1979, he 
added that:  
 About the only indication we had before we went to South Vietnam (on 
26 December) that something irregular might have occurred during the Bravo 
Company operation was a reference in the statement appended to Colonel 
Henderson's report of April 24, 1968. It was tenuous at best, alluding to the fact 
that civilians had been gathered together and killed in Tu Cong and in another 
hamlet called Co Luy.
83
 
 
 One cannot be certain about the reasons behind the general's reluctance to 
acknowledge the importance of Kamm's story but it may be that he was unwilling to 
draw attention to the determination with which the Army had clung to the idea that 
references to Co Luy, a name used by the Vietnamese, were references to Co Lay, a 
name used by the Americans for a number of sub-hamlets in the south of Co Luy. The 
cable sent to Abrams and passed on, in slightly different form, to others including the 
commander of the Americal and senior American advisors in Quang Ngai and Son Tinh 
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demonstrates this determination. There was an assumption that Kamm or his sources 
had mis-named the location and that, in the unsigned statement by Rodriguez, the 
reference to the killing of 90 civilians in Co Luy was a mis-spelling of Co Lay.
84
  
  
 Why did the Army dismiss the references to Co Luy? Kamm's location of Co 
Luy to the west of Tu Cung, perhaps as a result of an error of translation, had not helped 
and the process of translating Vietnamese place names into the Roman alphabet might 
have led to different spellings of those names in English. That a community might be 
referred to by its name as a sub-hamlet or by the name of the hamlet of which it was a 
part added to the confusion. In December 1969 the Americans had not grasped that 
those Vietnamese alleging that killings had occurred in My Hoi were corroborating the 
allegations that killings had occurred in Co Luy. It was, however, the American solution 
to these problems which made matters worse.  
 
 The policy of renaming and numbering Vietnamese communities for ease of 
identification and the use of maps which bore these names might have helped American 
soldiers to orient themselves but the Army apparently persuaded itself that the 
Vietnamese would adopt the same custom. This is demonstrated by Peers' account of 
the difficulty of tracing the whereabouts of Co Luy. On American maps Xuan Duong, 
Xam Tuan and Xam Cua, all of which were sub-hamlets in Co Luy, appeared as Co Lay 
1, Co Lay 2 and Co Lay 3 and Peers admits in The My Lai Inquiry that before he left for 
South Vietnam he and his assistants had:  
studied several maps and charts of U.S. origin trying to locate a Co Luy but 
there was none to be found in the Bravo Company area. There were three 
hamlets of Co Lay - 1,2, and 3 - but none of these seemed to fit.
85
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Peers, therefore, was attempting to find a place referred to by its Vietnamese name, Co 
Luy, on 'maps and charts of U.S. origin', apparently convinced that the Vietnamese who 
had alleged that a massacre had occurred at Co Luy would have identified it by its 
American name. This is the mind-set evident in the cables triggered by Kamm's story 
which assumed that Kamm or his Vietnamese sources had mis-pronounced Co Lay and 
that Rodriguez had mis-spelt it.
86
 
 
 In the weeks between the publication of Kamm's story and the announcement of 
the charges against Willingham in February, the suggestion that a second massacre 
might have occurred in Son My was obscured by the reporting of other developments: 
Peers' visit to South Vietnam and the charging of a further three members of Charlie 
Company with offences committed at My Lai 4. Journalists did not learn of the detailed 
testimony that Feher had taken from Bay on 17 December, that the location of Co Luy 
was established whilst Peers was in South Vietnam or that Jerry Walsh, who had been 
assigned to obtain testimony from former residents of Co Luy, became 'certain that 
some atrocities had been committed by Bravo Company'. No hint of this reached the 
media until February.  
  
 There was some justification for the Army's reluctance to share what its 
investigators had discovered about the massacre at My Khe 4: it was necessary to 
protect the rights of anyone who had been or was going to be accused. On the other 
hand, the Army was anxious to protect itself. Major General Winant Sidle, who had 
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been brought back from South Vietnam late in October 1969 to become the Army's 
Chief of Information, has admitted that: 'The atrocities (in Son My) … created a huge 
public relations problem for the army and the Department of Defense'.
87
 To 
acknowledge that there was evidence of a second massacre at a different place, 
perpetrated by men from a different company, was to invite a fresh round of media 
interest, to undermine the defence that what had happened at My Lai 4 was 'an isolated 
incident', and to paint the US Army in an even bleaker light. On the other hand, if the 
Army was found to be 'covering-up' another massacre the damage to its reputation 
might be even graver. What should be done? By early February there was an urgent 
need for a decision about how to manage the story because at least one reporter had 
registered Peers' interest in Bravo Company and speculated about its significance.  
 
Ted Sell's story, which appeared in the Los Angeles Times on 3 February, was 
mainly concerned with the possibility that members of Charlie Company had committed 
crimes on other occasions but he also noted that Peers had 'summoned 21 members of 
Bravo Company, 4th Battalion, 3rd Infantry to testify', that in the last few days 'more 
men of that unit have been witnesses than from any other single outfit' and that Bravo 
Company had been positioned 'outside the village when Charlie Company moved into 
My Lai.' This was significant, Sell argued, because Peers could be in the process of 
establishing that 'My Lai was less an isolated incident than part of a pattern of 
misbehavior by at least some American units', exactly the sort of conclusion which the 
Army wished to avoid.
88
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The implications of Sell's story produced anxiety in another quarter. Slightly 
edited, it had appeared in The Washington Post on 3 February and in this form it was 
seen by L. Mendel Rivers, the chair of the House's Armed Services Committee, and 
Hébert, the chair of the sub-committee set up to investigate 'the My Lai Incident'. They 
complained to a representative of the Army's OCLL (Office, Chief of Legislative 
Liaison) that Sell's story was one of several which might have been based upon 
information leaked by someone in the Army. Chief of Information Sidle, who was asked 
to identify the source of the leaks, responded on 4 March that the stories had 'been the 
result of journalistic enterprise and not "leaks"' from the Army.
89
 Whether the 
congressmen were satisfied by Sidle's conclusion is less important than what triggered 
their concern: Sell's attempt to widen the story and the effects which this might have 
upon the Army‟s reputation.     
 
On the day after Sell's story was printed, the Department of Defense announced 
that it would henceforth refer to the area of investigation as Son My rather than My 
Lai.
90
 The change had been prompted by Peers who, on 21 January, had sent a 
memorandum to Resor and Westmoreland recommending that 'the geographic scope of 
the final report be extended to include the entire Son My Village'. Peers' justification 
was that this would 'permit better definition within the report of the actions which took 
place in some of the sub-hamlets.'
91
 It was not until 2 February that Resor and 
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Westmoreland sent their approval, with the qualification that: 'The exploration of 
matters within Son My Village is considered to be within the scope of your original 
directive for investigation.'
92
 This hardly clarified matters. The original directive, dated 
26 November 1969, required Peers 'to explore the nature and the scope of the original 
U.S. Army investigation[s] of the alleged My Lai [4] incident'.
93
 This is not evidence 
that Resor and Westmoreland conspired to conceal the massacre at My Khe 4 but the 
retention of the reference to My Lai [4] in the wording of the original directive ensured 
that the media remained focused upon Charlie Company and the decision to refer to the 
area of investigation as Son My helped the Army's spokesmen to avoid the distinction 
between the massacres: a tactic which was to be used so frequently in the following 
weeks that it is hard to resist the conclusion that the Army had decided upon a public 
relations strategy. 
 
The news that Willingham had been charged was broken on the networks' 
evening news programmes on 12 February but coverage of the story in the newspapers 
on the following day was limited. On page twelve of The New York Times a report 
entitled '2d Officer faces Songmy Charges', began: 'The Army has charged Capt. 
Thomas K. Willingham, a 25-year-old infantry officer, with the unpremeditated murder 
of Vietnamese civilians in the village of Songmy on March 16, 1968', an explanation 
which offered no suggestion that the charges related to a separate action. It was not until 
later in the story that readers were told that Willingham was a member of Bravo 
Company and that he and his platoon were positioned 'two miles east' of Charlie 
Company and although the Times acknowledged the importance of an announcement 
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which 'marked the first time that officials had confirmed that another infantry unit might 
have committed crimes in (the) area', it first cited 'Defense Department officials' who 
'linked the incident to earlier charges of mass murder in the same village and on the 
same day'.
94
  
 
The linkage between the charges against Willingham and the charges which had 
already been laid against members of Charlie Company was even more marked in 
'Captain Charged in Viet Slayings', a story by Peter Braestrup which appeared on page 
six of The Washington Post. The opening paragraph explained that the charges against 
Willingham were significant because a second Army company was now involved 'in the 
alleged March 16, 1968, "Pinkville massacre" in Quangngai Province.' Willingham's 
company was described as 'a blocking force about two kilometres east of Mylai (4).' 
Because the Army had not specified the number of alleged victims, the Post was forced 
to rely on 'qualified sources' who 'said that the allegations against Willingham involved 
the deaths of several Vietnamese but less than a dozen'.
95
 One cannot help wondering 
about the identity of the 'qualified sources' who led Braestrup to under-estimate the 
extent of the crime with which Willingham had been charged. The Post, like the Times, 
devoted space to detailing the charges which had been made against members of Charlie 
Company and to providing some background information about Willingham. 
 
Like their colleagues in television, print journalists were unable to clarify the 
story because, as the Times noted, 'The details of the charges were not made public'.
96
 
An explanation of the Army's reticence was offered by Braestrup in the Post. The Army 
had indicated that publication of the specific charges 'might prejudice the rights of the 
accused' and according to Jerry Friedheim, a Pentagon spokesman quoted by Braestrup, 
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the Army would not be discussing the detail of the charges because 'our lawyers told us 
not to'.
97
  
 
 The Army, however, had already travelled this path in the Calley case and it had 
been pilloried for doing so. An original announcement, on 5 September 1969, which 
indicated that Calley had been 'charged with violation of Article 118, murder, for 
offenses allegedly committed against civilians while serving in Vietnam in 1968', had 
been restrained to the point of mis-representation. Developed by Seymour Hersh, the 
Calley story was carried by more than thirty newspapers on 13 November and by all 
three of the networks on 17 November. Some of Haeberle's photographs of the massacre 
were published in the Cleveland Plain Dealer on 20 November.
98
 Surrendering, the 
Army released a 'Memorandum for Correspondents' on 24 November which included 
the wording of the charges and confirmed the date, the location and the extent of the 
crimes of which Calley was accused.
99
 Reporters remained resentful. Newsweek noted 
in its 8 December issue that 'Many observers ... believed that the Army's main interest 
had been to play down the case' and Lloyd Norman, the magazine's Pentagon 
correspondent, complained that: 
 The Army has hidden behind every possible legal bush to avoid adding 
any more drama to the story. When I asked Pentagon officials two weeks ago for 
the details of the charges, I was rebuffed with the reminder that the Army could 
not prejudice the case by prematurely releasing evidence. It is obvious, in fact, 
that the military dragged their feet and their law books as long as they could ... I 
don't believe we can actually accuse the Army of trying to cover up the story, 
but it came very close.
100
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 Evidence of the care with which the Army continued to handle its 
announcements that soldiers had been charged with offences committed at Son My can 
be found in the record of the Son My Army Staff Monitoring Group for 7 January 1970 
which noted that: 'OTJAG (Office of the Judge Advocate General) reports that in an 
effort to reduce publicity on the My Lai incident, (it was) decided late yesterday 6 Jan 
… to delay an announcement of the charges' against Private Gerald Smith.101 In 
Willingham's case the Army risked the antagonism of the media by sticking to the 
policy of withholding the details of any charges until it was decided to refer the accused 
to trial by court-martial. A desire to avoid the pre-trial publicity which, according to 
Calley's defence lawyers, had denied their client the possibility of a fair trial might have 
been one reason for the Army's refusal to announce the detail of the charges but another 
seems to have been the Army's wish to present the actions of the two companies as 
elements of an 'isolated' incident. 
 
 The announcement of the charges against Willingham was apparently handled 
with this in mind. The date of the alleged offences was provided and thus a link to the 
charges against members of Charlie Company was established but there was no 
indication of the number of victims and beyond the statement that Willingham was 
charged with offences 'allegedly committed ... while serving in Vietnam' with Bravo 
Company, there was no reference to location. It would not have disappointed the Army 
to find that the bareness of the information it had provided led the media to make the 
sort of erroneous assumptions which were a feature of the television and newspaper 
reporting of the charges against Willingham. It must also have been a welcome surprise 
that the nature of the announcement did not provoke charges of a 'cover-up' from 
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reporters who, perhaps, had been sated by the volume of information which had become 
available about the massacre at My Lai 4.
102
  
 
 More compelling evidence of the Army's determination to obscure the 
distinction between the two massacres is provided by a comparison of earlier drafts of 
the charges against Willingham with their final wording. In draft, the first charge was 
that in violation of Section 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: 'Captain 
Thomas K. Willingham … did, at My Hoi subhamlet, Co Luy …hamlet, Son My … on 
or about 16 March 1968, with premeditation, murder 15 human beings, occupants of the 
subhamlet of My Hoi, whose names and sexes are unknown.' This followed the model 
set by earlier charges by identifying the sub-hamlet in which the killings had allegedly 
occurred. The charges which had been made against Calley and Sergeant David 
Mitchell, for example, accused them of crimes which had been committed at My Lai 
4.
103
 However, in its final form, dated 10 February, the charge against Willingham read 
that: 
Captain Thomas K. Willingham, US Army … did at Son My Village, Son Tinh 
District, Quang Ngai … on or about 16 March 1968, murder twenty Vietnamese 
civilians whose names are unknown, by means of shooting them with a machine 
gun and rifles.
104
 
 
 
By placing the killings of which Willingham was accused in Son My rather than in My 
Hoi, the Army did its best to ensure that, if the wording of the charges was released, the 
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distinction between the massacres carried out by Charlie Company and by Bravo 
Company's 1st Platoon would remain blurred.  
 
 To guard against the possibility that an Army spokesman might give too much 
away, a script was produced which listed the appropriate responses to twenty queries 
which might be raised by reporters. One of the queries was: 'Where was Company B at 
the time of the alleged incident?' In order to protect the notion of the 'isolated' incident, 
the official answer was: 'Both units were members of Task Force Barker. On 16 March 
1968, Company B was located in Son My Village approximately two miles east of 
Company C.'
105
 This wording was apparently intended to persuade reporters that there 
was no crucial distinction to be drawn between the activities of the two companies. 
 
 The Army was fortunate that its attempts to contain the Willingham story 
coincided with the media's focus upon the Calley case. Journalists displayed little 
interest, for example, in connecting the charges against Willingham with the allegations 
of a second massacre which had been reported in November and December 1969. Even 
so, events in the days which followed the announcement of the charges against 
Willingham might have wrecked the Army's management of the story. First, Robert 
McKinley, the civilian attorney whom Willingham had added to his defence team, gave 
journalists some important details about the charges against his client and then, on 18 
February, NBC broadcast a report about the massacre at My Khe 4 which included 
interviews with Vietnamese who had witnessed what had happened. These 
developments were picked up by the newspapers but the resulting stories did not make 
the front pages and the Army's fiction of an isolated incident was not significantly 
damaged. 
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 On the day that the charges against Willingham were reported in the 
newspapers, McKinley gave several telephone interviews. He told The Washington Post 
that Willingham had been charged with the killing of twenty Vietnamese civilians 'with 
rifles and machine gun' and that he and his client, who denied killing anyone, believed 
that the charges had been laid because it was thought that Willingham had ordered or 
allowed others in his platoon to carry out the killings. As the Post observed, this raised 
the 'possibility of criminal proceedings against more U.S. servicemen'. A similar report 
appeared in the Chicago Tribune and both newspapers noted that the charges related to 
'a second, separate … massacre' alleged 'to have happened two miles from My Lai 4'.106 
The implications of this, that Charlie Company could no longer be dismissed as a rogue 
unit and that what had happened in and around My Lai 4 was not an isolated incident, 
were not explored. Neither of the reports bore a headline suggesting that a second 
massacre had occurred and neither was given prominence. The report in the Post 
appeared on page four and the report in the Tribune, which was headlined 'Captain's 
Lawyer Tells My Lai Case', appeared on page eighteen.  
 
 A report entitled 'New Massacre?' which appeared on 15 February in the Los 
Angeles Times did highlight the Army's belief that 'a second massacre' had taken place 
and predicted 'that other members of Willingham's unit … would be charged'. Like the 
Tribune and the Post, however, the Times did not make much of the story, less than 250 
words appearing on page four.
107
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 In The New York Times there was no reference to the possibility that Willingham 
had been charged because of offences committed by those under his command and no 
attempt was made to establish that the charges related to a separate massacre. Instead, 
the Times dwelt on the significance of the charge that Willingham had acted 'in 
violation of the Laws and Customs of War', citing a 'ranking Pentagon officer' who said 
'that such a charge might be easier to prove in a military trial than the charge of 
unpremeditated murder'. It also picked up a claim by McKinley that Willingham's 
company had 'sustained heavy fire from numerous rifles that day' adding, however, that 
'Army records disclosed that one soldier in the company had been killed in action and 
seven others wounded' on the day in question but that 'None were in the platoon 
commanded by … Lieutenant Willingham.108   
 
 A clearer account of what Willingham's platoon had done at My Khe 4 was 
provided by NBC less than a week later and newspapers summarised the network's 
report in stories which appeared on 19 February. In 'Vietnamese Says G. I.'s Killed 
Children', The New York Times reported Vietnamese allegations that about 100 
civilians, including children, had been killed at a 'hamlet … designated Mykhe 4', which 
'according to the N.B.C. News correspondent Robert Goralski' was where Willingham's 
company was serving 'as a blocking force'.
109
 A UPI story carried by the Los Angeles 
Times and The Washington Post also linked the charges against Willingham with the 
allegation that almost 100 civilians had been killed at the hamlet of My Khe, adding that 
a survivor of the massacre named Nguyen Thong had told interpreters that 'American 
soldiers opened fire on … children, then went through the hamlet throwing hand 
grenades into bunkers.' The Los Angeles paper reported that the Pentagon 'had no 
immediate comment on the NBC report' but the Post cited unofficial Pentagon sources 
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who 'were not discounting the possibility the NBC story was accurate.'
110
 None of this, 
however, reached the front pages. The story in The New York Times was on page six 
and those in the Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post were on pages seventeen 
and twenty-four. In the Chicago Tribune, NBC's report drew less than 125 words on 
page twenty.
111
  
  
 Willingham's refusal to answer questions during his appearance before the Peers 
Inquiry on 20 February did not stimulate much newspaper coverage either, despite 
NBC's continuing interest in the story that evening. The network reported that 
Willingham had been 'accused of murder in a second alleged massacre at My Khe 4' and 
emphasised the view that he had ordered the shooting which led to the deaths of twenty 
civilians.
112
 Newspapers, on the other hand, briefly recorded Willingham's appearance 
at the Pentagon and repeated his lawyer's assertion that 'The captain killed no one.'
113
 
The New York Times noted that Willingham had refused to answer questions but the 
report, entitled 'Captain Appears at Inquiry', followed a story about a meeting between 
Calley and George C. Wallace, the former governor of Alabama, which began on the 
front page and ended on page nine.
114
 The Times, it seems, had concluded that 
Willingham was a footnote to the story of William Calley.   
 
 The Chicago Tribune concentrated on McKinley's defence of Willingham who, 
the lawyer said, 'categorically denies' the charges. 'Army Captain Will Deny Guilt in 
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Viet Case, His Lawyer Says', which appeared on page seven of the Tribune, mentioned 
the allegations of a massacre of 'up to 100 civilians' which had been aired by NBC and 
noted that McKinley had refused to comment on the suggestion that Willingham had 
ordered the killings.
115
 It did not, however, pursue McKinley's reluctance at the press 
conference to discuss the precise location of the killings with which his client had been 
charged. Asked if the statement his client had made to Peers referred „to action in any 
other areas than My Lai 4‟, the lawyer replied:  
I can only refer you to the charges which state the Son My village. I interpret 
this to mean the whole Batagan Peninsula which comprises Son My village and 
a number of hamlets including My Lai, My Khe and Co Lay.
116
  
 
McKinley had apparently decided that the Army's refusal to identify My Khe 4 as the 
location of the killings might be in his client's interests.   
 
 References in the newspapers to the massacre at My Khe 4 became even scarcer 
in the months which followed. The newpapers found little to add to the story about 
Willingham until the dropping of the charges against him was reported in June 1970 
and, when his name was mentioned, it was usually in the context of the massacre at Son 
My: an indication that reporters were no longer pursuing the idea of a second massacre. 
Early in March, for example, the Chicago Tribune noted that McKinley was planning to 
go to federal court to demand his client's release from the Army on the grounds that 
Willingham had received his release papers before he was charged 'in connection with 
the alleged massacre at Song My'.
117
 More significant was the reporting of the news 
conference on 17 March at which the Army announced the findings of the Peers 
Inquiry, an occasion on which the Army's strategy of avoiding the distinction between 
the two massacres might have been undone. Instead, the announcement that fourteen 
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officers, two of them generals, had been charged with various offences relating to the 
suppression of information about the killings in Son My moved the story in an entirely 
different direction.   
 
 The heavily censored version of the first volume of the Peers Report which was 
made public on that day did not contain chapters six or seven, the chapters which 
described the two massacres that had occurred in Son My, and during the news 
conference, as William Beecher noted in The New York Times on 18 March, Peers 
'repeatedly … declined to discuss specifics of the cases for fear of prejudicing possible 
trial of the men involved'.
118
 Consequently, accounts of the news conference, which 
were front page news, were focused upon the new charges relating to what Peers 
characterised as 'a tragedy of major proportions', a phrase which encouraged reporters 
towards the idea of a single incident: in the Times, Beecher referred to the Army's 
investigation 'to determine if there had been mass killings … at the My Lai 4 hamlet'; in 
The Washington Post Peter Braestrup wrote of the 'Pinkville massacre' and quoted 
Peers' assurance that the 'Sonmy affair (was) an "isolated instance"' and in the Chicago 
Tribune a story by Fred Farrar headlined 'Generals Face My Lai Charge' connected the 
charges 'with the alleged My Lai massacre'.
119
 There was no mention in any of these 
stories of the massacre at My Khe 4. Indeed, in the Times, a summary entitled 'Events in 
the Songmy Case' which claimed to list 'the major events leading up to yesterday's 
action by the Army in connection with the alleged massacre at Songmy' contained no 
reference to what had happened at My Khe 4. The entry for 16 March 1968 read: 
'Company C … sweeps through a hamlet called My Lai 4 in the village of Songmy'.120 
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Elsewhere, the brief references to Willingham as one of the fourteen officers to be 
charged with the suppression of information were marked by inaccuracy. In its lead 
story the Times mistakenly indicated that Willingham would remain at Fort McPherson 
in Georgia 'pending the outcome of the charges' against him and the Tribune stated that 
Willingham had previously 'been charged with the unpremeditated murder of a 
Vietnamese civilian'.
121
  
 
The extent to which the Army orchestrated the release of the Peers Report in 
order to conceal what had been learnt about the massacre at My Khe 4 has been the 
subject of some speculation. Peers admitted in The My Lai Inquiry that he was subjected 
to pressure by his superiors as he completed his report and prepared for the news 
conference but he offered no indication that he was encouraged to keep silent about the 
massacre at My Khe 4. He explained that: 
 It was an unwritten rule that we would not talk with anyone outside the 
Inquiry about our findings ... when I talked with Secretary Resor or General 
Westmoreland it was only of organization and procedural matters, nothing about 
what we had uncovered. But as we became aware of the enormity of the My Lai 
incident and the failures within the command to investigate and report it, I 
became concerned that our report would come as a horrendous shock to both 
Secretary Resor and General Westmoreland. 
 
In mid-February 1970, therefore, Peers sent Resor and Westmoreland 'a short 
preliminary report' which 'told, in abrupt and brutal terms, of the actions at My Lai-4 
and My Khe-4.' Resor responded to the preliminary report, according to Peers, by 
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requesting a meeting at which he requested that Peers avoid 'over-emotionalism' in the 
wording of the final report.
122
  
  
Peers went on to tell of a later attempt to influence him by Major General Sidle, 
whose 'instructions seemed as though they had come from the General Counsel and the 
Office of the Secretary'. Sidle objected to Peers' use of the word 'massacre' in the 
statement to be read at the news conference. Peers recorded that the dispute was 
resolved by replacing the word 'massacre' with the phrase 'a tragedy of major 
proportions' but he added that: 'Perhaps because of the restraint, I did not feel that all of 
my answers (at the news conference) were as clear and responsive as I would have 
liked'.
123
  
   
Hersh noted in Cover-Up that Peers' preparation for the news conference 
included 'a three-hour session with Daniel Henkin, the Pentagon's chief spokesman, and 
others' and that the general later described this as „three hours of hell‟.124 The suggestion 
that pressure from his superiors led Peers to avoid any mention of the massacre at My 
Khe 4 is borne out by those aspects of his performance at the news conference which 
Hersh recorded. Peers was asked whether there was any evidence that 'the type of 
behaviour that the charges ... are based on was more widespread than what happened at 
My Lai on March 16? In other words, other days or other places?' and that the general 
replied: 'If there is, I have no knowledge of it.' The following question focused on the 
charge of unpremeditated murder which had been made against Willingham. 'What 
about in the Son My area in that day? You have charges placed against a member of 
Company B who was not in My Lai village.' Peers' response was described, 
understandably, by Hersh as 'a classic example of obfuscation':   
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This is the reason why, if you will read that [the censored version of Volume I of 
his report] very carefully, it was expanded to include Son My village, as 
compared to My Lai 4 actually, because when we got to South Vietnam, we 
found that My Lai 4, when we say My Lai 4, they [the Vietnamese] didn't know 
what we were talking about ... What really is involved, what you might say in 
My Lai 4, encompassed several of the subhamlets, of which My Lai 4 is one of 
them ... But Bravo Company was not in that area, they were in another area 
further to the east. But it's all encompassed within the greater area of Son My 
village, and that is why we refer to it now as Son My village rather than try to 
delineate it to that one piece of terrain, My Lai 4.
125
  
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, Peers' refusal to clarify the distinction between the 
actions in My Lai 4 and My Khe 4, reporters did not pursue the question of a second 
massacre.   
  
 Hersh's attempts to probe the question of the Army's unwillingness to reveal the 
existence and extent of a separate investigation into the massacre at My Khe 4 were 
unsuccessful. A lawyer involved with the writing of the press release which 
accompanied the publication of the censored report told Hersh that he did not know why 
the killings at My Khe 4, the efforts already devoted to finding those responsible and 
the continuing CID investigation into Bravo Company's activities were not made public: 
'It's a good question. I can't help you because I don't remember anything about it.' The 
lawyer added that in the final, frantic days of the inquiry as the report was being 
prepared for transmission to Resor and Westmoreland there was no discussion of what 
had happened at My Khe 4.
126
  
 
 Another of Hersh's sources, a 'senior Pentagon official, who also was involved 
with the report', told him that 'One of the problems with that action [Bravo Company's] 
was that, although we had some information, it was really a fringe benefit of the Peers 
investigation.' Although Peers was prepared to answer questions about My Khe 4 at the 
news conference, Hersh's source maintained, it was agreed that it would be beneficial to 
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keep the matter quiet 'because we were very much afraid of scaring off some of the B 
Company witnesses.'
127
  
 
 According to Jerry Walsh, however, Peers decided that he would not volunteer 
information about the events at My Khe 4 in order to avoid further damage to the 
Army's reputation. Asked in August 2009 if there was any substance to Hersh's claim 
that the Army was determined to reveal as little as possible of what had been discovered 
about the second massacre, Walsh replied: 
we had a lot of discussion the day before the press conference ... about what 
Peers should say or shouldn't say ... Peers ... was concerned about two things and 
Resor was concerned about two things ... One was that they didn't want to say 
anything that would prejudice upcoming criminal charges. They were very 
concerned about this ... Peers wrote out a statement that he was going to read ... 
the day before and gave it to Resor and Westmoreland to review and they 
accepted it with one exception. He said, 'I've been asked whether a massacre 
took place and I have to tell the American people, yes, it did' and Resor said, 
'No, no, you can't say that. You can't use the word "massacre" ... You're pre-
judging Calley.' ... It could be used by defendants later to say, 'I didn't get a fair 
trial because they already pre-judged this.' That was one thing. 
Second thing was ... this was bad enough for the Army. Let's don't try to 
make it worse for the Army ... If there's anything to what Hersh said about that 
and it's not much but I guess you could say ... was it wrong for the Army to try 
to ... if not to put its best foot forward at least not to put its worst foot forward? 
... Don't try to paint it as black as you can.
128
 
 
 
 In Four Hours in My Lai, Bilton and Sim offered a different explanation of 
Peers‟ reticence, arguing that he „had been placed in an awkward position. Though his 
report gave a very full account of what happened during Bravo Company‟s assault on 
Co Luy, the testimony was mostly hearsay evidence and the Army decided to keep it 
top secret.‟129 Unfortunately, the idea that Peers was persuaded to keep quiet about My 
Khe 4 for legal reasons is used by Bilton and Sim as a stepping stone to the more 
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dramatic suggestion that 'Peers ... delicately sidestepped awkward questions about a 
second massacre' at the news conference because the 'shocking revelation' of the 
massacre at My Khe 4 was 'one that the Army brass were desperate to keep the lid on', a 
desperation borne of Army leaders' consciousness that the news of a second massacre 
would destroy 'the argument that My Lai had been something completely out of the 
ordinary.'
130
 Actually, Army leaders were conscious that the news of a second massacre, 
which had already appeared on NBC and in the newspapers, had not destroyed the 
argument that My Lai was an isolated incident. Thus, what Peers might have said about 
the massacre at My Khe 4 would not have been a „shocking revelation‟ although it 
would have been an unwelcome reminder and reinforcement of the allegations which 
had already been made. 
 
 The enthusiasm with which Bilton and Sim pursued the idea that the Army had 
classified the massacre at My Khe 4 as 'top secret' led them into a further error. They 
claimed in Four Hours in My Lai that, on the same day of the news conference, briefers 
at the Pentagon lied about the events at My Khe 4, parrying journalists‟ questions about 
the charges levelled at Willingham by accusing South Vietnamese forces of having 
killed civilians in Son My while Charlie Company was at work in My Lai. Thus 
'reporters learned nothing of Bravo Company's involvement. Instead South Vietnamese 
troops were blamed for what had happened to the civilians living in the coastal village 
of Co Luy.' The source for this allegation was given as a story on page 17 of The New 
York Times on 18 March 1970.
131
 None of the stories in the Times on that day, however, 
reported that South Vietnamese forces were believed to have killed civilians in Son My. 
Instead, Bilton and Sim seem to have based their claim on a story by William Beecher 
which appeared in the Times on the following day. It included the paragraph: 
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 In addition, Peers … also turned up assertions of a previously unknown 
atrocity, involving only South Vietnamese, knowledgeable sources say. 
Reportedly witnessed by an American officer, the incident allegedly took place 
the same day … in the Songmy area but was not reported as required by Army 
regulations. 
 
As Beecher went on to explain later in his story, this was a reference to a charge against  
Kenneth Boatman who, it was alleged, had failed to report an incident in which 
suspected Vietcong guerrillas had been shot by 'Vietnamese believed to be members of 
the national police force.'
132
 Boatman, an artillery officer attached to Bravo Company, 
had not been at My Khe 4 on the day of the massacre and the information provided by 
the briefers at the Pentagon was, on this occasion, accurate.
133
 
 
 Although Bilton and Sim exaggerated the extent to which the Army mis-
represented the massacre at My Khe 4, there can be no doubt that one of the reasons that 
the media failed to develop the story of what had happened there was because so many 
reporters were persuaded that the events in Son My could be presented as elements of a 
single story. Thus, the explanation that a rogue unit had spun out of control gained 
currency and, as Kendrick Oliver has noted, the Army did not have to deal with a more 
difficult set of questions:  
If correspondents had secured a more confident knowledge of what Willingham 
and his platoon had effected in (My Khe 4), then their attributions of guilt with 
respect to My Lai might well have been revised, exposing to a harsher 
interrogative light the culture of command existing within Task Force Barker 
itself and the wider army beyond.
134
   
 
 
 
 By the time that the charges against Willingham were dropped in June 1970, the 
story of what had happened in and around My Lai 4 had been told in considerable 
detail. Having interviewed members of Charlie Company and seen the transcripts of 
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some of the interviews conducted by the CID and the Inspector General's Office, Hersh 
had completed My Lai 4 by the end of February 1970. Much of what he had written 
appeared in Harper's Magazine in May and, before that, journalists had begun to track 
down some of the details in those sections of the Peers Report which had been with-
held.
135
 My Khe 4 did not feature in these stories although Hersh quoted at length from 
the story about Terry Reid in The Paper to illustrate the military culture prevailing in 
Quang Ngai in early 1968, not realising that Terry Reid's unit had been in Son My on 16 
March.
136
  
 
 The inaccuracy with which the dropping of the charges against Willingham was 
reported was probably a consequence of the media's absorption with the My Lai story, 
one strand of which seemed to have ended; a conclusion encouraged by headlines like 
'One Freed in My Lai Army Case' and 'Army Exonerates Mylai Suspect'.
137
 The lead 
paragraph of David Hoffman's report in The Washington Post struck this note, recording 
that 'The Army today exonerated one of four officers charged with the unpremeditated 
murder of South Vietnamese civilians during the alleged massacre at hamlet Mylai 4' 
although, later in the report, Hoffman indicated that Willingham and his platoon had 
been two miles away from My Lai 4.
138
 In the Chicago Tribune, Fred Farrar confused 
matters further by explaining that Willingham and his platoon had been operating two 
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miles away from My Lai in 'the coastal hamlet of My Kag'.
139
 The New York Times, 
which based its front page report on an AP release, reminded its readers that 'The 
incident in which (Willingham) was charged represented a second episode separate 
from that alleged to have occurred at Mylai' but it was not able to challenge the account 
of the operation which Willingham, accompanied by McKinley, gave to reporters after 
the dropping of the charges on 9 June.
140
  
 
  Asked if there had been a massacre at My Khe 4, Willingham had replied 'None 
whatsoever' and explained that 'We landed under fire and moved east toward the village 
and hit some land mines and sniper and grenade fire along the way … We made contact 
with the enemy as we approached the village. The official body count was about 28.'
141
 
Peers and his investigators had concluded that Bravo Company had not landed under 
fire, that Willingham's platoon had not encountered mines or 'significant resistance' in 
the approach to My Khe 4 and that the platoon, which claimed to have killed 38 of the 
enemy there, had instead been responsible for the killing of Vietnamese women and 
children.
142
 Willingham, who told reporters that 'he knew of no civilians being killed' at 
My Khe 4, had in May 1969 testified to Colonel Wilson of the Inspector General's 
Office that 'innocent civilians' had been killed there.
143
 
 
Indeed, the media was so determined to connect the charges against Willingham 
with the assault on My Lai that his lawyer was prompted to reverse the position he had 
adopted when the charges were first announced. In February McKinley had found it 
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expedient to present the charges against his client in the context of the assault on Son 
My. Now he found it necessary to remind them that Willingham and his platoon had 
been operating independently. The Washington Post noted that 'On several occasions', 
during the informal press conference, 'McKinley cautioned that legally and factually his 
client should not be associated with what happened at My Lai 4'.
144
 
  
 By March 1971 even the possibility that a massacre had occurred at My Khe 4 
seemed to have been forgotten. A report headlined 'Mylai History: From Rumor to 
Verdict' in The New York Times listed the various charges which had been laid against 
twenty-five officers and enlisted men in connection with the massacres in Son My and 
detailed the outcomes.
145
 Although the dropping of the charges that Willingham had 
made false official statements and failed to report a felony was recorded, there was no 
indication that he had ever been charged with murder.           
 
 When Hersh resurrected the story of My Khe 4 in The New Yorker in 1972 he 
was able to draw upon the work of the Peers Inquiry and at least some of the testimonies 
secured by the CID. He had also interviewed Hooton and Reid and in 'Coverup-I', which 
appeared on 22 January, he devoted several pages to a synthesis of the information he 
had gathered. Ironically, however, Hersh chose to present his account of the massacre at 
My Khe 4, the most detailed and accurate published at that time, in the context of the 
argument that the killings in Son My had been a consequence of policy and of attitudes 
encouraged throughout the chain of command in the Americal, an argument which 
stressed, as the Army had sought to do, the relationship between the massacres at My 
Lai 4 and My Khe 4.   
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 Readers of The New Yorker, who numbered almost half a million, were 
informed that after the men of Bravo Company had reached their landing zone near My 
Lai 1, Willingham and his platoon moved off to the east.
146
 After a few hundred yards 
they reached the narrow bridge which led to My Khe 4, 'a scraggly much harassed 
collection of straw-and-mud houses, inhabited by perhaps a hundred women, children, 
and old men.' There was disagreement, Hersh acknowledged, about what occurred as 
the platoon approached My Khe 4. Some members of the platoon testified that a hand 
grenade had been thrown at them, although no one recalled an explosion, and others 
claimed that they received sniper fire as they crossed the bridge. There were no 
casualties, however, and once across the bridge 'some of the G.I.s … could see the 
unsuspecting villagers through heavy brush and trees.' At this point, 'according to many 
witnesses', Willingham 'ordered two machine gunners … to set up their weapons … 
then, inexplicably, one of the gun crews began to spray bullets into My Khe 4, shooting 
at the people and their homes.'
147
 After the shooting stopped, the point team led the 
platoon into My Khe 4, firing at the inhabitants and into the houses.
148
 
 
Terry Reid told Hersh that he was a few hundred feet away when the shooting 
into My Khe 4 began but that:  
As soon as they started opening up, it hit me that it was insanity. I walked to the 
rear. Pandemonium broke loose. It sounded insane - machine guns, grenades. 
One of the guys walked back, and I remember him saying, 'We got sixty women, 
kids, and some old men.'
149
 
 
More killings occurred as some members of the platoon used explosives to destroy the 
bunkers and tunnels in the sub-hamlet. Hersh cited „an ex-G.I.‟ who told him that: „You 
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didn‟t know for sure there were people in them until you threw in the TNT, and then 
you‟d hear scurrying around in there. There wasn‟t much place for them to go.‟ 
Identification of Hersh‟s sources in Cover-Up makes it clear that the ex-G.I. was 
Donald Hooton.
150
 In order to continue the destruction, Hersh reported, more explosives 
were delivered by helicopter but „at some point that morning … word was passed along 
to stop the killing, and many of the surviving residents were allowed to flee‟.151     
 
Some of the survivors, Hersh noted, told military investigators that 'from ninety 
to a hundred women, children, and old men were slain' and in 'Coverup-II', published 
seven days later, he mentioned that in February 1970 NBC had broadcast interviews 
with survivors who had given similar estimates of the number of dead at My Khe 4.
152
 
This rather contradicted his claim that the importance of the massacre lay in part in 'the 
American public's ignorance of it' but Hersh's agreement that as many as one hundred 
people had been killed at My Khe 4 was important in the context of his revelation that, 
according to the Peers Report, Calley's platoon had been responsible for 'ninety to a 
hundred and thirty murders' at My Lai 4.
153
 If these figures were correct, the platoons 
led by Willingham and Calley had committed atrocities of similar magnitude.  
 
Hersh concluded that there was a „vital connection‟ between the massacres at 
My Khe 4 and My Lai 4 because they had proceeded not only from the same culture of 
command but from the same set of orders. He did not address, however, the awkward 
question of why, if the two companies had received the same orders, the men in Bravo 
Company's other platoons had not responded in the same way as Willingham's platoon 
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and Charlie Company. Neither did he refer in the articles in The New Yorker to the 
possibility that some of the men in 1st Platoon might have been reacting to the news of 
Cochran's death although when Cover-Up was published in March 1972 Hersh offered 
support for the idea that the killing of Lieutenant Cochran 'served as a literal trigger' for 
the massacre in My Khe 4 by quoting Terry Reid's memory that 'When Cochran got 
killed, I sort of giggled … but other guys started to cry. This was just before we crossed 
a bridge … Then the word came that we're going to go down and wipe them out.'154 
 
Another difficulty with Hersh's argument that the massacres proceeded from a 
common set of orders is the testimony provided by the men of Willingham's platoon 
about the briefings which they received: who spoke to them, in what order and to what 
effect? Hersh admitted that „precisely what information Michles and his platoon leaders 
gave their men is impossible to determine‟ but this did not prevent him from 
introducing his account of the massacre at My Khe 4 with the claim that 'The men of 
Task Force Barker were called together' on the night before the assault on Son My and 
told: „This is what you‟ve been waiting for – search and destroy – and you got it.‟155  
 
This had been Larry Holmes' testimony to the Peers Inquiry although Hersh did 
not identify Holmes as the source. What Holmes went on to say demonstrates that, at 
best, Hersh was mistaken as to its significance. Holmes explained initially:  
Well, we were called together. One of the officers said, 'This is what you've been 
waiting for, search and destroy, and you got it,' but I can't remember who said it, 
whether it was one of the lieutenants or what it was. But I remember them 
saying this is what we have been waiting for.  
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Pressed on the question of who had conducted the briefing, Holmes replied: 'It was 
either the platoon leader or Captain Michles. I don't know which.'  He was then asked if 
he remembered 'how many people were there?' He responded: 'It wasn't the whole 
company … more or less a platoon of them.'156 Whilst Holmes testified that the platoon 
was briefed by Michles or Willingham, those who testified that they were briefed by 
their squad leaders were, as Peers noted, in the majority and this testimony suggested 
that the squad leaders provided 'details on the essentials of getting to the objective area' 
rather than instructions about 'the methods of accomplishing the mission.'
157
 Thus 
Hersh's suggestion that Holmes 'summed up the recollections of many G.I.'s when he 
told the commission … "They told us … nobody was supposed to be there. If anybody 
is there, shoot them"' was mistaken.
158
 According to Peers, only two of the other men in 
the company who gave testimony recalled such an order.
159
  
 
 Hersh's presentation of the evidence gathered by Peers about the nature of the 
orders received by the men of 1st Platoon is misleading in another respect. He used the 
testimony of Homer Hall to support the impression that, like Charlie Company, Bravo 
had been prepared to act collectively. Hall, Hersh declared, had testified to a belief that 
'we were to leave nothing standing, because we were pretty sure that this was a 
confirmed V.C. village'. Although the summary of Hall's testimony implied that an 
order had been given to this effect, what he had said was that 'some of the guys in the 
company (had) said you don't leave anything standing there.' Hersh might also have 
pointed out Hall's testimony that, whilst waiting for the helicopters to take them to Son 
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My, 'We were instructed by Captain Michles not to, what you might say, shoot down 
anybody.'
160
 
 
 The impossibility of establishing exactly what the men of Willingham's platoon 
were told before they entered My Khe 4 makes the task of explaining the massacre 
rather more complex than Hersh admitted. Two points are clear: firstly, there is little 
evidence that the men of the two companies were collectively prepared for a slaughter 
and secondly, what happened in My Khe 4 was not simply the result of whatever orders 
the men received.     
 
 Hersh was on firmer ground in his identification, later in 'Coverup-I', of one 
factor common to the two massacres. Peers had referred in his report to the development 
of 'a permissive attitude towards the treatment and safeguarding of noncombatants' in 
'certain elements of the 11th Brigade' early in 1968.
161
 There were suggestions that, like 
Calley's platoon, Bravo's 1st Platoon had taken advantage of that permissiveness. 
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lieutenant colonel of that name who had been running it as an independent unit for several 
weeks. It too had gotten a briefing the night before similar to Medina's from its commander, a 
captain named Michles, with the basic message that any Vietnamese encountered the next day 
could be considered the enemy; and it too, once on the ground, quickly began murdering large 
numbers of Vietnamese civilians. Claims have been made that its part of the massacre began 
with shooting at Vietnamese under the impression that the Charlie Company gunfire was part of 
an enemy attack. More certain is the fact that one of its platoons, after witnessing the death of a 
nearby platoon leader and several of his men in a booby trap explosion, shortly undertook under 
the active direction of its own lieutenant, an additional campaign of murder, adding at least 100 
more civilians to the day's total. 
 
Philip D. Beidler, The Virginia Quarterly Review, Winter 2003.  
   Bravo Company had not come from the same battalion as Charlie Company and there is no evidence to 
suggest that Michles' company 'began murdering large numbers of Vietnamese civilians' as soon as it 
landed. 
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Congleton had told the Peers Inquiry that 'There was quite a bit (of firing) when our 1st 
Platoon opened up. They had a reputation for really firing heavy', and that this was a 
reputation which Bravo's second and third platoons did not share.
162
 Carter had testified 
to hearing rumours that 1st Platoon had killed civilians unnecessarily during two earlier 
operations. Although he was referring to the actions of the task force, rather than his 
own platoon, Hooton admitted something similar when he explained to Hersh the high 
body counts that had made Task Force Barker the envy of other officers in the 11th 
Brigade: 'Everybody said, "(Barker's) got the most phenomenal luck" … what they 
meant is that we'd go out and gun down a lot of people.'
163
  
 
 Having written of the 'Significant Factors Which Contributed to the Son My 
Tragedy', Peers had given the impression that it was not necessary to distinguish 
between the two massacres in order to understand what had caused them and, in 
'Coverup-I', Hersh reinforced this impression. The massacre at My Khe 4, however, was 
an event distinct in nature and cause and, rather than seeking to define it by its 
connection with the 'My Lai 4 tragedy', Hersh might have achieved a greater impact 
upon his readers by emphasising that what had happened at My Khe 4 required a 
different explanation. Unfortunately, this was not the only weak point in the arguments 
that he used to seize his audience's attention.  
 
 Hersh wrote in 'Coverup-I' that the massacre at My Khe 4 was important 
because of 'the total, detailed knowledge of it among the Peers investigators, the 
Department of the Army, and higher Pentagon officials; and the failure of any of these 
agencies to see that the men involved were prosecuted' but the suggestion that Walsh 
and Wilson were able to provide Peers with 'total, detailed knowledge' of the massacre 
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at My Khe 4 is to underestimate the difficulties that they and the CID encountered when 
they conducted their investigations.
164
 As Hersh pointed out in 'Coverup-II', Wilson had 
encountered 'guilt-ridden ex-G.I.s anxious to tell what they knew and why they had 
done what they did' when he questioned the men of Charlie Company during the 
Inspector General's investigation but Michener's testimony, noted by Hersh, that 'most 
of the people (in his platoon) were a little ashamed of themselves - and I was very 
ashamed of even being a part of the group' does not reflect the feelings of the majority 
of the men in Willingham's platoon.
165
 Indeed, Ronald Esterling testified to 
conversations with members of 1st Platoon who told him that 'they went through and 
killed about - well, they killed a lot of people in the village they went through that day. 
It seems like they said they killed about 40 people over there. They said shooting a lot 
of people. … some of them were bragging about it that day; some of them seemed to 
enjoy it.'
166
 The reluctance of the men in Willingham's platoon to talk about what had 
happened in My Khe 4, a reluctance which is palpable as one reads the testimony which 
they gave to the inquiry, frustrated Peers' attempts to 'establish either the full 
circumstances or the number of victims of this incident.'
167
   
 
 With the exceptions of the interview Reid gave to The Paper in November 1969 
and Willingham's appearances before the press in 1970, the men of 1st Platoon also kept 
their silence in the media until Hersh tracked down Hooton and Reid. Significantly, 
three years after the massacre, Hersh's sources remained extremely careful. Hooton, for 
example, seems to have insisted that some of what he told Hersh should not be directly 
attributed to him. Neither, unsurprisingly, did Hooton admit to the killing of a small 
child at My Khe 4, a crime which the CID had concluded he was responsible for. 
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Instead he told of how another soldier had killed a small child at My Khe 4 and Hersh 
included a description of this episode in Cover-Up although Hooton was not directly 
identified as the source. If Hersh knew of the CID's conclusion that Hooton was the 
killer, he gave no indication of this.
168
 
  
 Hersh's meeting with Reid in May 1971 seems to have elicited little more than 
what Reid had said when he was interviewed by Ekvall in November 1969. Indeed, in 
one respect Reid backtracked. In 1969 he had stated that 'We counted 60 bodies - 
women, children, and maybe a few old and decrepit men.' By the time that he spoke to 
Hersh, Reid had removed himself from the scene of the killing, recalling that, 'One of 
the guys walked back, and I remember him saying, 'We got sixty women, kids, and 
some old men.' One of the conclusions that Hersh might have drawn from his own 
encounters with the men of 1st Platoon, therefore, was that 'total, detailed knowledge' of 
what had happened in My Khe 4 was hard to find. 
 
 In 'Coverup-II', which focused upon Peers' inquiry into the Americal's failure to 
respond to the clearest of indications that a massacre had occurred at My Lai 4, Hersh 
returned to the argument that Peers had not fulfilled his responsibilities as an 
investigator because he 'apparently did not do all he could to insure that those men and 
officers who were involved in the killings at My Khe 4 were punished or 
reprimanded.'
169
 Hersh supported this allegation, which is somewhat contradicted by his 
assertions elsewhere in the same article that 'No serious critic questioned the integrity of 
General Peers' and that 'the Peers Inquiry was a model of integrity and industry,' by 
pointing to Peers' conduct at the news conference on 17 March.
170
 By the time that 
Cover-Up appeared, however, Hersh had qualified his position to the extent that he was 
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prepared to offer alternative explanations for Peers' clumsy attempts to avoid discussion 
of the massacre at My Khe 4. And as Peers pointed out in The My Lai Inquiry, he was 
not responsible for the decision which allowed Willingham to escape court-martial 
because 'The charges against … Willingham were dismissed for lack of sufficient 
evidence by the commanding general … after (his) own evaluation and upon the advice 
of (his) Staff Judge Advocate'.
171
 Neither could Peers be blamed for the legislative mess 
which prevented the Army from pressing charges against those, like Hooton, who had 
left the service.
172
 
 
 One thread in Hersh's explanation of the Americal's response to complaints that 
a massacre had occurred at My Lai 4 revealed reports from the Vietnamese had 
indicated, almost immediately, that there had been another massacre in Son My. Late in 
1969, Fred Emery and Henry Kamm had become aware that, in March or April of 1968, 
at least one South Vietnamese report had complained that the Americans had killed 
hundreds of civilians in Son My and that the killings had occurred in different locations. 
Hersh's access to the Peers Report enabled him to tell his readers that, within six days of 
the massacres, the District Chief, Lieutenant Tan, had been informed by the chief of Son 
My that 570 civilians had been killed in Son My, 90 of them at My Khe 4.
173
 More 
importantly, Hersh was able to cite in its entirety the report that Lieutenant Tan had sent 
to Colonel Khien, the province chief, on 11 April. Having received from the village 
chief a list of the names of hundreds of the dead, Tan complained bitterly about the 
killing of over 400 people at Tu Cung and ninety more at Co Luy. He concluded with 
the suggestion that this might be categorised as 'an act of insane violence' and the 
                                                 
171
 Peers, p. 222. Peers was also referring to the dismissal of charges against other soldiers.    
172
 Indeed, in Cover-Up, Hersh seems to suggest that Peers' pursuit of those who had left the Army was 
naive. In a footnote, Hersh observed: 'The final Peers report also cited seven former military officers as 
suspects, although the Defense Department had no possible jurisdiction over the men.' Hersh, Cover-Up, 
pp. 246-247.  
173
 Hersh, 'Coverup-II'. The information received by Tan was, in fact, less specific. The report written by 
the village chief identified Tu Cung and Co Luy as the sites of the killings. A translation of the report is 
printed in Peers, p. 277. 
195 
request that Khien 'intervene on behalf of the people,' a request which Khien and his 
superiors failed to meet.
174
 The significance of this, as Hersh pointed out, was that a 
copy of Tan's report was received by the American advisory team in Quang Ngai and 
that it triggered the writing of the statement signed by Rodriguez which downplayed 
Tan's allegations: one of which was that there had been two massacres in Son My.
175
 
Hersh was also able to identify the Rodriguez statement as the unsigned statement 
which Henderson had appended to his Report of Investigation.
176
  
 
 Another document of interest tracked down by Hersh was an 'eyes-only' 
message sent by Peers to Resor and Westmoreland shortly after his arrival in South 
Vietnam on 26 December. It reported that the interrogation of two Vietnamese women 
in a hospital in Quang Ngai had elicited allegations of a second massacre in Son My. It 
began: 'You will recall that you had asked me to include Co Luy in our investigation.'
177
 
Hersh attempted no explanation of what might have prompted Resor and Westmoreland 
to require Peers to investigate events in Co Luy but it is clear that Peers was referring to 
the instruction he had received after the publication of Kamm's story in The New York 
Times alleging that a massacre had occurred in Co Luy. In Cover-Up, which included an 
extract from Nguyen Thi Bay's statement to the CID describing how she had been raped 
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and beaten during the massacre at My Khe 4, Hersh suggested that Bay had provided 
'the first hint of Bravo Company's actions', a suggestion which reveals that Hersh had 
missed the significance of Kamm's story and the Army's response to it.
178
  
  
 The description of the massacre at My Khe 4 in Cover-Up featured material 
which had not appeared in the articles in The New Yorker including a particularly 
chilling version of some of the killings which Hersh had received from Hooton: 
'We were out there ... having a good time,' the ex-GI said. 'It was sort of like 
being in a shooting gallery.' He told of a machine gunner who with a blaze of 
bullets methodically tore one woman in half at the waist. And he told of a tiny 
infant, barely of crawling age, who became the object of a marksmanship 
contest. A rifleman had taken careful aim at the infant with a .45-caliber pistol ... 
'He missed. We all laughed. He got up three or four feet closer and missed again. 
We laughed again. Then he got up right on top of him and plugged him.' 
Retelling the story prompted the ex-soldier to begin laughing again.'
179
 
 
Hersh also used some of the testimony heard by the Peers Inquiry to offer a disturbing 
picture of the attitudes of some of the men in Willingham's platoon. He cited Marvin 
Jones' testimony that Silva, the platoon's medic, had declared his refusal to 'patch them 
gooks up' and the testimony of another, described erroneously by Hersh as one of the 
'radio operators', who had wanted to 'go up and help a little bit' during the massacre. 
Asked if there were 'women and children up there that might need some help', the man 
had replied, 'It wasn't that kind of help'.
180
 
  
Although they might have been a little less shocking, Hersh's articles in The New 
Yorker provoked a reaction. He was the reporter who had brought the massacre at My 
Lai 4 to the nation's attention and, despite their flaws, the articles contained many new 
details about the massacres in Son My and the cover-up which followed. Many 
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responded to his account of the massacre at My Khe 4 as if it was breaking news. The 
Chicago Tribune, for example, picked up a UPI report which credited Hersh with the 
discovery that 'about 100 … civilians were massacred' at My Khe 4. The report, which 
appeared in the Tribune on 19 January 1972, was headed 'Reporter Discloses 2d Viet 
Civilian Massacre'. It quoted from Hersh's description of the massacre and cited Reid's 
allegation that 'women, kids' and some old men' had been killed.
181
 A look through its 
archives would have indicated to the Tribune that this was, in its essentials, a story 
which it had already told. On successive days in February 1970 the Tribune had referred 
to the NBC report which alleged that a second massacre had occurred at My Khe 4 and 
that up to one hundred civilians had been killed there. During the same period it had run 
several pieces about Willingham.
182
 Once again, however, readers were not provided 
with an appropriate context for the story, one which might have demonstrated that, for 
almost two and a half years, there had been many indications that a separate massacre 
had occurred in Son My.
183
 
 
 Late in February, in the Pacific Stars and Stripes, retired Brigadier-General S. L. 
A. Marshall was sharper in his response to what Hersh had written. Marshall pointed 
out that 'Though all of this is being treated as shocking revelation, it is not new' and he 
challenged Hersh's theory that the same set of orders had caused the two massacres: 
The sweeps at My Lai and at My Khe 4 were linked only in that they were of a 
common operation. There had been major atrocities at both hamlets. Yet nothing 
(has) been found by way of an order, instruction or common incitement that 
would explain why these two convulsions of madness coincided.
184
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 It had occurred to General Westmoreland, the Army's Chief of Staff, that the 
publication of Hersh's work about the massacre at My Khe 4 could prove damaging to 
the Army's already battered reputation. Alerted to Hersh's intentions more than six 
months before the articles were published, Westmoreland ordered the Judge Advocate 
General to 'review prior investigations of the incident at My Khe 4.' On 21 July 1971 
the Judge Advocate General reported to Westmoreland that 'although there is evidence 
that possibly 90 Vietnamese people were dead as a result of this … incident, there was 
just not sufficient evidence of criminality to bring charges against anyone subject to 
military law.'
185
 By January 1972 the Army had concluded, perhaps with a sigh of relief, 
that there was nothing in Hersh's articles to justify 'a reopening of the investigation.'
186
 
Nevertheless, a position paper was prepared which, having accepted that the Peers 
Inquiry had 'determined that …members of B/4/3 … killed between 60 and 90 unarmed 
noncombatants at My Khe 4', defended its decision to drop the charges against 
Willingham on the grounds that 'there was insufficient admissible evidence'. It also 
asserted that the CID had 'conducted a thorough investigation' which was hindered 
because 'some of the participants had left the Army and others refused to talk to 
investigators' and offered a reminder that the press had reported the incident at My Khe 
4 during the Peers Inquiry as well as 'the referral and the dismissal of charges against … 
Willingham.' There was no mention of the CID's conclusion that Hooton had killed a 
child at My Khe 4.
187
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 Whilst it is significant that the Army was sufficiently concerned to prepare a 
defence against the criticism which Hersh's work was likely to generate, more 
significant still is the use to which that defence was eventually put. Hersh's articles in 
The New Yorker moved Professor Telford Taylor, who had been America's chief 
prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials, to make a scathing attack on the Army in The New 
York Times on 2 February. Taylor declared that 'the Army's procedures for the 
prevention, detection and punishment of war crimes have failed abysmally' and that the 
government had breached the Geneva Convention by failing to enact legislation which 
enabled the prosecution of civilians who had committed crimes whilst in military 
service. He also complained that, although 'the killings at Mylai were not confined to 
the men of Calley's platoon, or even of Medina's company … the Army has never 
brought charges in connection with these other units, or even acknowledged that they 
occurred.'
188
 That the Army had brought charges against Willingham did not detract 
significantly from the force of the professor's criticism although his error probably 
reflected the way that the Willingham case had been subsumed into the My Lai story.  
 
 
 Criticism of the government's failure to close the loophole which seemed to 
render civilians immune to prosecution for crimes which they had committed whilst in 
uniform was not welcome. Neither was criticism of the Army's failure to bring anyone 
to account for the killings in My Khe 4, killings which, it might be suggested, could not 
be explained by their connection to the massacre at My Lai 4. The Army's anxiety is 
demonstrated by its reaction to Taylor's criticisms. Five major-generals, including Chief 
of Information Sidle and Acting Judge Advocate General Harold Parker, gathered to 
decide what to do. The outcome, however, was an agreement to do nothing because 'of 
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the propensity for any reaction by the Army on "My Lai" to be newsworthy'.
189
 Or to 
put it another way, why not trust that, despite Hersh's best efforts to drum up interest in 
the story, it would be allowed to die by a media and a nation with little appetite for more 
bad news from Vietnam?  
  
 Hersh concluded 'Coverup-II' with the observation that 'By the fall of 1971, the 
massacre by Bravo Company was forgotten … just another atrocity'.190 In his attempts 
to drag the massacre at My Khe 4 to the nation's attention once again he made 
appearances on national television news programmes and followed up his articles in The 
New Yorker and the publication of Cover-Up with another story in The New York Times 
in June.
191
 His frustration at his failure to prevent the story from being forgotten again 
became evident more than twenty years later. Whilst writing in The New Yorker in 
November 2003 about war crimes committed in Vietnam in 1967 by an American unit 
known as the Tiger Force, Hersh revived his charge that Peers had covered up the 
massacre at My Khe 4: 
 In fact, while the Army was conducting its internal investigation of My 
Lai, it discovered that a second large massacre had taken place on the same day 
in the same area, in a hamlet known as My Khe 4, but Lieutenant General 
William R. Peers, who had served for more than two years in Vietnam and who 
led the investigation, publicly denied that there were any other incidents. 'It was 
not brought out to me in the evidence,' Peers told reporters at the close of the 
inquiry, and he was not challenged on that assertion, even though two Army 
officers who had been present at My Khe had already been charged with war 
crimes. Twenty years later, the Army declassified an April, 1970, memorandum 
to the General responding to an article I had written about My Lai. It noted that I 
did not appear to 'possess any substantive information concerning the 
suppression or cover-up aspects of the [My Khe 4] incident,' but that I was being 
aided in my reporting by someone with access to the official records. It 
concluded, 'The need to terminate such assistance to Mr. Hersh becomes 
increasingly important when consideration is given to the use Mr. Hersh would 
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make of any information he obtained concerning command reaction and efforts 
of suppression.'
192
 
 
Unfortunately, Hersh's determination to build a case against Peers led him to mis-
represent the significance of the memorandum which he referred to. Rather than 
demonstrating the Army's anxiety about what Hersh might do with 'information' relating 
to a conspiracy to keep the massacre at My Khe 4 out of the news, it reflected the 
Army's concern about what Hersh had written in My Lai 4, excerpts of which were 
published in Harper's Magazine in May of that year, and what else he might learn about 
the cover-up of the massacre at My Lai 4. Thus the reference to My Khe 4 in Hersh's 
parenthesis is highly misleading. Indeed, according to Kendrick Oliver, Hersh did not 
begin to investigate the massacre at My Khe 4 until the spring of 1971.
193
  
   
 Occasional references to the massacre at My Khe 4 have continued to appear in 
the print media. Like the first allegation that a massacre had taken place at Co Luy, the 
first demonstration that Vo Thi Lien had not been at My Lai 4 appeared in the English 
press. In April 1989 The Sunday Times Magazine carried a lengthy report entitled 'My 
Lai: A Half-Told Story', in anticipation of the broadcast of Kevin Sim's film Four 
Hours in My Lai on British television. The report, by Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim, 
included a paragraph about 1st Platoon's assault on 'My Khe'. Apparently drawn from 
accounts of the massacre which had been distributed by the NLF, it provided some 
horrifying details:  
As they mopped up, the GIs went from house to house, tunnel to tunnel, lobbing 
in grenades, bayonetting old men, women and children as they tried to escape. 
Pregnant women had their stomachs slashed open and were left dyng in the hot 
sun … Women and young girls were stripped naked, some … raped, others … 
stabbed in the vagina.
194
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Lien's contribution to the report, which repeated in outline the account she had given as 
she travelled around Europe in 1970, was on this occasion given a more precise context:  
Lien was 11-years-old when her village of My Khe, a mile-and-a-half from My 
Lai(,) was entered by US soldiers … Thirty-three members of her immediate and 
extended family were among the 97 innocent civilians who were killed in the 
village in a second massacre.
195
 
 
 
 In 2006, the massacre at My Khe 4 was featured in a story in the Los Angeles 
Times about atrocities which had occurred during the Vietnam War. The Times, 
sourcing its story from the archives of the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group, 
devoted five paragraphs to the massacre at My Khe 4 in 'Verified Civilian Slayings', a 
description of three of the incidents which the working group had documented. Once 
again, a look at its own archives would have reminded the newspaper that this was not 
an entirely new story.  The final paragraph, however, with its revelation that 'A separate 
inquiry found a soldier had executed a boy during the assault on My Khe. The soldier, 
who had left the service, was not charged', was a step forward.
196
 It was the first time 
that a newspaper had referred to the CID's finding that Hooton had committed a murder 
or to the reason that he had not been charged.    
  
 Americans were not able to read the story of the massacre at My Khe 4 until 
Seymour Hersh published 'Coverup-I' in The New Yorker in January 1972. Hersh's 
account, accurate in much of its substance, was undermined by his commitment to the 
argument that the massacres in Son My had been caused by a single set of orders, an 
argument that sought to make the senior officers who had planned the operation 
responsible for the deaths of over 500 civilians. Distinct in nature and cause, the 
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massacre at My Khe 4 required an explanation which America's print journalists were 
unable to supply. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE MASSACRE AT MY KHE 4 ON SCREEN 
 
 
The story of the massacre at My Khe 4 was not to compel the attention of America's 
television audiences. There are a variety of reasons for this: some relating to the nature 
of the story; some to the nature of the coverage and some to the nature of the audience. 
Therefore, it is somewhat surprising that NBC's Huntley-Brinkley Report did, in 
February 1970, contain a lengthy report about My Khe 4 which included accounts by 
survivors, a description in some detail of what had happened there and an attempt to 
explain the context in which the massacre had occurred.
1
 Otherwise, the events at My 
Khe 4 were presented, usually briefly, as a strand in the story of the My Lai Massacre 
with Thomas Willingham as the focus. After the charges against Willingham were 
dropped, television lost interest until January 1972 when Seymour Hersh tried, without 
much success, to persuade Americans that a massacre had taken place at My Khe 4 and 
that it had been deliberately obscured by military leaders. Nevertheless, examination of 
the coverage of the story of My Khe 4 by the national networks‟ news programmes is 
illuminating. It brings into relief the differences between the massacre there and the 
massacre at My Lai and it indicates that, like America's newspapers, the networks failed 
to make the most of the story. It also highlights factors which influenced the medium‟s 
response to the actions of American soldiers in Vietnam and leads to the interesting 
question: why did so many Americans apparently fail to respond to those parts of the 
story of the massacre at My Khe 4 which did make their way on to the nation‟s 
television screens?  
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Like their colleagues in the print media, America's television news reporters 
found that the story of My Khe 4 was hard to tell. There were no images of the dead and 
whilst some of the men in Charlie Company had appeared on television or given 
interviews to newspapers to describe what they had done or seen in My Lai 4, nobody in 
Bravo Company's 1st Platoon was so forthcoming. Unlike Ronald Ridenhour who had 
persisted in his attempts to expose what had happened in 'Pinkville', Terry Reid had 
given his cryptic interview in Oshkosh and then retreated, refusing to assist the Army 
with its inquiries. Only the Vietnamese who had survived the massacre at My Khe 4 
wanted to talk about it.  
 
 As well as the difficulties of showing what had happened at My Khe 4 and of 
identifying the soldiers who might have committed murder there, the television 
networks had to consider the context in which any stories about My Khe 4 would 
appear. In a wider sense, the volume of Vietnam-related news shown by the networks - 
more than ten thousand pieces between 1965 and 1975 - might have become 
overwhelming or simply boring to some viewers.
2
 More particularly, by the time the 
charges against Willingham were announced in February 1970, the My Lai story had 
been running for several months. All three of the networks had picked it up on 17 
November.
3
 In eight of the remaining nine days of the month on which evening news 
programmes were aired it was featured by at least one of the nightly news programmes. 
Thirty-four news items were devoted to the massacre during November and in the first 
half of December the story attracted even more of the networks' attention. By the end of 
the year a further seventy-six items had been broadcast, all but nine of them before 17 
                                                 
2
 This figure is provided by Lawrence Lichty in Harrison E. Salisbury, Vietnam Reconsidered: Lessons 
From A War (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), p. 86. 
3
 There had been brief references to the story before this. On 10 September 1969 a short item on the 
Huntley-Brinkley Report revealed that Calley had been charged with the murder of Vietnamese civilians 
and, the day before Hersh's story appeared, CBS Evening News noted that the Army was investigating the 
deaths of over a hundred Vietnamese civilians at the hands of Calley and his platoon. Huntley-Brinkley 
Report, 10 September, 1969;  CBS Evening News, 12 November, 1969, VTNA. 
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December. Although the story slowed in the second half of December and this trend 
continued into January, there were a further thirty-three references to it in a forty-six 
day period.  
 
When Calley's pre-trial hearings began on 9 February, the story's profile was 
raised again. All three of the networks covered the first and second days of the hearings 
and only ABC failed to report the latest on the hearings on the 11th, material which 
provided CBS Evening News with its lead item.
4
 On the following day the networks 
were able to tell their viewers that the judge had set a tentative date for Calley's court-
martial. On the same day, 12 February, the media had been informed by the Army that 
there was a further development to report: a soldier called Thomas Willingham had 
been charged. 
  
Encouraged to believe that the charges against Willingham related to the My Lai 
Massacre by the way the Army had presented them, the networks had to decide how he 
should be fitted into a story which had already found in Calley its central character. 
With the realisation, later, that there might be another massacre to present to their 
viewers, the networks were confronted by a further problem. Reactions to the story of 
Charlie Company's crimes in and around My Lai 4 had not been straightforward. The 
breaking of that news had climaxed with the appearance in print and on the television 
screen of Ronald Haeberle's photographs of the dead at My Lai 4 and Paul Meadlo's 
confession that he had killed women, children and babies. Marvin Barrett observed in 
the Survey of Broadcast Journalism for 1969-1970 that 'Mike Wallace's pitiless 
                                                 
4
 The data for this analysis has been taken from the catalogue of the VTNA. Evening news programmes 
were not broadcast at the weekends. The following broadcasts are missing from the archive: CBS and 
NBC for 27 November; ABC, CBS and NBC for 25 December; NBC for 1 January. As ABC carried a 
report on 27 November it seems likely that the other networks will have done so. The figures provided 
above do not include this assumption, however. CBS and NBC screened a presidential press conference 
instead of their news programmes on 30 January. 
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interrogation of former Army Private Paul Meadlo - the better part of one edition of the 
CBS Evening News in November - was given credit for finally convincing the public 
that something terrible had happened ... in My Lai.'
5
 However, Barrett went on to 
explain that the impact of Wallace's encounter with Meadlo was significant in another 
way. Appearing on 60 Minutes the next day, Wallace revealed that the Meadlo 
interview had prompted 'hundreds of messages' and that 'the overwhelming majority 
condemn CBS News for putting the interview on the air.' As Barrett observed: 'What 
was becoming distressingly clear was that people sometimes not only did not value their 
right to know, they frequently deeply resented being told the unpleasant truth.'
6
 
 
There was, perhaps, another factor for the networks to ponder. Vice President 
Spiro Agnew had given a speech in Des Moines, Iowa on 13 November 1969 in which 
he accused the networks of bias in their presentation of the news. The speech provoked 
a national debate about the power of the networks, who defended themselves with 
varying degrees of vigour against Agnew‟s charges. Although it is hard to assess the 
extent to which the speech affected news presentation in the following weeks, it might 
have reduced the networks‟ enthusiasm for the exposure of a second massacre by 
American soldiers in South Vietnam.
7
  
 
Indeed, the networks were initially reluctant to respond to the news that a 
massacre might have occurred at My Lai 4. The story by Hersh which had appeared in 
more than thirty newspapers on 13 November (the day, ironically, on which Agnew had 
delivered his attack against the networks) had asserted that „In terms of numbers … 
                                                 
5
 Barrett, p. 12. 
6
 Ibid., p. 38. A similar message was received by the Cleveland Plain Dealer after its publication of 
Haeberle's photographs. See 'Callers Say PD Shouldn't Have Used Pictures of Civilain Slaughter in Viet', 
Cleveland Plain Dealer, 21 November 1969. 
7
 For the transcripts of the speeches given by the presidents of the three networks in response to Agnew, 
see ibid., p. 139. Barrett demonstrated the inconsistency of the evidence with regard to the impact of the 
vice-president‟s attack in ibid., pp. 32-45. 
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“Pinkville” is by far the worst known US atrocity case of the Vietnam War‟ and 
revealed that Calley had been charged with 109 killings.
8
 Despite its content, Hersh‟s 
story received no mention on America‟s national television news programmes that 
night. As Oliver has noted in The My Lai massacre in American history and memory, 
before the appearance of Haeberle‟s photographs and the screening of Meadlo‟s 
confession 'the national media seemed unable to resolve its doubts about the news status 
of the massacre'.
9
  
 
There might have been, then, a number of reasons why the networks were 
reluctant to pursue the story of another massacre. Nevertheless, stories about the 
massacre at My Khe 4 did feature on national news programmes broadcast by ABC, 
CBS and NBC during February and June of 1970. The coverage, which can be 
separated into four stages, began on 12 February when each of the networks reported 
that Willingham had been charged. On 18 February NBC changed the focus of the story 
with an investigative piece filmed in South Vietnam which contained interviews with 
civilians who claimed to have survived the massacre at My Khe 4. Willingham's 
appearance before the Peers Inquiry on 20 February was covered by CBS and NBC and 
all three of the networks returned to the story in June when the Army announced that 
the charges against Willingham had been dropped.  
 
 Significantly, however, the distinction between the massacre at My Khe 4 and 
the massacre perpetrated by Charlie Company in and around My Lai 4 was not clearly 
established on television news programmes until NBC's investigative report on 18 
February. By June, when the networks reported the dropping of the charges, the 
distinction had nearly disappeared.  
                                                 
8
 Hersh‟s story is cited in Oliver, The My Lai massacre in American history and memory, p. 44. 
9
 Oliver, The My Lai massacre in American history and memory, p. 45. 
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On Thursday, 12 February 1970 when network news programmes carried the 
first television reportage related to the killings at My Khe 4 their interest had been 
prompted by the Army's brief announcement that Willingham had been charged with 
murder. Not one of the networks identified My Khe 4 as the location of the alleged 
killings and only ABC's coverage might have led viewers to suppose that a separate 
massacre could have been taking place as Calley and his comrades killed Vietnamese 
civilians in and around My Lai 4 on 16 March, 1968.  
 
 ABC's viewers were told in the fourth item of the network's news programme 
that: 
There are indications this evening that the Army has uncovered a second My Lai 
incident. Charges of unpremeditated murder were filed against Captain Thomas 
Willingham of Allenhurst, New Jersey. On the day of the original My Lai 
incident he was a platoon leader of a unit fighting two miles away.
10
 
 
The claim that the charges against Willingham indicated a 'second My Lai incident' 
involving 'a unit fighting two miles away' was less explicit than it may appear in 
transcription. The appellation 'My Lai' was apparently intended as a description of a 
geographical area rather than as a synonym for 'a massacre carried out by American 
troops'. Thus, the impression was given that, although this 'second' incident had taken 
place 'two miles away' from the massacre conducted by Charlie Company, it had 
occurred within the boundaries of My Lai. Such an impression was reinforced by the 
introduction to the following news item which explained that Calley 'was the first man 
to be charged in connection with My Lai' and by the use of the background graphic 'My 
Lai' throughout the report about Willingham.
11
 This was characteristic of the media‟s 
confusion about the geography of Son My, a confusion which the Army had little desire 
to resolve.    
                                                 
10
 ABC News, 12 February 1970, VTNA.  
11
 The italics indicate the emphasis put on the word 'first' by the newsreader. 
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 The relative importance ABC accorded to the news of the charges against 
Willingham is demonstrated by the placing of the item ahead of the latest news about 
the forthcoming Calley trial. CBS, on the other hand, made the charges against 
Willingham an addendum to its coverage of the Calley trial in the fifth story of its 
nightly news programme on 12 February. After a detailed account of the pre-trial 
arguments in the Calley case, newsreader Walter Cronkite informed viewers that, as the 
preparations for the Calley trial continued, 'the Army charged an Army officer in a unit 
other than Calley's with murder in that 1968 operation. In the case against Captain 
Thomas Willingham of Allenhurst, New Jersey, the number of civilians allegedly killed 
was not specified.'
12
 Such a formulation presented the fact that a separate unit had been 
involved in the killing of civilians but the reference to 'that 1968 operation' contained no 
suggestion that a separate massacre might have taken place. 
 
 A similarly limited version of the story was presented by NBC. The second of its 
news stories on the evening of 12 February had focused on the Calley trial but, at its 
end, newsreader Chet Huntley announced that: 
A fifth man was accused by the Army today of crimes against civilians during 
the alleged My Lai Massacre. He is Captain Thomas Willingham of Allenhurst, 
New Jersey who is now stationed at Fort Meade, Maryland. He was accused of 
the unpremeditated murder of an unspecified number of civilians. Willingham 
was a member of a different company from the other four. His attorney said he 
was charged just one day before he was to be released from the Army.
13
 
 
Once again, the wording of the story failed to distinguish the killings at My Khe 4 and 
the massacre at My Lai 4. The first sentence of the report conveyed the idea that 
Willingham had been charged with 'crimes against civilians' which had been committed 
in the context of the My Lai Massacre. Although it was noted that he was a member of a 
different company, the impression was created that the crimes he was alleged to have 
                                                 
12
 CBS Evening News, 12 February 1970, VTNA. 
13
 Huntley-Brinkley Report, 12 February 1970, VTNA. 
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committed had occurred at the same time and in the same place as the massacre 
perpetrated by Charlie Company. 
 
Like the newspapers, the networks were unable to clarify the story because the 
details of the charges had not been made public and the Army's presentation of the story 
encouraged them to believe that there was no crucial distinction to be drawn between 
the activities of the two companies.   
  
 On the following day CBS and NBC returned to the story. As Hallin observed in 
‘The Uncensored War’: 'In general, television places high value on its ability to bring 
the audience 'close' to events, something which it usually accomplishes by bringing the 
people of the story to life so that the audience can empathize with them.'
14
 Thus, the 
attention of the two networks was drawn to the accused American officer, who could be 
filmed, rather than the victims of the alleged crime, who could not. Willingham's 
lawyers were apparently eager for such attention. His civilian lawyer, McKinley, had 
contacted reporters to tell them about the charges which his client faced and his military 
counsel, Captain Jerold Allen, gave an interview to NBC. The lead that the lawyers 
gave was followed by the networks and Willingham's reactions to the charges became 
the focus of their stories. Although NBC indicated some awareness of the significance 
of Willingham's location on 16 March, this significance seemed to escape CBS. 
 
 In the eleventh of sixteen items on the CBS Evening News, Cronkite repeated the 
network's assumption that the crimes with which Willingham was charged had occurred 
in My Lai :  
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 Hallin, p. 196. 
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The latest serviceman to be charged in the My Lai mass killings is Captain 
Thomas Willingham and his civilian attorney said today that the Army has 
accused him of killing twenty Vietnamese civilians in March 1968. 
 
Following the example set by ABC on the previous evening, CBS used the words 'My 
Lai' in a background graphic to reinforce this message. More detail was provided in a 
report by Steve Rowan which was accompanied by film showing Willingham at Fort 
Meade with his military lawyer:  
 
Twenty-five year old Captain Thomas Willingham, described as 'a personable 
young man' is said to be 'deeply shocked' by the charges of unpremeditated 
murder and violating the rules of war. He'll be defended by Captain Jerold Allen 
and a civilian lawyer from his home state of New Jersey. At the time of the 
alleged killings Willingham was a lieutenant with Bravo Company, 4th 
Battalion, 3rd Infantry, one of the companies in Task Force Barker which went 
out that day to engage a Viet Cong force believed to be making its headquarters 
in Song My Village of which My Lai 4 was one of several hamlets. 
Willingham's company was about two miles outside that hamlet acting as a 
blocking force while the company of which Calley was a member swept 
through. The charges do not spell out exactly when or how the alleged killings 
occurred.
15
 
 
Although Rowan's report made it clear that Willingham's company had been acting 
separately in 'Song My', the emphasis of the piece was upon Willingham rather than the 
operation; an emphasis encouraged by his lawyers and the Army's failure to provide any 
details about the events at My Khe 4. The sympathetic portrayal of the 'personable 
young' officer presented in the opening sentence of the report was reinforced by the 
visual images. Willingham, his uniform bearing military decorations, was shown 
walking alongside his military lawyer; the lawyer's overcoat obscuring any decorations 
which he might have worn.
16
 
 
 NBC gave the story a higher priority, making it the fourth of seventeen items 
and including film of the interview which Allen had given. Like CBS, NBC focused its 
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 CBS Evening News, 13 February 1970, VTNA. 
16
 CBS had provided Calley and his lawyers with a similar opportunity. Footage of a uniformed Calley 
walking alongside his military lawyer had been shown on CBS Evening News, 17 November 1970, 
VTNA.  
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coverage upon the American in the story but more alert viewers might have noticed that, 
unlike Cronkite, NBC's anchor John Chancellor introduced the item with a reference to 
the 'alleged massacres at My Lai'. There was a hint, therefore, that the connection 
between the killings with which Willingham had been charged and the killings at My 
Lai 4 was not necessarily straightforward: 
More details on the newest charges in the alleged massacres at My Lai: the latest 
man to be charged is Captain Thomas Willingham who was about to have left 
the Army. His lawyer said today in Washington that Willingham very definitely 
denies he killed anyone. 
 
  
 NBC had stated in its report of the previous day that Willingham had been due 
to leave the Army on 11 February. This aspect of the story was pursued at some length 
in the interview with Captain Allen, although no parallel was drawn with Calley whose 
release from active duty had also been delayed because charges had been laid against 
him. First, however, Allen confirmed the number of killings which his client had been 
accused of and agreed that he did not know if the victims included women and children. 
He was not asked about the location of the alleged killings nor about the additional 
charge that Willingham had violated the law of war: 
Allen: Captain Willingham is charged with one charge of a violation of Article 
118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, that being the unpremeditated 
murder of twenty Vietnamese civilians. 
Interviewer: You don't know if the civilians were men, women or children, do 
you? 
Allen: No, I do not. 
Interviewer: What was his reaction to having these charges preferred against 
him? 
Allen: He was quite shocked. 
Interviewer: He was supposed to have gotten out of the Army on the 10th. 
Would you describe the whole historical sequence of his date of exit and when 
he was notified and his reaction? 
Allen: Captain Willingham was scheduled to be released from the Army on the 
10th. However, he received notification on the evening of the 10th that the 
orders releasing him were, in fact, revoked and he was to remain here at Fort 
Meade. 
Interviewer: Then the charges were not read to him until yesterday morning, the 
12th? 
Allen: That is correct. 
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Interviewer: So, are you saying that all of Wednesday, the 11th, he had no idea 
why he had been kept in the Army? 
Allen: That's correct.
17
 
 
  
Within forty-eight hours of the charges having been read to him, therefore, 
Willingham was already being depicted as something of a victim. NBC presented him 
as bewildered by the Army's last minute decision to revoke the orders releasing him 
from active duty, kept in ignorance of the reason throughout the 11th and then 'shocked' 
at the nature of the charges. In fact, the reading of the charges had been delayed at 
Willingham's request in order that he 'could be informed of the charges in the presence 
of his civilian counsel' and it is hard to believe that Willingham 'had no idea why he had 
been kept in the Army'.
18
 In May of the previous year he had testified to Wilson about 
the 'Pinkville operation' and he could scarcely have been unaware of the continuing 
investigations into the activities of Task Force Barker and the charges against Calley, 
Mitchell, Hutto and Smith. 
 
 By the middle of the following week, however, NBC had adopted a radically 
different perspective on the story. On Wednesday 18 February, with ABC and CBS 
silent about the killings in Son My, the fourth of sixteen stories on NBC's evening news 
programme revealed in a report from South Vietnam that the charges against 
Willingham related to a massacre in a place called My Khe 4, a massacre which 
Vietnamese witnesses described in some detail. The story, which ran for nearly five and 
a half minutes, is surprising in several respects.
19
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 Huntley-Brinkley Report, 13 February, 1970, VTNA. Allen's interviewer is not named.  
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 The Army had anticipated this question: it was one of twenty to which an answer had been prepared.  
See 'Response to Query', CIP 180 XI-1-5: Captain Thomas K. Willingham. 
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 Huntley-Brinkley Report, 18 February, 1970, VTNA. All three of the networks led their news 
programmes with stories about the ending of the Chicago Conspiracy Trial on the 18th. Whilst NBC 
explored the massacre at My Khe 4, CBS devoted the penultimate of seventeen stories to the suffering of 
the family of an American soldier killed in Vietnam. 'War Effects', CBS Evening News, 18 February, 
1970, VTNA. 
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 The item began with a brief introduction from anchor David Brinkley which 
reminded viewers of the charges against Willingham and informed them of the location 
of the alleged murders: 'Last week the Army charged another officer, Captain Thomas 
Willingham, with the murder of Vietnamese civilians at My Khe, some distance from 
My Lai.' Significantly, any notion of Willingham as a victim had disappeared: the 
introduction was delivered against a black backdrop which featured at top left a 
headshot of the accused and the title Willingham. The report from South Vietnam 
followed. 
 
 Narrated by Kenley Jones, the report lasted for three minutes and twenty 
seconds. Viewers were shown two Vietnamese women and two Vietnamese men 
speaking to an interpreter amidst images of the refugee camp at Son My, the fishing 
village of Co Luy and aerial views of a coastal area indicated as My Khe:  
The survivors of the alleged massacre at My Lai 4 live today in the Son My 
Refugee Village. The village is also the home of hundreds of other people who 
have been forced to leave their hamlets because of the war. 
 One of them is Mrs Ngo Thi De who says she witnessed an American 
massacre on March 16th, 1968, not at My Lai 4 but at a small coastal hamlet one 
and a half miles away. The name of the hamlet on Army maps is My Khe 4. Mrs 
De described to an NBC interpreter how American soldiers landed by 
helicopters early in the morning and crossed a wooden footbridge into the 
hamlet. 
 No one lives in My Khe now but the remains of the bridge are still there. 
Mrs De said the Americans had been to the hamlet several times in the past but 
this time when children ran out to greet them the soldiers shot them dead. Mrs 
De said she fled for her life. She said she returned in the evening and found 
about 100 people dead including her daughter and grandchild who had been 
killed while hiding in a bunker. She remembers the date very well because on 
the same morning her mother and sister were killed at My Lai. 
 Mrs De said other survivors of the attack at My Khe had moved to a 
fishing village about three miles down the coast. The village is Co Luy. Two 
men there told the same story as Mrs De. Eighty-seven year old Nguyen Thong 
said American soldiers opened fire on children who ran to meet them, then went 
through the hamlet throwing hand grenades into bunkers. He said when the 
soldiers saw him they did not shoot. Instead they forced him to walk around the 
hamlet with them. He does not know why. Later they let him go and for the next 
three days he said he watched as relatives came to claim the bodies of the dead, 
about ninety in all, according to Mr Thong. 
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 Fisherman Nguyen Tan Thanh was in his boat just off the shore of My 
Khe on the morning of the attack. He drew a map in the sand to show where the 
American helicopters landed and used a small stick to mark the bridge where the 
soldiers entered the hamlet. He said he heard a lot of firing and explosions after 
the soldiers entered. 
 But he and the others said there were no Viet Cong in the village that 
morning although there is general agreement that the area was controlled by the 
Viet Cong. Thanh said his family was one of the few in My Khe to survive the 
attack. His wife and four children were hiding in a bunker which escaped being 
hit with hand grenades. Mrs Thanh said after noon she and her children had to 
leave the bunker for air. She said they yelled, 'No VC. No VC' when they came 
out so the American soldiers still in the hamlet would not shoot. 
 The US infantry company that was operating in the vicinity of My Khe 
on March 16th, 1968 was part of Task Force Barker. So was the company that 
swept through My Lai.
20
 
 
The description of the assault on My Khe 4 which NBC's witnesses gave to the 
interpreter anticipated, therefore, the testimony that CID investigators were to hear from 
other Vietnamese in March and the soldiers' crossing of the bridge, the firing upon the 
inhabitants of the sub-hamlet who were in the open, the throwing of grenades into the 
bunkers and the approximate number of fatalities were consistent with the account of 
the massacre which was to appear in the Peers Report.
21
 
 
 Other features of Jones‟ report require comment. In an essay entitled 'And That's 
the Way It Was: The Vietnam War on the Nightly Network News', published in 1994, 
Chester J. Pach Jr. has observed that:   
 With just twenty-two minutes each weekday night to present the news - 
commercials took up the rest of the half-hour program - television functioned as 
an electronic front page, covering little more than the day's most important 
occurrences, often in spare summaries. Correspondents' reports almost never ran 
more than three minutes and often considerably less.
22
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 Huntley-Brinkley Report, 18 February, 1970. Confusion about the geography of Son My persisted. 
Some of the survivors of the attack on My Khe 4 had apparently moved to the southern part of Co Luy 
and this is where Thong, Thanh and his wife were interviewed. 
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investigators'. Investigator's Statement by Thomas J. McGreevy, 3 April 1970. 
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Thus, Jones‟ report was exceptional in its length. It was also unusual to find Vietnamese 
civilians at the heart of a story. As Hallin commented in ‘The Uncensored War’: 
'Almost all television coverage after mid-1965 was about Americans "in action" ... 
Television people assumed ... that this was what would most interest the American 
public.'
23
 Each of the networks had broadcast interviews with survivors of My Lai 4 
during their evening news programmes on 18 November but on this occasion NBC 
acted independently and Jones‟ report sought, much as Hersh‟s newspaper article had, 
to bring the story of a massacre perpetrated by American soldiers to the nation's 
attention.
24
 Unlike Hersh, who had relied upon American sources, NBC built its story 
upon what had been learned from the Vietnamese. 
  
That details of the massacre at My Khe 4 were revealed in this manner is 
surprising on two counts. According to Braestrup in Big Story, the role of the network 
correspondent in Vietnam 'was not to produce news in the sense of "fact-finding" and 
interviewing‟ but „to obtain and produce film vignettes' which were 'presented as 
"typical", or a "microcosm"' of the war.
25
 And Oliver has argued of the My Lai 
Massacre that:  
 
the same asymmetries of language, culture and political allegiance that left 
Charlie Company confused ... worked in the wake of the massacre disclosures to 
confound and discourage the efforts of investigators and news reporters ... to 
learn from the survivors what had happened.
26
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Kenley Jones and his colleagues were apparently willing to do some „fact-finding‟ and 
able to overcome the difficulties of obtaining information from the Vietnamese.
27
 
 
Jones‟ report from Vietnam did not conclude NBC‟s item on the killings at My 
Khe 4, however. The final segment was delivered by Robert Goralski. In 1969, Goralski 
had pursued a story about the killing of a Vietnamese spy by members of America‟s 
Special Forces with such energy that Barrett was to single his work out for praise in the 
annual Survey of Broadcast Journalism, noting that his efforts were „an example of 
reportorial persistence too rarely seen on television.' Goralski, said Barrett, had opened 
„new and dank vistas on the alleged murder of a Vietnamese double or triple agent by 
the Green Berets‟ to such effect that „the print media were hard-pressed to keep up with 
him.‟28 Now, Goralski spoke from the studio to explain the context of the charges 
against Willingham: 
 The Pentagon first learned about My Khe while investigating My Lai. 
The Special Investigating Committee headed by Lieutenant-General William 
Peers began getting reports about another alleged atrocity involving Bravo 
Company. Captain Thomas Willingham who is newly accused was a member of 
that unit. While in Vietnam the Peers group heard the testimony of a Sergeant 
Martin Brunelle and soon began questioning other former members of the 
company. Fifty-one men from the unit have now appeared before the Peers 
panel. All testimony relating to the alleged massacres is classified but some 
information has come to light.  
 The overall operation code-named Muscatine was centred near Quang 
Ngai city about 75 miles south of Da Nang. Americal Division units were to 
ferret out enemy forces between the hills and the coast line. Three companies 
were involved as part of Task Force Barker around My Lai and My Khe on 
March 16th 1968. A or Alpha Company moved in to seal off My Lai 1, the 
largest of the hamlets. B or Bravo Company was to serve as a blocking force at 
My Khe 4. Captain Willingham was the leader of one of the four platoons 
attached to the company. C or Charlie Company, commanded by Captain Ernest 
Medina with Lieutenant William Calley at the head of a platoon, swept through 
My Lai 4. The major action took place several miles to the west. Senior 
commanders were preoccupied with what was happening there and not at My 
Lai and My Khe where the junior officers were virtually on their own. Scores of 
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witnesses have testified that massacres took place in both places on the same 
day. Did unnecessary killings in fact occur? Were they isolated incidents in the 
Vietnamese War? It appears that only the Army can answer these questions.
29
 
 
 
This attempt to explain the relationship between the actions of the three 
companies on the day of Task Force Barker‟s assault on Son My made it clear that the 
Army was now investigating separate massacres, a point which was reinforced by a map 
graphic indicating My Lai 4 and My Khe 4 as separate communities. Goralski‟s 
statement that the whole of Bravo Company had been at My Khe 4 and his implication 
that Brunelle‟s testimony triggered Peers‟ decision to question other members of the 
company were in error but, in other respects, he provided a detailed context that, once 
again, was atypical of television reports.
30
 As Ron Steinman, who had served as NBC‟s 
Bureau Chief in Saigon, noted, 'limited time on the air … meant …complexity became a 
casualty of war.'
31
 Pach has made a similar point with an important qualification: 
Because of the shortness of time, (television) reports condense and simplify the 
news. And because of journalists' preoccupation with immediacy, the reports 
usually focus only on today's news, with little, if any, analysis of how recent 
events fit into larger patterns. Anchors may try to provide some context for the 
reports, but they usually must do so in a few sentences. Some studies have 
shown, however, that viewers often fail to make the intended connection 
between an anchor's introduction or conclusion and a correspondent's story.
32
 
 
Whether viewers who watched NBC‟s report on My Khe 4 in its entirety made the 
necessary connections is no longer a testable proposition but it is useful to be reminded 
that an analysis of the content of a news story is not the same as an assessment of the 
impact of the story upon its viewers.  
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 The unusual features of NBC‟s story about My Khe 4, the features which make 
it in retrospect an admirable piece of reportage, probably limited its impact. The more 
conventional items screened on network news programmes were intended to suit the 
tastes of the majority, to persuade viewers to keep watching. Again, it is not possible to 
assess the particular impact of the My Khe 4 story upon those who watched it but its 
length, its detail, the complexity of its context and its focus upon the Vietnamese did not 
impress its competitors: ABC and CBS ignored the story. 
 
 In a brief consideration of the media‟s treatment of the massacre at My Khe 4 in 
The My Lai massacre in American history and memory, Oliver cites Goralski‟s 
concluding comment that it was up to the Army to establish what had happened at My 
Lai 4 and My Khe 4 and to ascertain whether other massacres had been committed by 
American soldiers in Vietnam. Observing that „In the end news reporters did not force 
the Army to do so‟, Oliver describes the reports of Terry Reid‟s interview in Oshkosh, 
Richard Hammer‟s brief account of the massacre in One Morning in the War and 
NBC‟s story on 18 February as „pretty much the only significant examples of media 
interest in the massacre at My Khe 4‟ before the publication of Hersh‟s articles in The 
New Yorker in January 1972.
33
 As the previous chapter has demonstrated, America's 
print media had only nibbled at the edges of the My Khe 4 story until Hersh took it up 
and although NBC‟s attempt to break the story spawned reports in a number of 
newspapers including the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, The New York 
Times and The Washington Post, the attempt did not constitute front page news.  
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 That NBC's report from South Vietnam, which had offered its viewers the 
opportunity to appreciate that separate massacres had occurred in Son My, apparently 
had little impact might seem hard to accept in the context of research which suggests 
that the three television networks were the most popular sources of national news in 
America during the 1960s  and 70s. From a population of slightly over 200 million 
Americans in 1970, the news programmes broadcast nightly by ABC, CBS, and NBC 
drew at least fifty-one million viewers, according to figures cited in 2004 by James 
Landers in The Weekly War. According to Landers, about half of these viewers watched 
at least three programmes each week.
 
In contrast, only nine million listened to news 
programmes on the radio each day and on Sundays little more than 80,000 copies of the 
national edition of The New York Times were purchased outside of metropolitan New 
York.
34
 Surveys conducted by the Roper Organization found that the number of people 
who stated that they 'got most of their news' from television increased between 1964 
and 1972.
35
 In 1969 Roper reported that 59% of Americans relied upon the television 
for their news.
36
 When Vice President Spiro Agnew accused the networks of bias in Des 
Moines, he cited the estimate that 'At least forty million Americans, every night ... 
watch the network news. Seven million of them view ABC, the remainder being divided 
between NBC and CBS.' He also referred to 'Harris polls and other studies' which 
showed that 'for millions of Americans the networks are the sole source of national and 
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world news.'
37
 At the Annual Convention of the American Newspaper Publishers 
Association held early in 1971, the President of Omaha's World-Herald admitted that 
'the public is depending more heavily than ever on television as its primary source of 
news.'
38
  
  
 Other research, however, contradicts this picture. The W.R. Simmons 
organization collected data in October and November of 1969 which indicated that less 
than 25% of adults watched a network news programme on an average weekday and 
that more than 52% of adults failed to report seeing one programme during a two week 
period: a figure which, as John P. Robinson commented in an article entitled 'The 
Audience for National Television Programs' published in 1971, 'is difficult to 
comprehend' alongside the findings of the Roper Report in 1969.
39
  
 
 The Simmons data is especially interesting because it was in November 1969 
that the networks took up the story of the massacre at My Lai. All three featured it on 17 
November and 18 November. CBS showed Haeberle's photographs on 20 November 
and ran the interview with Paul Meadlo on 24 November. All the networks led their 
news programmes with the story on 26 November.
40
 Despite the extent and character of 
this coverage, polls taken in the days and weeks which followed did not indicate that the 
great majority of Americans were either convinced that a massacre had taken place or 
certain that it had been unjustified: a scepticism partly due, perhaps, to the number of 
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Americans who failed to watch any of the television coverage.
41
 NBC's single report on 
the massacre at My Khe 4 might have suffered in a similar way.  
 
 Any qualms the nation's leaders might have felt about the difficulty of 
approximating the number of Americans who tuned into the networks' news 
programmes during the sixties and seventies did not prevent them from seizing upon the 
idea that television could sway public opinion about the war. When CBS anchor Walter 
Cronkite told his viewers in February 1968 that, in his opinion, America was 'mired in 
stalemate' in Vietnam, President Johnson is reputed to have moaned: 'If I've lost 
Cronkite, I've lost Middle America.'
42
 In his memoirs Richard Nixon observed that, 
during the Vietnam War, American 'television showed the terrible human suffering and 
sacrifice of war' and that 'the result was a serious demoralization of the home front'.
43
 In 
Des Moines, Agnew had complained that 'A raised eyebrow, an inflection of the voice, 
a caustic remark dropped in the middle of a broadcast can raise doubts in a million 
minds about the veracity of a public official or the wisdom of a government policy.'
44
 
Bob Haldeman, Nixon's chief of staff, noted in his diary on 16 December 1969 that 
'enormous television emphasis' could be brought to bear upon the story of the massacre 
at My Lai 4 and such ideas received more formal expression in 1975 when Samuel 
Huntington argued that: 
The most notable new source of national power in 1970, as compared to 1950, 
was the national media .... There is ... considerable evidence to suggest that the 
development of television journalism contributed to the undermining of 
governmental authority. The advent of the half-hour nightly news broadcast in 
1963 led to greatly increased popular dependence on television as a source of 
news. At the same time the themes which were stressed, the focus on 
controversy and violence, and, conceivably, the values and outlook of the 
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journalists, tended to arouse unfavorable attitudes toward established 
institutions.
45
  
  
  
 Therefore, the notion that the networks' news programmes had the power to 
'arouse unfavorable attitudes' towards the US government and its armed forces, amongst 
others, rests upon assumptions about the scale of the programmes' audience, their 
primacy as a source of news, the emphasis upon particular 'themes', the capacity of 
television to present material in a memorable and affecting manner and the charisma of 
the anchormen. That the networks devoted a significant proportion of their evening 
news programmes to stories about the Vietnam War in 1970 has been demonstrated by 
Oscar Patterson III in an article entitled 'An Analysis of Television Coverage of the 
Vietnam War'. A sampling exercise conducted by Patterson showed that, in a twelve 
month period beginning August 1969, 27% of the stories which appeared on the 
networks' news programmes concerned the war in Vietnam, significantly more than any 
other category.
46
 Nevertheless, it is one thing to indicate by an analysis of their content 
and presentation (or in Johnson's case, perhaps, by gut reaction) the potential of 
television news programmes to influence their viewers. It is entirely another to 
demonstrate the quality of the viewers' attention and understanding. 
 
 Pach has pointed out that what Americans:  
learned from nightly newscasts is by no means clear. Studies have revealed that 
most viewers have trouble remembering anything from news programs that they 
just finished watching. Perhaps that is because, as one scholar has observed, 
television 'is designed to be watched intermittently, casually, and without full 
concentration.'
47
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Whilst it is possible that viewers might have been affected at a sub-conscious level by 
an item on the news, such a theory is hard to test. What has been demonstrated is that 
news stories about the Vietnam War stimulated contrasting responses in terms of 
viewers' ability to recall what they had watched. According to the results of a study by 
W. Russell Neuman which was published in 1976, people were more likely to recall a 
story about the war without prompting but, having been prompted, they were less likely 
to recall the details of the story.
48
 This suggests that whilst stories about the war made 
an impact, viewers tended to ignore the details which accompanied them. And in order 
to distinguish between the massacres which took place in Son My, a grasp of detail was 
crucial.   
 
On 20 February, Willingham made his appearance before Peers at the Pentagon. 
The treatment accorded to this event by the networks' evening news programmes 
underlines the degree of importance each attached to NBC's claim, forty-eight hours 
previously, that a massacre might have occurred in My Khe 4. ABC did not pick up the 
story and, although CBS ran film of Willingham and his attorneys entering the Pentagon 
whilst Cronkite gave a brief commentary, the story was the seventeenth of twenty-three 
on CBS Evening News. Cronkite's explanation established that two massacres were 
alleged to have occurred but it lacked most of the detail of NBC's earlier piece from 
South Vietnam and, in one of the details Cronkite did provide, it was mistaken. Viewers 
were told that:  
Captain Thomas Willingham, accused in a second alleged Vietnam massacre, 
appeared before a Special Army Inquiry in Washington today. His attorney said 
afterwards that the officer would plead innocent to Army charges of 
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unpremeditated murder. He's accused of killing 20 Vietnamese civilians at My 
Khe Village in 1968 on the same day as the massacre in nearby My Lai.
49
  
 
Already, if unwittingly, Cronkite had contributed to the confusion surrounding the 
whereabouts of the second massacre. My Khe 4 was not a village, nor was it even in the 
hamlet of My Khe. 
  
 Unsurprisingly, NBC gave the Willingham story the highest priority and the 
fullest treatment. In the third of the stories on the Huntley-Brinkley Report that evening, 
David Brinkley informed viewers that 'The Army Board of Inquiry looking into the 
alleged massacre at My Lai met again today and took testimony from Captain Thomas 
Willingham, the fifth to be charged. He is accused of killing South Vietnamese civilians 
near My Lai.' Whilst Willingham and his lawyers were shown arriving at the Pentagon, 
Goralski continued the story: 'Captain Willingham, who is accused of murder in a 
second alleged massacre at My Khe, arrived at the Pentagon flanked by his military and 
civilian attorneys. He testified before the Special Panel which first developed the 
charges against him.' Willingham's lawyer was then shown responding to questions put 
by Goralski, amongst others, after the hearing: 
McKinley: The Captain was before the committee approximately thirty-five 
minutes. 
Questioner: Did he answer questions? 
McKinley: The Captain made a statement to the committee. 
Questioner: Will the Captain plead innocent to these charges? 
McKinley: Oh, most certainly. 
Questioner: Why's that, sir? 
McKinley: Because the Captain is completely innocent of these charges. The 
Captain killed no-one. 
Questioner: There's a question whether or not he gave orders for others to be 
killed. 
McKinley: There are ... there's no comment. 
 
Finally, the camera cut to Goralski who delivered the observation that: 
The Army has charged Captain Willingham with unpremeditated as opposed to 
premeditated murder. This may mean that the Army believes that Captain 
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Willingham did not fire weapons himself but gave orders which resulted in the 
deaths of Vietnamese civilians.
50
 
 
Thus, NBC's account of Willingham's case on the day of his appearance before Peers 
was marked by a concluding emphasis on the suggestion that Willingham had ordered 
the killings of Vietnamese civilians, a suggestion which Willingham's lawyer was 
apparently not prepared to deny.  
 
At this point, having made such efforts to raise the profile of the story of the 
killings at My Khe 4, NBC apparently lost interest. In reporting the Peers news 
conference more than three weeks later, the network, like ABC and CBS, failed to note 
that the Willingham case had been subsumed into the My Lai massacre. Like its 
competitors, NBC led its news programme on 17 March with a report on the news 
conference. Anchor Huntley began the story with the announcement that: 
The Army today accused fourteen officers, probably the highest ranking officers 
ever involved in a single case, of failing to look into the incident at My Lai, two 
years ago yesterday, or failing to report or lying about what they did find. A 
Special Army Board which investigated the case said there had been a major 
tragedy at My Lai although it did not use the word 'massacre'. 
 
Subsequently film of General Peers speaking to the assembled reporters was shown: 
On several occasions I have been asked about what happened in Son My Village 
on 16 March 1968. I am not going to try to characterise what occurred there. I 
can say, however, and I feel that the public is entitled to know that our inquiry 
clearly established that a tragedy of major proportions occurred there on that 
day. In order not to prejudice the rights of individuals concerned I am not able to 
further discuss the events which transpired in Son My on 16 March of 1968. 
 
Asked if he was disturbed 'by the fact that fourteen officers ... were engaged in the 
suppression of information', Peers replied: 'Well, certainly, I'm greatly concerned. I 
would look upon this, from what I know of the situation, as being quite an isolated 
incident.'
51
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 Having apparently been persuaded to avoid discussion of the second massacre at 
the news conference, Peers' reference to 'an isolated incident' ensured that reporters 
remained focused upon My Lai 4. He might have been justified in referring to the 
suppression of information within the Americal as 'quite an isolated incident' but it 
seems likely that his words would have been interpreted as a reassurance that there had 
only been one massacre in Son My. Yet, having demonstrated in its report on 18 
February that what had occurred in Son My on 16 March 1968 constituted two incidents 
rather than one, NBC chose not to challenge the Army's pretext that the massacre at My 
Lai 4 was 'an isolated incident' and Peers' uncomfortable response to the question about 
the charges against Willingham was not included in NBC's coverage.
52
 
  
When the Army announced on 9 June that the charges against Willingham had 
been dropped, each of the networks returned to the story. The tone of their treatments 
varied from the celebratory to the suspicious. A common feature, however, was that the 
crimes with which Willingham had been charged were presented in the context of the 
crimes which had allegedly been committed at 'My Lai'. Thus, NBC's suggestion in its 
February stories that massacres might have taken place in different places and that, if so, 
they had been perpetrated by men in different companies was effectively refuted by 
being ignored. 
 
 ABC's piece, the eighth of twelve items, made no reference to the location of the 
killings with which Willingham had been charged and its brevity was characteristic of 
its previous treatment of the events at My Khe 4. Frank Reynolds told viewers:     
The Army announced today that it is dropping charges against Captain Thomas 
Willingham, one of thirteen men accused of committing atrocities in Vietnam. 
He had originally been charged with unpremeditated murder. Willingham, 
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whose tour of duty expired last February, had been kept on duty pending 
disposition of the charges. He will now be released from the Army.
53
 
 
 
In the eighth of twenty-four items CBS made rather more of the story, focusing, 
as it had when the story broke, on Willingham. In February, its portrayal of the accused 
Captain had been cautiously sympathetic. Now, it celebrated his absolution. Cronkite 
introduced the piece with the explanation that:  
The Army, for lack of evidence, has dropped all charges against one of the 
officers accused in connection with the 1968 My Lai Massacre. He's twenty-five 
year old Captain Thomas Willingham of Allenhurst, New Jersey who had been 
charged with the murder of twenty Vietnamese. 
 
By connecting the charges against Willingham 'with the 1968 My Lai Massacre', 
Cronkite (probably unwittingly) was rendering unnecessary any further explanation of 
the events at My Khe 4. Neil Strasser picked up the story as film of Willingham and his 
lawyers at Fort Meade was shown:  
The months of uncertainty ended, Captain Willingham with his Army and 
civilian attorneys headed for a news conference after receiving the word by 
telephone at Fort Meade, Maryland. The charges had been filed last February, 
just as Willingham was to leave the Army. He was held over but now with his 
discharge again in sight, the Captain looked back on his military service ... 
 
Significantly, CBS chose to offer Willingham's thoughts on his more recent military 
service rather than his memories of the assault on My Khe 4 and the tone was upbeat as 
the Captain expressed his admiration for the service which he was about to leave: 
Well, I've had the privilege of dealing with probably the finest people. I'm with 
the 6th Cavalry Regiment right now and they have to be some of the most 
outstanding officers and men there. They treated me with no prejudice, nor ... 
nor malice. They're fine people to work for. And I don't have anything against 
the service. I've always had a good career. I worked here for the 1st Army and 
they were pleasant people. I worked in intelligence. I don't hold anything against 
them whatsoever. 
 
While the camera showed Willingham and his wife, hand in hand, Strasser observed:  
He is looking forward to a civilian job in the personnel field perhaps in San 
Francisco. The Captain said he is very happy about the outcome. His wife of 
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half a year said she is too ... and looked it. Willingham's platoon had been 
operating about two miles outside My Lai. The Army today indicates charges 
against several men involved in the operations inside the hamlet will stand. But 
in Washington the House Armed Services Subcommittee is winding up its own 
investigation into the killings at My Lai ...
54
 
 
Thus, having buried in the story's conclusion the detail that 'Willingham's platoon had 
been operating about two miles outside My Lai' and, with it, any hint that a separate 
massacre might have occurred, CBS moved on to an account of the congressional 
investigation into 'the My Lai incident'.
55
   
 
 Like CBS, NBC covered the story in some detail but, perhaps because it had 
previously made an effort to establish exactly what Willingham had been accused of, 
the celebratory tone adopted by its rival network was missing. Introducing the sixth of 
the evening's stories Brinkley announced that: 
 One of the officers charged in the massacre at My Lai was Captain 
Thomas Willingham of Allenhurst, New Jersey. Today all the charges against 
him were dismissed. Twelve other soldiers are still charged with murder, rape 
and other crimes but the charges against Willingham have been dropped. 
 
The emphasis, therefore was already different. Viewers were reminded that twelve other 
soldiers had been charged (rather than 'several') and that the crimes with which they had 
been charged included rape as well as murder. In the report from Fort Meade which 
followed, there was even an implication that two 'incidents' had occurred in Son My. As 
film of Willingham with his wife and lawyers was shown, Goralski explained: 
Captain Thomas Willingham had been accused of murder. The incident 
allegedly took place near and on the same day as My Lai. Today at Fort Meade, 
Maryland, Captain Willingham was told by the Army it didn't have enough 
evidence to court-martial him.  
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 In the next segment of the report Willingham was shown talking about 'the 
incident' rather than the less controversial question of his more recent postings. Seated 
between his attorneys, Willingham explained: 
Our company had about nineteen casualties through sniper fire and command-
detonated mines. We ... we performed as an infantry platoon would under ... the 
conditions ... as cautious as possible and for the protection of our men and that's 
really the mission of a platoon leader. 
 
At least one of the reporters present was not satisfied, however. As the camera rested on 
McKinley, the question was posed: 'How could the charges of unpremeditated murder 
of twenty persons come about then?' Panning to the right, the camera showed 
Willingham who looked to his left at Allen. Before the military lawyer could respond, 
McKinley came up with an answer: 
Well, I think that's something you'll have to ask the Army. You must realize that 
the charges were preferred against the Captain at the last minute before the 
Army had any opportunity to make a detailed investigation and the reason the 
charges were preferred I assume is because the Army was apprehensive they 
were going to lose jurisdiction over the Captain: he was being discharged. 
 
The contention that the Army had not had the opportunity to make a detailed 
investigation before the charges against Willingham were made ignored the work that 
Walsh and Wilson had done. By 12 February, the day that Willingham was charged, 
testimony had been taken from forty-seven men who had been in Bravo Company: 
eleven of whom had been in Willingham's platoon. If there was any challenge to 
McKinley on this point, however, NBC opted not to include it in its report and, in 
Goralski's conclusion to the Willingham case, it was implied that the Captain had, after 
all, been a strand in the story of the My Lai Massacre: 
Captain Willingham is the only one of those accused who has been exonerated 
by the Army. There are still a dozen officers and enlisted men who face court-
martial or possible court-martial for murder at My Lai. The first of the military 
trials, involving Lieutenant William Calley is now scheduled to begin in late 
August.
56
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 Like their colleagues in the print media, television's journalists failed to pursue 
the story of the massacre at My Khe 4 to a satisfactory conclusion and the failure of the 
Army's charges against Willingham was allowed to imply that a massacre had not taken 
place at My Khe 4. As the investigations by Peers and the CID had demonstrated and as 
Vietnamese survivors of the massacre continued to maintain, a second massacre had 
occurred. Like America's newspapers, its network news programmes did not register 
that Vo Thi Lien had been at My Khe 4 and that she had been  repeating her account of 
the massacre as she toured Europe. Ironically, NBC's archives contain film, apparently 
shot on 12 December 1969, which shows Lien telling her story in North Vietnam. 
During the footage, which NBC entitled 'Witnesses to My Lai Massacre Tell Their 
Story', Lien points at a map to identify the hamlet of Co Luy.
57
 Thus the film, which 
was not used on the Huntley-Brinkley Report, contained a clue to the site of the second 
massacre which might have been useful to Peers who remained uncertain of the location 
of the second massacre until the end of 1969. Had the film been studied more closely 
before it was consigned to the archive, it could have provided NBC with another thread 
in the story which it, alone amongst the networks, had made some attempt to unravel.  
 
 In January 1972, prompted by the imminent publication in The New Yorker of 
Seymour Hersh's articles about the massacres in Son My and the cover-up which 
ensued, the name of My Khe 4 featured once more on American television. On 18 
January items about Hersh appeared on each of the networks' nightly news programmes. 
ABC focused on Hersh's claim that the Army had obscured the true number of victims 
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 NBC News Archives, 'Witnesses to My Lai Massacre Tell Their Story', 12 December 1969 (Media Id.: 
0039995). NBC's archives also contain 'Family & Friends Form Committee to Defend Willingham', 28 
February, 1970 (Media Id.: 0043679) and 'Capt. Willingham's Mother Says She is the Happiest Mother in 
the World', 9 June 1970 (Media Id. 0049112). Like the film of Vo Thi Lien, neither of these pieces were 
shown on the Huntley-Brinkley Report. 
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in Son My but NBC and CBS referred to Hersh's allegation that a massacre had 
occurred in My Khe 4.
58
 Whilst being interviewed on CBS Morning News on the 
following day, according to the 'Talking Paper' dated 29 January 1972 which was 
circulated within the Army's Military Justice Division, Hersh 'charged that the decision 
not to proceed further with the My Khe 4 investigation or to court-martial those 
involved was made at the highest level of the Army or even the White House.'
59
 The 
'Talking Paper', which was attached to a summary of the articles in The New Yorker and 
the position paper detailing the Army's refutation of Hersh's charges, carries no 
suggestion that the Army was unduly concerned by the resurfacing of the My Khe 4 
story on television.
60
  
  
 And, at least on screen, the story of the massacre at My Khe 4 died with Hersh's 
attempt to revive it. Calley's conviction in March 1971 had triggered extended coverage 
by each of the networks but it included no mention of the massacre at My Khe 4.
61
 
There are no references either in Joseph Strick's short documentary Interviews with My 
Lai Veterans which was released in 1970 or in Kevin Sim's Four Hours in My Lai 
which appeared in 1989.
62
 Interestingly, Sim's decision to exclude the story of the 
massacre at My Khe 4 was a conscious one. An extended interview with Vo Thi Lien 
was conducted during the preparations for the film and then omitted from the final cut.
63
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 ABC News, CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, 18 January 1972, VTNA. 
59
 'Talking Paper', 29 January 1972. Subject: '"Coverup", the Seymour Hersh Articles in The New Yorker, 
Concerning Son My' in Box 6, Folder: Congressional Back up Sheets - My Lai Case, 1970-72, VWCWG, 
RAS, RG 319, NARA, College Park.   
60
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61
 Four extended reports were produced after the announcement of Calley's conviction: NBC News 
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More recently, a film called Pinkville was planned by United Artists and director Oliver 
Stone visited Son My in September 2007 'to survey the field'.
64
 According to Michael 
Fleming in Variety the film was to be about 'the Army's investigation of the My Lai 
massacre'.
65
 By the end of November 2007, however, the film company had cancelled 
the film, citing problems with the script although there was 'widespread speculation' that 
United Artists was eager to drop the film because of the failure of Lions for Lambs, a 
'war-themed' movie which it had released a few weeks before.
66
 Whether the script, by 
Mikko Alanne, contained any references to the events at My Khe 4 has not been 
reported.
67
  
 
 Oliver has written of the massacre at My Lai 4 that: 
Even as the massacre dominated public discourse, the ordeals of its victims 
became neutralized as a source of national anxiety and remorse and their 
presence ... reduced to half-remembered images of what the first newspaper to 
print them called 'A clump of bodies on a road in South Vietnam'.
68
 
 
Of the dead at My Khe 4 there were no pictures and the consequence in America's 
newspapers and on America's screens has been that the other massacre has been even 
easier to forget. 
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 'Oliver Stone Visits My Lai for New Film', The New York Times, 6 September 2007. 
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 According to the Los Angeles Times, Alanne was inspired by Stone's JFK which: 
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forgotten heroes and villains of the story … 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In a rare moment of optimism, Hamlet told himself that 'Foul deeds will rise, Though all 
the earth o'erwhelm them, to men's eyes' but it is unlikely that Fortinbras, the soldier in 
the play, would have agreed with him.
1
 Fortinbras would have known that in a war 'foul 
deeds' often go unremarked and this would probably have been the fate of the events at 
My Khe 4 had it not been for CID's investigation into the massacre at My Lai 4 and 
Peers' insistence that every lead was followed up. In the weeks following the Son My 
operation, the reports which Willingham had made on 16 March, the complaints of the 
South Vietnamese and the propaganda of the enemy did not persuade the commanders 
of the 11th Brigade and the Americal that they should make inquiries about the attack 
on My Khe 4. It might be argued that this is unsurprising because Henderson and Koster 
made no serious attempt to find out what had happened at My Lai 4 but the evidence 
suggests that it did not occur to them that there might be a second massacre to worry 
about. Like Westmoreland, they were happy to accept reports which indicated success 
and they were not alone in their failure to understand the geography of Son My and 
their conviction that what the Vietnamese had to say was of little value. In January 1970 
investigators were still puzzled by references to Co Luy and convinced that the 
Vietnamese had adopted the American names for the places in which they lived. CID 
investigators were also unimpressed by the consistency of the accounts provided by the 
Vietnamese, a consistency which was eventually rationalised as evidence of their 
unreliability. It was only Peers' determination to leave no 'single stone unturned' which 
led to the charges against Willingham and Walsh's account of the assault on My Khe 4 
in the Peers Report. 
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 William Shakespeare, Hamlet Act I Scene ii, Lines 255-256 (London: Longman, 1987). 
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The discovery that there had been a massacre at My Khe 4 did not lead to a 
conviction or even a trial but, rather than proving that the Army undermined the work of 
its investigators, this outcome underlines the obstacles faced by its prosecutors. All but 
four of the surviving members of Bravo Company's 1st Platoon were out of uniform and 
safe from prosecution.
2
 Even those who agreed to testify were unwilling to give 
evidence against their former comrades and the prosecutors' task was complicated by 
the testimony which indicated that there might have been enemy activity in or near My 
Khe 4 and the difficulty of establishing the extent to which Willingham had controlled 
the operation.
3
 The Vietnamese could assert that civilians had been killed in My Khe 4 
but they could not identify any of the killers. What was demonstrated by the massacre at 
My Khe 4, therefore, was that American soldiers in Vietnam could get away with 
murder despite the Army's efforts to find the guilty and bring them to justice.   
 
 It is one of history's ironies that, having been revealed because of the massacre 
at My Lai, the massacre at My Khe 4 has been mis-represented as a sub-plot to Charlie 
Company's exploits or, more usually, dismissed as an unimportant thread in that 
narrative. One of the reasons that the story of My Khe 4 made little impression upon the 
American people in 1970 was that the scant information which the Army released about 
the actions of Willingham's platoon encouraged reporters to ignore the distinction 
between the two massacres. This, as Walsh has indicated, was primarily to protect the 
Army's reputation but there was also a justifiable concern that prosecutors would be 
hindered by excessive pre-trial publicity. The extent to which the Army was able to 
                                                 
2
 Out of uniform or not, the men who took part in the operation in Son My seem to have had the support 
of the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. In March 1970 Mendel Rivers promised:  
 
We are not going to sit idly by and see men indicted for crimes of war when you have no Rules 
of Engagement, when the enemy is savage in treatment of prisoners of war, and where men, 
women, children – everybody is attacking their benefactors with hand grenades. 
 
Rivers cited in Greiner, p. 335.      
3
 Whether there was a grenade which failed to explode or not, the references to it were enough to suggest 
to a sympathetic jury that the platoon had come under attack. 
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control the story has been exaggerated, however.
4
 The charges against Willingham were 
reported on television and in the newspapers and it was possible, as NBC demonstrated, 
to find sources of information in South Vietnam. The events at My Khe 4 did not seize 
the attention of Americans because there were no photographs, no confessions and, 
finally, no court case. Most of the reporters who stumbled across clues to what had 
happened at My Khe 4 lacked the enthusiasm to follow a story which seemed more 
complicated and less dramatic than Calley's. Reaction to that story, moreover, suggested 
that the detailed exposure of another massacre would not be well received.
5
 Those, like 
Hersh, who have been able to draw upon sources unavailable to reporters in 1970 have 
portrayed the nature of the attack on My Khe 4 more clearly but explanation of the 
actions of Willingham's platoon has often been driven, not by the evidence, but by a 
desire to identify a common set of orders as the trigger for the killings in Son My. 
Others, dipping into the documentation of the Army's investigations into the events at 
My Khe 4, have been unable to produce an accurate account of the process which led to 
the discovery that there had been a second massacre.   
 
 What happened at My Khe 4 was different to what happened at My Lai 4. In 
each sub-hamlet unresisting non-combatants were killed but there is no evidence to 
indicate that groups of Vietnamese were gathered together for execution at My Khe 4 
and, whereas the orders received by the men of Charlie Company were at least 
susceptible to misinterpretation, the actions of Willingham's platoon were in defiance of 
the orders of the company commander. The attack on My Khe 4 was not, as Homer Hall 
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 Peers has been accused of 'suppressing evidence of another massacre' in Richard Drinnon, Facing West: 
The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 
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 A survey conducted on behalf of the Chicago Tribune in 1971 found that only 30% of those questioned 
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admitted, uncharacteristic of the platoon, however, and it is interesting to note how it 
resembles a series of attacks carried out in 1967 by 'Tiger Force'. In each unit there were 
those who assumed that the Vietnamese, irrespective of age or gender, were the enemy. 
'Tiger Force' sprayed huts with gunfire and destroyed bunkers with explosives in the 
knowledge that there were people inside them. On at least one occasion they responded 
to the death of a comrade by turning their guns on nearby villagers.
6
 There were men in 
each platoon who acted, at times, without waiting for orders and, in this respect, it 
seems that they would not have had the support of the American people. When Calley 
was found guilty of murder in 1971, a survey of public opinion concluded that 'the 
public's doubts about the justice of the Calley conviction (rested upon) the belief, voiced 
by a lopsided margin of 76 to 6 percent, that "soldiers at My Lai were only following 
orders from their higher ups."'
7
 
 
 The indiscipline of Willingham's platoon was, nevertheless, a consequence of 
policies adopted by the US Army in Vietnam. In a war in which much of the fighting 
took place in and around inhabited areas, units were judged according to the number of 
kills which they reported and soldiers received the order to 'search and destroy', only the 
strongest leadership could prevent some from crossing the line to murder. When 
Willingham's platoon approached My Khe 4, the tactic of 'recon by fire' had become a 
justification for opening fire upon anyone, anywhere and some of his men were 
accustomed to making up their own orders. To what extent Willingham tried to control 
what followed remains unclear but, with or without his approval, his platoon carried out 
a different sort of massacre in Son My.   
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 Sallah and Weiss, p. 290; p. 153; p. 269; p. 275 and pp. 149-150.  
7
 Harris Survey, date of release 5 April 1971. 
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